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ABSTRACT 
COPTIC ETHNOPOLITICAL MOBILIZATION ON THE ROAD TO AND BEYOND 
THE JANUARY 25 REVOLUTION 
 
Gökpınar, Ali Zeynel 
MA, Department of Modern Turkish Studies 
Supervisor: Assistant Prof. Talha Kose 
August 2012, 112 pages 
This study examines why and how the Copts of Egypt mobilized in the last seven years, 
2005-2012. To discuss the reasons behind the mobilization and its extent, this study 
integrates Harff and Gurr‟s (2004) ethnopolitical mobilization framework and Fox‟s 
(2002) ethnoreligious conflict model. This study critically approaches both models, 
supplements them with relevant variables when necessary and employs field research 
data to analyze the issue in depth and offer an analytical perspective. The relationship 
between the majority Muslim community and Coptic community is decoded under the 
light of the neo-millet system while special attention has been paid to the entente 
between the Egyptian state and Coptic Orthodox Church. Research findings suggest that 
Coptic mobilization was part of the broader Egyptian mobilization and socio-economic 
and religious grievances played a significant role between 2005-2010. Nevertheless, 
after the January 25 Revolution Coptic ethnopolitical mobilization transformed and 
Coptic ethnopolitical movements challenged the Church on non-religious grounds and 
the state by actively demanding their political and religious rights, in contrast to pre-
2005. 
Key words: Coptic ethnopolitical mobilization, January 25 Revolution, socio-economic 
and religious grievances, Maspero Youth Union  
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     ÖZ 
25 OCAK MISIR DEVRİMİNE GİDEN YOLDA VE ÖTESİNDE KIPTİ 
ETNOPOLİTİK MOBİLİZASYONU 
 
   Gökpınar, Ali Zeynel 
 MA, Modern Türkiye Çalışmaları Bölümü 
 Tez Yöneticisi:  Yar. Doç.Dr. Talha Kose  
   Ağustos 2012, 112 sayfa 
Bu çalışma Mısır‟dakı Kıpti cemaatinin etnopolitik mobilizasyonunun nedenlerini ve bu 
mobilizasyonun nasıl gerçekleştigini incelemektedir. Etnopolitik mobilizasyonun 
sebeplerini ve boyutunu irdelemek için Harff ve Gurr‟ün (2004) etnopolitik 
mobilizasyon modeli ile Fox‟un (2002) etno-dinsel mobilizasyon modelini birbirine 
entegre etmektedir. Bu çalışma her iki modele de eleştirel yaklaşmakta ve gerektiğinde 
bu modellere ilgili değişkenleri eklemekte ve konuyu derinlemesine analiz etmek ve 
analitik bir bakış sunabilmek için alan araştırmasında toplanan verileri kullanmaktadır. 
Müslüman çoğunluk ile Kıptiler arasındakı ilişkiler neo-millet sistemi ışığında 
sorgulanırken ve Kıpti Ortodoks Kilisesi ile Mısır devleti arasındaki anlaşma Kıptilerin 
mobilizasyonuna etkisi bağlamında tartışılmaktadır. Araştırma sonuçları  2005-2010 
yılları arasında Kıpti mobilizasyonunun Mısır‟daki genel mobilizasyonun bir parçası 
olduğunu ve sosyo-ekonomik ve dini mağduriyetlerin bu süreçte önemli bir  rol 
oynadığını göstermektedir. Bununla beraber, 2011‟deki 25 Ocak Devriminden sonra 
Kıpti mobilizasyonu dönüşmüş ve Kıpti etnopolitik hareketler, 2005 öncesi dönemin 
aksine, Kilise‟yi dini olmayan zeminlerde Mısır devletini de dini ve siyasi haklarını aktif 
bir şekilde arayarak zorlamışlardır. 
Anahtar kelimeler: Kıpti etnopolitik mobilizasyonu, 25 Ocak Devrimi, sosyo-ekonomik 
ve dini mağduriyetler, Maspero Gençlik Birliği 
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Chapter 1  Introduction 
Much has been written on the history of Eastern Christianity and Christians. Western travelers 
and missionaries have written extensively on their experiences among the Copts who have been 
considered the sons of Pharaohs. While these writings point to persecution of the Copts under 
Muslim rule, Muslim authors usually portray Muslim-Coptic relations as peaceful and 
harmonious. These characterizations make one to wonder which account is true and to question 
why the Copts do not revolt if they were persecuted or deny these accounts if they really lived 
peacefully with their Muslim fellows. Finding an answer to the first part of this question is the 
task of historians. The second part, however, requires extensive research on coexistence and 
conflict between both communities. Studying the Copts as a minority brings the often-
mentioned persecution and victimization accounts together. Why did the Copts not mobilize or 
revolt? More importantly, why did the Copts mobilize recently? This study looks into one of 
those rare moments where the Copts mobilized. 
1.1 Rationale, Relevance of Research and the Puzzle 
Despite the growing body of literature on the Copts, our understanding of the Copts remains 
limited as scholarship focuses on so called sectarian relations and does not treat the Copts as a 
political actor but as dhimmis party to the neo-millet system. Why were the Copts not 
considered as a political actor? In order to fill the gap in the literature and for a sound analysis, 
this study treats the Copts as a political actor instead of understanding the community as a 
persecuted minority. This study‟s objective is to discuss the ethnopolitical mobilization of the 
Coptic community in the last seven years and analyze the reasons behind the mobilization in an 
analytical framework. The relevance and importance of this study stems not only from its 
attempt to address an understudied topic in the literature but also because of its  new 
perspective on why the Copts mobilized in the last seven years but not 1980s or 1990s. 
This study‟s main puzzle is “Why and how did the Copts mobilize from 2005 to 2012?”  While 
this is the fundamental research question this study addresses, it also questions the role of 
religion, institutions, and socio-economic developments in the mobilization process. The 
fundamental identity marker between the Muslims and Copts is religion that is believed to be 
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the major sources of the conflicts. In order to deconstruct this phenomenon, this study examines 
the role of religion in the mobilization process with special attention if religion and religion-
related issues facilitated or blocked mobilization. Another sub-question is how did religious and 
state institutions respond to the mobilization process? Discussing this sub-question will reveal 
the ambivalent role of these institutions and contribute to the literature that often considers such 
institutions as either facilitators or blockers of mobilization.  
 
1.2 Methodology and Control of the Data 
This study‟s objective is not only to show what is unknown and test of ethnopolitical and 
ethnoreligious models, but also to delve into the world of a complicated and contentious issue. 
When political scientists cannot use statistics either because they do not exist or their validity is 
suspected as a result of “politics of numbers”, research has to be done qualitatively. Therefore, 
this study employed a methodology combining literature review on Copts and Egypt and field 
research to interview Coptic people and collected data available only locally. I interviewed 
Coptic people (24) randomly but was selective about people‟s age range, sex, occupation, and 
educational level in order to keep the data I gather unbiased and not influenced by patterns 
specific to the participants. This study‟s qualitative research data was based on representative 
interview sampling that allowed me to ask open-ended questions to my interviewees. By doing 
so, I had the opportunity to understand how ordinary Coptic people make sense of social and 
political developments within and outside of the community. Questioning the relationship 
between the Church and the parishes, ordinary Copts‟ protest against the regime and the 
patterns and strategies of different protest types revealed the extent of and how the Copts have 
been mobilized.  Overall, this study concurs with Creswell‟s (2008) propositions on how to 
make use of representative sampling and in depth interviews. 
Pursuing field research in Egypt was a challenging but enjoyable task as it was difficult to get 
in touch with people since the Coptic issue is untouchable and makes people fear to speak. 
Therefore, I established different connections through university professors, friends, and Yunus 
Emre Institute‟s contacts and met people where they felt safe to speak such as cafes serving 
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mostly Western tourists in Zamalek, bookstores, or the campuses of Cairo University and 
American University in Cairo. Furthermore, I ensured my interviewees that I would use only 
their names‟ abbreviations that helped me to build a trustful relationship and make sure that no 
external factors influenced the interviews.  
Analysis of the data was another challenge, as it had to be controlled for validity. To check its 
validity, this study reclassified the data gathered in the field and reread it to find out if there 
were any inconsistencies and irrelevant points. Then, I critically approached the existing 
literature in general and media reports and discussed this data by decoding my interviewees‟ 
stories. Research findings showed consistency and allowed me to find support from different 
sources.  
1.3 Content 
The second chapter of this study summarizes Harff and Gurr‟s (2004) ethnopolitical and Fox‟s 
(2002) ethnoreligious frameworks by outlining them in a way to operationalize the theories for 
a more argumentative and analytic discussion. First, these frameworks are critically approached 
and their consistency and validity is examined. Harff and Gurr‟s ethnopolitical framework 
presents a general model to assess why and how ethnic groups mobilize and what kind of 
factors influence this process. Inequality and discrimination experienced in different areas such 
as politics, economy, and social life cause grievances and these grievances may result in 
mobilization. Second, this framework does not address religion‟s role in such mobilization 
process and therefore needs to be combined with Fox‟s (2002) ethnoreligious conflict 
framework that examines the role of religion, religious institutes, and religious matters as 
variables in a mobilization process. By incorporating these two models this study intends to 
avoid two things: an analysis based only on politics and economics on the one hand and another 
based only on religion. Last but not least, after discussing the strengths and weaknesses of both 
models, the scene is framed and additional variables are added. 
The third chapter discusses the history of the Copts with a special focus on the community‟s 
relationship with the Muslim majority. First, the literature on the subject is explored and 
relevancy of this project is discussed with an emphasis on what is already achieved in the 
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literature and why this project is necessary. Second, I delve into the history of inter-communal 
relations with the objective of identifying historical sources of conflict, instead of summarizing 
the relationship. Further, this chapter points to continuities and ruptures inter-communal 
relations. The coexistence of the Copts and Muslims is assessed in the background and the 
impact of modernization and nationalism processes are analyzed in parallel. While the common 
wisdom on Coptic-Muslim relations considers the 1970s as the crystallization of inter-
communal (for many sectarian) conflict, relying on recent scholarship this study finds that the 
conflict in the Egyptian nation state dates back to the foundation of contemporary Egypt. The 
entente between the Church and the state apparatus is analyzed in depth as it is the main 
determinant of conflict, cooperation, and possible mobilization. Third, another contribution of 
this study is to investigate intra-communal conflict within the Coptic community that may 
decrease the likelihood of group cohesion and mobilization. Finally, this study questions if this 
conflict is sectarian as it is labeled by the literature or inter-communal, as this study prefers to 
put it. 
The fourth chapter of this study presents its research findings and discusses these findings by 
applying them to Harff and Gurr‟s and Fox‟s models. First, the ethnopolitical framework is 
discussed by considering every variable to measure the level of mobilization from 2005 to 
2012. Then, the causes and extent of Coptic mobilization is analyzed in two periods: 2005-2010 
and 2011-2012. The first period reveals how changing institutional design, involvement of new 
actors in long lasting relationship, and the increasing discontent in the broader Egyptian society 
influence Coptic mobilization. A reflection of this discontent and dire poverty and 
unemployment with the increasing publicity of religion is the escalating level of violence 
against the Copts. After the January 25
th
 Revolution, one expects the targeting of the Copts, as 
the Revolution was achieved in cooperation. However, insecurity and inefficient state capacity 
caused further violence that led the Copts to enter streets without their Muslim fellows in 
contrast to pre-Revolution era. This period shows that Coptic ethnopolitical movements start to 
challenge not only national government but also the Coptic Orthodox Church and its leadership. 
While the Revolution‟s impact on the Copts was negative, since they experienced official 
discrimination and violence, Maspero being the ultimate example, the Revolution influenced 
Coptic mobilization positively, as they started to actively demand their rights. In sum, the 
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research findings discuss to what extent Harff and Gurr‟s and Fox‟s models explain Coptic 
mobilization and point to contradictions or weaknesses of these models. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 2  Theoretical Background  
Why and how do ethnic and religious groups mobilize?  What contributes to ethnic and/or 
ethnoreligious mobilization? Students of political science have long been seeking answers to 
these questions. A prominent attempt is Harff and Gurr‟s ethnopolitical mobilization model.  
This model is based on quantitative and qualitative data gathered in the Minorities at Risk 
Project (MAR), which was initiated by the second author in 1986.  MAR examines 
ethnopolitical groups, and non-state communal groups that have political importance in the 20
th
 
century and includes data on 283 groups‟ grievances and mobilization processes. 
This study uses Harff and Gurr‟s ethnopolitical mobilization framework to discuss the 
mobilization of the Copts and the relationship among the Egyptian state, the Coptic minority, 
and the Muslim majority. Nevertheless, some concepts should be clarified for the sake of this 
study before discussing the theoretical framework. In the context of this discussion, 
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ethnopolitical conflict refers to those conflicts that are between a national or minority group and 
the state (Harff & Gurr, 2004). In such situations, national or minority groups have claims 
against the state such as autonomy, use of ethno-national languages, religions, or improvement 
of political and social rights. By authoritarian regime, I mean competitive authoritarian regimes 
in which economic liberalization and the façade free elections are  significant tools of the state 
apparatus to maintain its power-both on minority and majority groups (Blaydes, 2011; Levitsky 
& Way, 2010). By religious “violence”, I refer to those events, which are aimed at destroying 
the sacred places of the Copts and used violence against a “group” of Copts in order to harm 
them.  
Harff and Gurr‟s ethnopolitical mobilization model questions “why and how do  ethnic groups 
mobilize and enter into open conflict with the governments that claim to rule them” (Harff & 
Gurr, 2004). Harff and Gurr build their model on earlier versions of Ted Gurr‟s basic model on 
relative deprivation   and ethnic conflict. According to the Relative Deprivation concept, which 
is “the perceived discrepancy between men‟s value expectations and their value capabilities”, 
discontent arises as a result of group comparison regarding new modes of life, status, and 
expected improvements (Gurr, 1971; 2011, p. 24). Discontent seems to be the most basic factor 
in kindling the mobilization processes. The second step is the politicization of the discontent 
actualizes in violent means against political objects and actors in the third step (Gurr, 1971; 
2011). Politicization of discontent, depending upon intensity and magnitude, may appear in 
different forms of protest and rebellion. Violence may be observed in the last phase as a result 
of unsatisfied demands (Gurr, 1993, 1994, 2000; Harff & Gurr, 2004; Olzak, 1998). However, 
that does not necessarıly mean so, since there is evidence showing violence could be observed 
in the transformation process from the third phase to the fourth. 
The basic ethnic conflict model which follows the casual sequence in the abovementioned 
framework can be explained as follows: „„discrimination against an ethnic minority form 
grievances [my emphasis]; these grievances cause an ethnic group to mobilize; finally 
mobilized ethnic groups are more likely to take part in ethnic conflict in the form of protest and 
rebellion‟‟(Fox, 2003). This sequence is more complicated than the above sequence and will be 
explored below. 
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2.1 Ethnopolitical Mobilization 
Harff and Gurr propose seven concepts in a systematic way to explain what contributes to 
ethnic mobilization and how. 
The first concept is discrimination in which they mean the inequalities the group members face 
in the political and social arena in comparison with other groups. An ethnic group is based on 
shared traits such as blood, language, culture, religion, and territory that mark the identity of 
group members. According to Harff and Gurr (2004), people resent and react against 
discriminatory treatment. This is because groups make comparisons of relative worth or rights 
based on their experiences (Horowitz, 1985). Nevertheless, their resentment and reactions may 
be constructive or destructive and sometimes apathetic. While some people try to overcome 
discrimination by channeling their energies to be successful, others may emigrate to avoid 
discrimination or challenge the political actors, or institutions which cause their resentment. 
Harff and Gurr (2004) propose that when people with a shared ethnic identity are discriminated 
against, it is likely that these people will react and organize as the degree of discrimination 
increases. 
Discrimination can be sketched in different fields such as politics, economics, and culture.  As a 
variable, discrimination can be traced in the abovementioned fields with low, medium and high 
levels.  While government policies that treat ethnic groups unequally are the most obvious 
indicators of discrimination, some other forms of inequalities may be a result of historical 
discrimination or economic and cultural differences that give other groups advantages (Gurr, 
2000; Harff & Gurr, 2004). They argue that the below principles are indicators of political and 
economic discrimination: 
a) Public policies that limit the group‟s participation in politics and access to political office (high)  
b) Low participation in politics compared with other groups in the society (medium) 
c) Proportionally few group members in elective offices in commercial, managerial or professional 
positions (medium) 
d) Public policies that restrict the economic activities or roles of group members (high) 
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e) Limited group access to education, especially higher education (high) 
f) Low income, poor housing and high infant mortality rates compared with other groups in the 
society (medium) 
g) Proportionally few group members in commercial, managerial or professional positions 
(medium) (Harff & Gurr, 2004, p. 108) 
However, Harff and Gurr seldom mention cultural discrimination, and do not specify what the 
indicators of the cultural discrimination are in their book‟s last version. Cultural differences are 
always important but they become more significant if ethnicity is not a marking factor. Gurr 
discusses cultural discrimination in an earlier study and mentions various aspects of cultural 
discrimination. Restrictions on customs, expression of traditions and values, practices related to 
a religion and behaviors are some but not all indicators of cultural discrimination. Nevertheless, 
one should also keep in mind that not all such practices are imposed by public policy though 
public restrictions and discrimination are the most important ones. In Peoples versus States, 
Gurr mentions the following as the most observed restrictions under the title of indicators of 
cultural discrimination, -their severity ranges from 0 to 3, (3 being the most severe restriction), 
in the Minorities at Risk study (Gurr, 2000, p. 44): 
a) Restrictions on observance of the group religion(s) 
b) Restrictions on speaking or publishing in the group‟s language or dialect 
c) Restrictions on instruction in the group‟s language 
d) Restrictions on celebration of group holidays, ceremonies, cultural events 
e) Restrictions on dress, appearance, behavior 
f) Restrictions on marriage or family life 
g) Restrictions on organizations promoting group‟s cultural interests. 
Nonetheless, one should also be aware of the following points; firstly, although some 
restrictions are not imposed by public policy but by some different social groups which see 
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themselves as the majority or superior, it is the state that should protect and promote the rights 
of the minorities
1
.  Also, cultural factors  are always important for different social groups, be 
they ethnic, religious, or communal groups, however cultural aspects and discrimination 
become more remarkable as a cementing factor in non-ethnic groups (Nisbett & Cohen, 1996). 
However, Gurr focuses on the salience of ethno-cultural identity to draw the multi-dimensional 
aspects of mobilization process rather than finding out „„what really motivates the leaders and 
members of such groups…‟‟(Gurr, 2000). Lastly, the impact of the cultural discrimination may 
reach a significant point that does not necessarily mean material interests may trigger collective 
reaction. Harff and Gurr do not provide a decisive direction where the grievances lead but try to 
draw the fundamental points. 
The second concept in the ethnopolitical mobilization model is ethnic group identity that 
intensifies discontent and encourages people to take action since it helps people to find 
individuals in the same group who suffer from the same grievances. Finding like-minded 
people with similar grievances direct group members to take action and organize which may 
challenge the conflicting party. Harff and Gurr propose „„the more strongly a person with an 
ethnic group that is subject to discrimination, the more likely he or she is to be motivated into 
action‟‟(Harff & Gurr, 2004, p. 109). The salience of ethnocultural identity is a significant 
factor in this process since it helps people to differentiate from and compare with other people 
and thus  strengthening the identity in the discriminatory process (Gurr, 2000).  In addition, it is 
important to measure the strength of group identity since this variable shows us to what extent 
the individuals act in accordance with the group interests. The second proposition of Harff and 
Gurr (2004) is that the more the shared traits such as culture, common history, and religion, the 
greater the strength of group identity. The below points are used to measure strength of group 
identity (Harff & Gurr, 2004, p. 109): 
a) The extent to which they share and use a common language (high) 
                                                 
1
 While inter-communal and governmental discrimination are two different concepts and have different dynamics, sometimes 
they overlap and it is difficult to differentiate between them. Theoretically, states deny such policies but in practice one can 
trace such activities that are usually welcomed by the majority. 
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b) The proportion of people who share a common religious belief (high,-if used for religious 
groups, otherwise medium) 
c) Visible racial characteristics (high) 
d) A shared history over one hundred years (medium) 
e) A common culture (low) 
Group identity may be strong due to the perceived and experienced discrimination. 
Nonetheless, one should ask what factors strengthen the group identity more and contribute to 
collective action of the group.   
Harff and Gurr (2004) refer to the concept of cohesion of the group, the third concept, which 
shows us the unity and strength of leaders and the networks of communication that link leaders 
with followers. This concept is important since ethnopolitical entrepreneurs have the ability to 
subordinate individual preferences to group preferences.  
According to Harff and Gurr (2004), group cohesion increases if group members live in the 
same geographical area, widely accept their leaders‟ position and the established order within 
the group. While identity markers like race and blood are significant factors in group cohesion, 
religion is also a very strong source of group cohesion if its power is not removed by 
secularism (Gurr, 2000).  Nevertheless, religion can also play a significant role in response to 
secularism. 
One point Harff and Gurr observed during their research is group cohesion decreases if the 
leadership and the group are more democratic rather than being autocratic. That means there 
may be some factions that challenge each other, have disputes and weaken the loyalty to the 
group. In addition, according to Harff and Gurr, autocratic leaders may mobilize their groups 
better than others because democracy emphasizes individual rights whereas autocratic leaders 
seek group interests. The below factors are used to indicate group cohesion (Gurr, 2000; Gurr 
& Moore, 1997; Harff & Gurr, 2004, p. 109): 
a) Degree of acceptance of established social order within the group (high) 
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b) Extent of acceptance of a common belief within the group (high) 
c) Number of the factions within the group (high) 
d) Extent of open conflict within the group (high) 
e) Number of identifiable leaders within the group (medium) 
f) Degree of acceptance of traditional roles of leaders (medium) 
g) Number of newspapers and radio stations used by the group (medium) 
Although these factors are significant indicators, it is important to recognize that not all 
autocratic leaders are successful or willing to channel individual interests to group interests and 
in some cases, autocratic leaders may themselves exacerbate and weaken group cohesion. In 
addition, in countries where political transition is observed different factions may challenge 
traditional autocratic leadership by opening alternative channels to present grievances that do 
not necessarily mean weakening group cohesion. These points will be explored in depth in the 
discussion section of this study. 
The fourth concept, political environment, refers to the regime type of a certain state. As it is 
known, in democratic countries basic rights are provided (at least expected) to the people 
whether they are from the majority or the minority. That means individuals that compose 
various groups have equality before the law, full political and civil rights, which is a sign of 
non-discrimination. Even if there is discrimination, having such rights allow groups to protest 
without using violence. However, in autocratic countries minority groups usually do not have 
such rights and cannot express their discontent since autocracies usually repress political 
activities against their governments (Gurr & Moore, 1997; Harff & Gurr, 2004; Tilly, 1978). 
While unexpressed discontent usually causes grievances to deepen, it is likely the state will 
repress protesting groups either by violence or cooptation (Gurr, 1993, 2000; Gurr & Moore, 
1997; Harff & Gurr, 2004). Some democratic states respond with accommodation but that does 
not mean the grievances of certain groups are solved. Nevertheless, challengers respond with 
rebellion if political authorities use violence(Harff & Gurr, 2004).  Use of violence is generally 
observed in autocratic regimes where state mechanisms accommodate a wide range of 
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suppression tools. According to Harff and Gurr (2004, p.110) the following are indicators of 
institutionalized autocracies: 
a) Concentrate most or all power in the executive (high) 
b) Restriction or ban on political parties, and sharp limits on civil rights and political participation 
(high) 
c) Political power usually transferred and distributed among members of a tiny political elite 
(medium) 
In addition, one should also consider that not all autocratic regimes use violent means of power 
against minorities or social groups but they may employ other measures like threatening not to 
protest. Furthermore, mobilization does not only depend on autocratic regimes‟ use of violence 
but also on group leaders‟ ability and willingness to mobilize or hold the group. It is well 
known that ethnopolitical leaders may use historical memories, past victimization, and fear of 
future losses (Gurr, 2000). But this begs the question when do the ethnopolitical leaders and 
ethnopolitical groups respond with rebellion? 
Harff and Gurr (2004) assume that the challengers will respond with open rebellion if the 
likelihood of the political authorities‟ use of violence increases.  In contrast, the authors observe 
that  if state authorities use extreme force like massacres, torture and genocide, the challengers 
will not challenge openly  because of  either their inability to organize in such cases or their 
fear since they witnessed what happened to others (Harff, 1987; Harff & Gurr, 2004).  In such 
cases the severity of violence used by governments has a great significance since the decision 
to react depends on this variable. The means used to oppress the challengers and their indicators 
are as follows (Harff & Gurr, 2004, p. 111): 
a) Political mass murder and genocide (high) 
b) Massacres (high) 
c) Widespread torture and executions (medium) 
d) Forcible relocation of group members (medium) 
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e) Number of arrests (low) 
Nevertheless, behaviors and mobilization of ethnopolitical groups do not remain the same all 
the time. Changes within group and in politics of the country affect behaviors of ethnopolitical 
groups. In transitional periods the mobilization of the groups can change due to the security and 
instability issues which may create fruitful opportunities for the groups (Gurr, 2000; Gurr & 
Moore, 1998). This proposition found support from different studies examining transitional 
societies and politics (Fearon & Laitin, 2000; Roeder, 1991). This point will be highlighted in 
my analysis since the recent revolution in Egypt caused significant behavioral changes in the 
mobilization of the Copts. 
On the other hand, one should question if ethnopolitical groups are only influenced by internal 
political processes. This question also reminds readers whether such groups seek outside 
support. Obviously, many ethnopolitical groups seek support from international powers or their 
fellows‟ organizations abroad. On the other hand, the economic status (locally and 
internationally) of a country is significant factor that influences the extent and content of 
external support. 
Accordingly, the last two concepts are external support and economic status. Although many 
ethnic groups pursue their policies according to internal political processes, some groups seek 
external support in their struggle against the state. The below factors are the indicators  of 
external support (Harff & Gurr, 2004, p. 111): 
a) Weaponry and supplies (high) 
b) Mercenaries and military advisers (high) 
c) Provisions of safe havens for exiles and refugees (high) 
d) Provision of intelligence information (medium) 
e) Financial support (medium) 
f) Verbal encouragement and support (low) 
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The states that enjoy an abundance of resources are more likely to get the support of the 
international community.  Harff and Gurr also argue that these states experience less foreign 
intervention compared to others that have fewer resources. Therefore, these authors argue that 
the greater international status attributed to a country, the less likely the challenger will find 
external support. High economic status is attributed to states that possess the following aspects 
(Harff & Gurr, 2004, pp. 111-112): 
a) Rank high in gross domestic product and gross national product (high) 
b) Control large reserves of scarce resources (medium) 
c) Control a high percentage of the global trade of valuable commodities (medium) 
d) Have a high level of per capita income (medium) 
e) Have a global network of trading partners (medium) 
f) Proportion of people with advanced degrees (low) 
 
Figure 1. Ethnopolitical Mobilization Framework 
4.Type of Political Environment 5.Severity of Governmental Violence
1.Degree of Group Discrimination
2.Strength of Group Identity Strategies and Extent of Political Action 7.International Status of Regime
3.Degree of Ethnic Group Cohesion 6.Extent of External Support for Minorities  
 
2.1.1 Overview of the Model 
2.1.2 Strengths and Weaknesses of Ethnopolitical Model 
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Harff and Gurr‟s ethnopolitical model aims at finding out what factors contribute to 
ethnopolitical mobilization, and why and how ethnic and communal groups mobilize and use 
violence (if any). Their model incorporates various factors such as the salience of communal 
identity, cohesion of the group, communal leadership and the political environment and shared 
group incentives  that results in a significant contribution to the literature (Scanlan, 2001). 
Furthermore, this model tests the mobilization process with a large-n study that provides 
empirical and theoretical material to researchers.  
However, although different students of political science have proved  the explanatory power of 
this model (Fox, 2002; Saideman, 2002; Saxton, 2005; Shaykhutdinov & Bragg, 2011), some 
problems with  this model, which are mostly a result of a large-n study, should be pointed out. 
Firstly and most importantly, though Gurr emphasizes the importance of culture and religion in 
his earlier works, he does not provide an extensive discussion of these catalysts in any of his 
works and seem to be underestimating these factors in his newer work. He argues that religion 
is rarely the root cause of conflict (Gurr, 1993). Furthermore,  this model does not include 
different aspects of   general conflict theory (Fox, 2002).  Last but not least, despite Gurr‟s 
statement that this model could be used for analyzing inter-communal relations, this model is 
designed to analyze the mobilization of ethnic and communal groups  against the states (Gurr, 
2000). For example, while this model looks at the Coptic minority in Egypt, it does not include 
any evaluation of the relations between the Islamic groups and the Copts. This situation is a 
result of the Copts‟ religiously distinct ethnic minority position while the Islamic groups belong 
to the Muslim majority. 
The strength of Harff and Gurr‟s model stems from its explanatory power for ethnic and 
religious mobilization, which overlaps with the Egyptian context to a certain extent. In addition, 
Harff and Gurr (2004) encourage scholars to add other variables if necessary. This model can 
be used in this study, which will discuss the state and Muslim majority‟s discrimination against 
the Copts of Egypt, if it is also integrated with the ethnoreligious conflict model of Jonathan 
Fox. This integration is necessary since “religion” is a key variable in the Egyptian context. 
Furthermore, the integrated model provides a better understanding of the issue, as it considers 
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communal groups relations (ethnoreligious in the Egyptian context) and ethnoreligious and 
ethno-secular causes of the conflict. This model is discussed in the following pages. 
2.2 Ethnoreligious Conflict Model 
Though there are different approaches to the study of religion and its role in the contemporary 
world, it is more important for this study to discuss the social functions of the religion in 
relation with conflict. In his extensive research, Jonathan Fox (2002) finds four fundamental 
social functions of religion that influence people‟s understanding and making sense of the 
world. From these functions he draws six hypothesizes and integrates Minorities at Risk data 
with his findings. 
First, religion provides a meaningful framework for understanding the world, offers solutions to 
human needs including a secure identity. Second, religious frameworks provide guiding 
instructions, and principles that allow people to arrange their behaviors. Nevertheless, this 
means that different religious groups will opt to implement their religious code of conducts that 
may cause conflict. Third, religion can also operate “as a link between the individual and the 
greater whole and provider of formal institutions which define and organize that whole” (Fox, 
2002). Followers of religions usually build formal institutions to organize and manage their 
relationships within the group and with the external world. The current scholarship finds  
cogent empirical evidence that show religious institutes either facilitate mobilization or support 
status quo and hinder conflicts- but religious institutions‟ role is not limited to these points 
(Fox, 2002; Gurr, 1993; Marty & Appleby, 1993; Sahliyeh, 1990). But the key issue here is the 
elites‟ interests and motivations. 
Fourth, religion has the ability to provide the necessary means of legitimization of actions and 
institutions. Last, it is important to note that there are two overlapping points between the first 
two and the last two social functions of religion: (1) conflicts involving the defense and 
frameworks of religion naturally has religious legitimacy and (2) conflicts that start with non-
religious  issues but use religious legitimacy can be transformed into religious conflicts(Fox, 
2002). For example, the conflict between the FLN of Algeria and the fundamentalists stemmed 
from economic reasons but transformed to a religious one. 
   
17 
 
Fox (2002) surmises six hypotheses that stem from his propositions regarding the relationship 
between the social functions of religion and conflict. These hypotheses are integrated into the 
Minorities at Risk model and elaborated below. 
The first hypothesis is states that  “religious discrimination, whatever its cause, is likely to 
result in the formation of religious grievances within the ethnic group suffering from this 
religious discrimination” (Fox, 2002, p. 154). Obviously, as this study showed above while 
discussing Harff and Gurr‟s model, individuals, people and groups react and show resentment 
against discrimination. Fox provides persuasive evidence that religious grievances increase as 
religious discrimination is more experienced.  He shows that religious grievances in post-USSR 
period mostly derived from religious discrimination and as the level of the discrimination 
increased, the grievances expressed rose. Along with this example, the example of Naga people 
of India show that religious grievances may be overshadowed under political and economic 
discrimination but, in time, it may be expressed strongly. Overall, religious grievances can be 
felt not only at the time of occurrence time but also long after the discrimination. In addition, 
fears that religious discrimination will occur again may strengthen the religious grievances
2
. 
The second hypothesis simply predicts that „„religious grievances are likely to result in the 
mobilization for protest and rebellion as well as directly causing protest and rebellion among 
the ethnic group which has formed these grievances‟‟(Fox, 2002, p. 156). However, the case is 
not that simple because while some grievances are active others may be passive or unaddressed. 
Fox, examining 105 ethnoreligious groups‟ grievances found that mobilization increases as the 
number and/or level of active grievances experienced whereas passive grievances contradict 
this point and reduce the number of protests. 
The third hypothesis argues that “provocative actions by a minority religious ethnic group are 
likely to provoke a negative reaction from the dominant ethnic group. This negative action can 
include religious, social, political and/or economic discrimination as well as other forms 
                                                 
2
 Fear is usually attributed to the “grief” theory that assesses such issues from the perspective of psychology. I will not 
discuss such processes in this study, as my focus will be on mobilization rather than psychology of different communities. 
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oppression” (Fox, 2002, p. 163).  Clearly, the majority group is expected to take a defensive 
position that will probably result in discrimination in different spheres. In the same vein, Fox 
finds that discrimination in every field rises considerably as the religious grievances expressed 
actively. On the other hand, many other grievances are expressed in religious terms and groups 
use these grievances under religious labels. This is so because while minority groups see it 
more operational the majority groups respond with more discrimination since they feel their 
religious frameworks are threatened. Such examples are Arabs of Israel, Palestinians of West 
Bank and the Shiites of Lebanon. 
The fourth hypothesis states that “the presence of established religious institutions can facilitate 
mobilization for protest and rebellion regardless of the more basic causes of that mobilization 
unless the elites in control of these institutions  have an interest in supporting the status quo” 
(Fox, 2002, p. 165). But the issue is here when and how elites mobilize their groups or support 
the status quo.  According to Fox (2002, 2003), religious institutions and elites usually support 
two types of mobilization: 1) peaceful mobilization and 2) mobilization for rebellion. In the 
peaceful mobilization processes, institutions usually pursue group interests by legal means such 
as lobbying, and peaceful protest. On the other hand, in mobilization for rebellion there are 
organizations that use violence for seeking their objectives. Furthermore,  the study of 105 
ethnoreligious groups  shows that religious elites  show their support to the status quo through 
religious institutions when there is no or low level of threat to the religion. However, when 
religion is perceived to be at risk the elites protest but do not mobilize groups for rebellion 
unless their autonomy is threatened. 
The fifth hypothesis theorizes that “the use of religious legitimacy can facilitate the growth of 
economic, political and social grievances as well as mobilization, regardless of the basic causes 
of that mobilization, unless the elites who have an influence over the use of religious legitimacy  
have an interest in supporting the status quo”(Fox, 2002, p. 171).  There is clear evidence that 
shows religious legitimacy facilitates non-religious grievances when religion is not relevant to 
the conflict but hinders them if religion is at stake.  When religion is relevant to a conflict then, 
religious issues become more discussed and the focus stays on religion. Fox finds that when 
religious issues are not relevant, as the causes of nonreligious grievances rise peaceful 
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mobilization increase. There is no direct and clear relationship between religious legitimacy and 
mobilization for rebellion unless „autonomy‟ is a significant variable in the conflict. 
The sixth and the last hypothesis predicts that “the presence of religious discrimination and 
disadvantages is likely to cause an increase in the levels of group identity and cohesion among 
the group which suffers from these disadvantages and discrimination” (Fox, 2002, p. 176). 
However, Fox finds that if there are other types of discrimination like political, economic or 
cultural, the group cohesion does not increase but rather decreases. This begs the question why 
it is so. This question will be answered in the following pages in relation with the Copts. On the 
other hand, if religious discrimination is the only issue, according to Fox, the group cohesion 
increases significantly. That shows us the power of religion as a cementing but complex factor. 
 
 
2.2.1 The Strengths and Weaknesses of Ethnoreligious Conflict Model  
Fox‟s study sheds light on the relationship between social functions of religion and conflicts. 
His model has been acclaimed by Robert T. Gurr and Scott Appleby since this study affirms 
previous studies‟ results (those of Harff and Gurr) and fills a significant gap in the literature3.  
This study‟s strength does not stem only from these points but also it provides a general 
framework that can be applied to different cases in different contexts. The study successfully 
shows that non-religious grievances can be voiced as religious and religious grievances may be 
overshadowed by other means of grievances as it traces different examples from different 
contexts. As Pace noted, this study also shows us how religion can operate like ethnos which 
produces and reproduces individual and social group identities (Pace, 2005). It is also important 
to note that this study is more interested in ethnoreligious communal groups rather than those 
identified as radical or jihadist groups. Last but not least, religious institutions‟ role in conflicts 
                                                 
3
 Both scholars‟ comments can be found on the back cover of Fox‟s “Ethnoreligious Conflict in the Late Twentieth Century” 
(Fox, 2002). 
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is sometimes not discussed enough. This study shows us that these institutions may use various 
strategies in mobilization and usually decide according to the threats posed to the religion not to 
the community.  
In contrast to the abovementioned positive aspects of this theory, there are also some criticisms. 
First, this work is a product of a large-n study and the overall trend may not apply to each case. 
Second, as Zubricyki noted in her harsh criticism, Fox does not distinguish cases whether they 
are based on theological grounds or fundamentalist means (Zubrzycki, 2004). However, it is 
difficult to categorize and treat each case differently since the study includes 105 ethnoreligious 
communal groups. These differences can be studied in case studies supported by theoretical and 
empirical data. Also, Fox considers the role of religious institutions only positive or negative 
whereas this study reveals that ambivalent approaches are also possible. Fox studies religious 
institutions as monolithic structures, usually led by a powerful priest. However, religious 
institutions can accommodate different currents that have different perspectives, not necessarily 
on religion and religious practices. Nevertheless, both Harff and Gurr‟s and Fox‟s models 
provide the necessary theoretical framework to study this thesis topic. 
So far, I explained the theoretical framework of this study. Now, I will identify the parties of 
the conflict and set the discussion of this thesis. 
2.3. Setting the Scene 
2.3.1 Parties to the Conflict 
This study discusses the conflict between the Egyptian state, the Copts and the Muslim 
majority.  The first party to this conflict is the Egyptian state apparatus. The Egyptian state and 
its approach to the Coptic community will be analyzed at institutional level. The Egyptian state 
operates through an authoritarian regime and therefore its government which will be analyzed 
as a fundamental tenet. In addition, the Egyptian army and the Ministry of Interior‟s approaches 
to the discrimination against to the Copts and to the conflict will be discussed when it is 
relevant. These institutions do not only operate as basic tools of the state apparatus but also 
they also have the power to mobilize the Muslim majority. 
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The second party to this conflict is the Copts who are basically represented by the Eastern 
Orthodox Church
4
. The Church has always been central to the Coptic community and 
negotiated issues related to Christianity and community‟s interest with the Egyptian state. 
While an institutional analysis of the church will be provided, the role of the church in the 
formation of the grievances and mobilization process will also be explored. Nevertheless, the 
recent revolution has influenced the Coptic community remarkably, as it did to the whole 
Egyptian society. But the gist of the issue is the formation of the Maspero Youth organization 
that challenged the church and its leadership. This issue will be discussed in depth in the 
following chapters. 
The third party to this conflict is the Muslim majority. Despite the problems of taking the 
Muslims as a whole community party to the conflict, examining discrimination and violence 
against the Copts reveal that such practices are widespread in the Muslim majority. Further, 
identifying perpetrators of violence is almost impossible since the rule of law is not enforced 
and media usually reports that “unknown thugs” attacked the Copts. Therefore, the literature on 
Copts studies the issue by not identifying a certain actor but by enjoying the existence of 
multiple actors as it provides flexibility to analyze how discrimination, exclusion and violence 
are undertaken by different groups. For instance, most notable studies, those of Apostolov 
(1999), Pennington (1982), Iskander (2012) and Zeidan (1999) in the literature do not specify a 
certain actor but discuss the issue in the given context. Nevertheless, this study will examine 
the Muslim Brothers‟ and the Salafi trend‟s relations with the Copts when it is relevant and 
helpful to deepen the level of analysis. While the Muslim Brothers has been perceived as a 
threat to the Coptic community, some of the violent actions against the Coptic community have 
been attributed to the Salafi trend. Recently, both conflict and cooperation discourse among the 
Muslim Brothers, the Copts, and the Salafi trend took place. Nevertheless, one should bear in 
mind that the Salafi movement consists of many groups difficult to identify that do not 
necessarily have the same political agenda but share a common framework (A. Hamada, 
personal communication, March 19, 2012). Therefore, this study will use the term the Salafi 
                                                 
4
 Throughout the text, I use the term Church interchangeably with the Coptic Orthodox Church. 
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trend in order to describe this movement. In order to shed light on this processes, I will 
critically approach the assumptions of the abovementioned theoretical models and sketch the 
conflicting issues that have contributed to the mobilization of the Coptic community as 
discourse analysis or other measures do not fit to the models that I employed in this study. 
2.3.2 Time Frame of the Study 
This study investigates the 2005-2012 period since the most meaningful issues related to scope 
of this study occurred in this era. 2005 is a turning point in the history of Egypt since the 
authoritarian regime allowed „„competitive elections‟‟ to take place and initiated economic 
liberalization policies. The Muslim Brothers achieved to form a group in the Egyptian 
Parliament that was perceived as a threat by the Coptic community. Furthermore, different 
protest movements such as Kefaya (Enough) started to criticize the government and encouraged 
all people to do so. These civil attempts resulted in the overthrown of the almost thirty years old 
authoritarian government of President Mubarak. In the aftermath, I observe more protest led by 
the Coptic community while the Salafis and the Muslim Brothers achieved to form political 
parties and entered the Parliament in 2011 elections. 
2.3.3 Additional Variables  
Along with the ethnopolitical mobilization framework‟s and ethnoreligious conflict model‟s 
variables, I will take regional differences as an additional variable. Upper and Lower Egypt 
historically have shown distinct patterns that are attributed to the hydraulic like nature of the 
country. While the Lower Egypt has presented prosperity and modernization, the Upper Egypt 
has been home to the poor and illiterate people. Thus, while many people migrated from Upper 
Egypt to Lower Egypt (especially to Cairo), the low level of education and welfare in Upper 
Egypt seem to be significant dynamics in the conflict. 
In the next chapter, I will briefly sketch the history of the relationship between the Muslim 
majority and the Copts with a special focus on 2005-2012 and review the literature on this 
subject. 
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Chapter 3 Literature Review  and Historical Background of the 
Conflict  
This chapter discusses the historical background of the remittent relationship in two ways. The 
first part of this section will examine and classify the literature on Coptic question. While many 
studies focus on the causes of discrimination and label the conflict as “sectarian”, some studies 
argue that there is no “Coptic question” in Egypt. In addition to these two currents, there are 
also studies focusing on modernization of Egyptian state, the Orthodox Coptic Church, and rise 
of Islamist fraternities in relation with the Copts.   
In the second part, this study will track the development of inter-communal relations with 
regards to the establishment and consolidation of the modern Egyptian state. While the primary 
focus will be on Coptic-Muslim relations and the causes of the conflict, i.e. inter communal 
relations, intra-communal relations of the Copts will also be explored as the Coptic Orthodox 
Church‟s modernization will shed light on State-Church and Church-community relations. 
Emphasis on Islamization of Egypt and the impacts of Infitah policies  blinds one to see how  
the Copts‟ internal dynamics played a role in (im) mobilization. 
3.1 Literature Review 
As the Copts are seen the sons of pharaohs and the first community to follow Jesus Christ and 
disseminate Christianity, there is great amount of biblical canon devoted not only Coptic 
Orthodox beliefs but also to the Coptic language and culture. Nevertheless, this study 
concentrates on ethnopolitical mobilization of the community that narrows the literature that 
this study considers. The literature created by the students of political science, history and 
sociology can be divided into three categories; discrimination and sectarian conflict literature 
with an emphasis on Islamization, state of denial, and modernization in Egypt and in the Coptic 
community. 
To begin with, the literature focusing on discrimination against the Copts usually documents 
exclusion and official discrimination of the Egyptian state in relation with the Muslim majority. 
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This body of literature analyzes the Coptic question through historic lenses with an emphasis of 
“Islamization” of Egypt referring to dominant role of Islam has played since 1970s. Ibrahim‟s 
(1996) study is a primary resource with the depth of its historical and sociological analysis of 
Copts‟ and their relationships with the Egyptian state and Muslim majority until mid-1990s. 
Nevertheless, this study, being part of Minority Rights publications, reflects a trend in western 
scholarship to study minorities in the Middle East as a whole rather than as single entities. 
Following this trend, Apsotolov (2001), Ayalon (1999), Chaudhry (1995), Rahman (1986) and 
Meinardus (2006) examine Copts relations with the “Islamic state and Islamized society” and 
Muslim majority in the broader Middle East as one of the many Christian minorities. Zeidan 
(1999) tracks how Islamization contributed to the persecution discourse of the Copts that 
marred the whole history of Copts as suggested by Sedra (2009). Counter arguments to this 
body of literature are offered by Sedra (1999) and Khawaga (1998) who point to overestimation 
of religion and sectarianism in studying Muslim-Christian relations, and refer to Coptic 
modernization as a turning point instead of exaggerating impact of 1967 and 1974.  
The second body of literature is a reflection of the on the Egyptian state‟s “denial of the Coptic 
question”.  In 1993, Mohamed Heikal wrote an article negating the Coptic question and arguing 
that the Copts are part of the “Egyptian fabric” (al-Gawhary, 1996). This discourse is 
reproduced by the media and articulated to a discourse of foreign powers that want to create 
internal problems to weaken the Egyptian state and society. Heikal‟s debate found widespread 
support both from the top institutions and the civil society highlighting to what extent this 
discourse is entrenched in the society. Since Tadros (2009) and Iskander (2012) decode this 
body of literature, which is usually in Arabic, there is no need to further this discussion. 
Nevertheless, there is also a moderate perspective that focuses on cooperation between the 
Copts and the Muslims and distancing itself from the victimhood and persecution. Makari 
(2007) focuses on the cooperation among the state and church institutions but rely only on 
official discourses that plague his study since official accounts show that there is no problem 
between the two communities, which is in fact a sign of problems. 
The third body of literature is mainly concerned about Coptic modernity and history but also 
many subtitles such as identity, diaspora groups and media have articulated to this literature. V. 
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Ibrahim (2011) and Scott (2010) challenge the common wisdom on Coptic-Muslim relations 
that is usually presented peaceful in early 20
th
 century and provide in depth analysis of how 
internal conflicts divided the Coptic community until Pope Shenouda rose to power. Hassan‟s 
(2003) study on Sunday School Movement digs the ground on Coptic modernization but recent 
reviews cast serious doubt on this  study since  the study pulls away itself from scientific 
methodology (Sedra, 2004). Further, Hassan (2003) portrays the two communities‟ relations as 
a sectarian dichotomy: Muslims versus Christians, which is not accurate.  
Sub-branches of this body of literature focus on identity, diaspora groups and media in the last 
decade. Henderson (2005) discussed how demanding equality influenced Copts identity, 
Delhaye (2012) argues Coptic diaspora forced the Egyptian government to address some issues 
to protect its image in the international stage, and Brinkerhoff (2005) shows how interaction 
between the digital diaspora and ordinary Copts through internet resulted in demands of 
change. Iskander (2012) discusses the impact of media liberalization by showing how it shaped 
Coptic identity and discourse of sectarianism that alienated the community. The emergence of 
this sub-branch of literature resulted in new research on Coptic history and contemporary 
developments that led to Sedra (2009) to conclude “The Copts have become actors”. However, 
nobody has studied the mobilization of the Copts yet and this study intends to fill this gap in the 
literature  
The categorical difference between these three bodies of literature is being pro-Coptic or anti-
Coptic. While the first and the third bodies are in favor of the Copts despite their different 
perspectives, the second body of literature is in line with the Egyptian state‟s discourse. 
Further, the first and third body of literature is concerned with scholarly research whereas the 
second is biased from the very beginning and methodologically may be subject to criticism. It is 
interesting to witness that the first body of literature is also obsessed with “sectarianism” and 
almost all of the research conducted on Copts somewhat related to “sectarianism”. The result is, 
unfortunately, ignoring the socio-economic dynamics and problems of the Muslim and Coptic 
communities such as poverty, unemployment or the problems of youth since the state also use 
such a discourse with a different tone. Nevertheless, the scholarship on the Copts has been 
changing recently as new studies problematize internal and external dynamics of the 
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community and do not study only the Copts relations with the state as an oppressed minority. 
For example, Tadros (2009) and McCallum (2010) researched the entente between the Church 
and the State that showed us how the institutions act between each other but obey the rules of 
the game in public.  However, this may also result in more sectarian conflict research, in 
contrast to “revolution hopeful” academic Saba Mahmood‟s prediction that sectarian conflict 
will melt away,  as the Muslim Brothers and the Salafis formed legal political parties after the 
25 January Revolution (Mahmood, 2012).  
3.2 Inter-Communal Relations 
In this part, I will discuss mainly three periods of coexistence and conflict. First, Egypt was one 
of the first places that Christianity was introduced and the Eastern Orthodox Christianity 
enjoyed autonomy after the schism that was an outcome of the Council of Chalcedon in 451. 
The arrival of Islam to Egyptian soils caused many conflicts between the Muslims and Copts 
but six Coptic rebellions were of little use in practice but resulted in persecution discourse that 
still dominates Coptic history. Another continuity was increasing number of Copts converting 
to Islam and learning Arabic because of the advantages it offered. Second, during the pre-
modern era the Copts had to deal with Crusaders with their Muslim fellows and Coptic middle 
classes managed to rise to senior positions in Mamluk bureaucracy. However, the Ottomans 
removed the Copts from senior positions and introduced the millet system that reconfigured the 
relations between Istanbul and Alexandria.  Third, the modern times begin with Muhammad Ali 
Pasha‟s reign (1805-1848) and Copts enjoyed higher position in governmental offices and the 
Coptic Church entered a phase of modernization following footprints of Muhammad Ali. The 
Hamayouni decree (1856) regulated state-society and inter-communal relations that showed 
continuity until recently with the entente established by the state apparatus and the Church. The 
crystallization of nation state idea indicates a rupture, as some Coptic movements and the 
Church developed some programs to revive Coptic identity.  
To begin with, Egypt was one of the first places that Christianity was introduced and has a long 
history of Coptic existence beginning from the first century C.E. Throughout Roman history, 
the relationship between the Roman Empire and the Church fluctuated, as Rome wanted to 
have control over church by appointing patriarchs from the capital. However, the Coptic 
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Church and the Coptic community did not accept such appointments not only because it was 
direct intervention in church affairs but also because of the interpretation of the Holy Bible and 
the nature of Christ. At the Council of Chalcedon 451 CE, the Orthodox Coptic Church argued 
that Christ had one nature (monophysites), which is the unity of his divine and human beings in 
contrast to the Roman Church based in Istanbul that claimed Christ was both divine and human 
(Meinardus, 1999). This dispute caused an early schism between the Eastern Christianity and 
the Roman Church that still did not last. 
Early in history, the term Aigyptos in Coptic language was used to refer to Egypt.  Gypt meant 
Copt and therefore Aigyptos referred to Coptic people from Egypt.  This has changed when 
„Amr ibn al-„As conquered Egypt and introduced Arabic and Islam on the Egyptian territories. 
Since then, gypt has become qibti, meaning Egyptians who did not convert to Islam, as  in three 
hundred years the Arabs achieved to Islamize and Arabize  the country to a significant extent 
(Makari, 2007). As a result, the Coptic language also gradually lost its influence among the 
people and was used only in the Church.  
During the early Islamic period (639-747), the Copts accepted Islamic rule since it brought an 
end to Byzantine rule and allowed the Copts to choose their own patriarchs and manage their 
own internal affairs. However, that does not necessarily mean the Copts did not challenge the 
Islamic rulers. The Copts rebelled at least six times but were defeated in all of their attempts 
which resulted in conversion of more Copts to Islam (S. E. Ibrahim, 1996). The impact of Islam 
and Arabic being mentioned, one should also add migration as a significant factor.  There is 
evidence that between the seventh and the thirteenth centuries Arabs migrated to Egyptian 
peninsula as the birth rate increased and the appointed rulers of Egypt brought a large number 
of people with them (S. E. Ibrahim, 1996).  
On the other hand, the good relations deteriorated during the rule of Ayyubids (1171-1250) and 
Mamluks (1250-1517) as the crusaders led a holy war against the Muslims. One should pay 
special attention to Salah al-Din‟s  reign  not just because he was successful against the 
crusaders but more importantly since he appointed many Copts to high status and halted the so 
called „„sectarian conflict‟‟. According to Malaty (1993), two Copts were given the task to 
design the Citadel in Cairo which historically has been the government office until late 19
th
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century (quoted in Makari, 2007). Nevertheless, the Copts suffered from both the Western 
Christians and Muslims. On the one hand, they were subject to prohibition because their 
practices were in dispute with that of the western type of Christianity and they did not 
collaborate with the Crusaders. On the other hand, the Muslims turned out to be intolerant as  
the spirit of Jihad  increased as they dealt with the Crusaders (S. E. Ibrahim, 1996). In addition, 
Ibrahim (1996) observes that the crusaders wanted to divide Ethiopian church and the Coptic 
Church in Egypt so as to gain power and this caused hostility against them among the Copts. 
As the Mamluks consolidated their power, the Crusaders were removed from Egypt.  During 
the Mamluks period, the conflict between the Muslims and the Copts was over the bureaucratic 
class. While the Coptic middle class dominated the bureaucracy, the economically rising 
Muslim middle classes aspired for such government positions (S. E. Ibrahim, 1996). Therefore, 
the Mamluks tried to resolve this tension by adjusting the bureaucracy but in 1517 the 
Ottomans conquered Egypt bringing an end to Mamluk rule. 
3.2.1 Ottoman Empire, Muhammad Ali and the Copts as Dhimmis 
The Ottoman Empire employing the millet system offered the dhimmi (the protected people of 
the book) status to the non-Muslim communities living in the Empire. Makari (2007) describes 
three accounts of the Copts under Ottoman rule. First, according to  the Coptic historian 
Malaty, the Ottoman rulers imposed heavy taxes on Copts, forced them to leave  Nubia, 
imprisoning Pope Mark IV and making the Copts to wear different dresses (quoted in Makari, 
2007).  According to an English traveller, the Copts  have been subject to discrimination until 
Mohammed Ali became the ruler of Egypt and conscripted the Copts (quoted in Makari, 2007). 
A third account is that of Saad Eddin Ibrahim (1996) who observes that the Ottomans removed 
the Copts from the administration apparatus. Nevertheless, while some Copts became wealthier 
and gained high status positions, those at the bottom suffered with their Muslim fellows since 
the only means to earn their living was agriculture
5
.  
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 The relationship between the Copts and the Ottoman Empire is not a well-researched area. While a more nuanced account 
of the relationship is needed, this study will not enter into such a discussion as this paper is on recent day relations.   
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Under Muhammad Ali‟s reign (1805-1848) the Copts enjoyed a relatively better period as he 
appointed some Copts to high status positions but excluded them from the High Council, which 
he consulted for the administration of the country. In addition, Jacques Tajer,  a Coptic 
historian who wrote early in the 20
th
 century, claimed that Muhammad Ali never rejected the 
Copts‟ request to build new churches (quoted in Scott, 2010). Muhammad Ali aimed at building 
a modern and developed state, therefore he made use of all Egyptians but employed the Copts 
in financial institutes as it was their specialization
6
 (S. E. Ibrahim, 1996; Scott, 2010).  Scott 
(2010) finds Muhammad Ali‟s impact on the Copts significant as the Coptic Church followed 
Muhammad Ali‟s modernist policies, especially in education and the formation of a Coptic 
intelligentsia.  
Muhammad Ali died while the Ottoman Empire experienced a painful period of modernization, 
Tanzimat that changed the status of the non-Muslim communities along with the modern, 
secular policies and institutions. The influence of the Tanzimat to Copts is the Hamayouni 
decree that tried to establish equality between the Muslim and non-Muslim subjects of the 
Ottoman Sultan. The Hamayouni decree regulated the relations among the Copts, their Muslim 
fellows and the state as follows: 
a. The re-establishment of all previous laws concerning Copts, especially the independent personal 
status law, 
b. The formation of Lay Councils consisting of the clergy and secularists to administer the financial 
matters of the church and to discuss personal status affairs, 
c. Requests for church building to be presented by the pope to the sultan and a license to be issued, 
d. No one is to be punished nor prevented from preventing his (sic) rites  and no one should  be 
forced to abandon his religion 
e. Equality between Muslims and Christians in employment, 
                                                 
6
 According to Scott (2010), Muhammad Ali stated that he does not want to see any difference between his subjects except 
them praying in different temples.  
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f. Military training and participation  is a duty for all males, regardless of religion, 
g. All terminology that discriminates between people on the basis of religion should be from the 
diwans, and offending people on a religious basis is forbidden
7
 (S. E. Ibrahim, 1996, p. 11). 
The Hamayouni decree‟s promise for equality was not fully realized as modernization process 
was a work in progress but eased church construction issues
8
. On the other hand, according to 
Malaty (1993) Khedive Ismail has been the most tolerant  ruler in Muhammad Ali‟s ruling 
family as the Hamayouni decree  provided the Copts the opportunity to have better relations 
with Muslims at communal level and Khedive himself appointed many Copts to high-level 
administrative positions (quoted in Makari, 2007). Nevertheless, during the second half of the 
19
th
 century as the British forces occupied the country many missionaries arrived in the country 
to invite not only Muslims but also Copts to their sects.  This created a sense of discontent 
among Muslims against Copts as some of them collaborated with the missionaries. That being 
said, the Church felt threatened as the missionaries reached poor people by offering them social 
benefits that caused alignment between the Copts and the Muslims and reformation of the 
church affairs (Makari, 2007). Last but not least, the formation of Lay Council is a significant 
example of state intervention in Coptic communal issues as the Lay Council became a secular, 
parallel decision making body that caused conflicts over the management of waqf endowments 
between this institute and the Church.   
3.2.2 The Making of Egyptian Nation State and Crystallization of Coptic 
Demands 
The late 19
th
 and early 20
th
 centuries are marked by the spread of ideas, and magazines and 
newspapers as tools of information distribution. Similar to that of the Ottoman Empire, Egypt 
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 This decree was amended in 1934 by the Minister of Interior‟s will. This amendment will be explored below in detail as it is 
the source of many Coptic grievances. 
8
 According to Makari (2007), President Mubarak has changed this process in early 2000s. However, he does not elaborate on 
the new process and how it solved the problem. Unfortunately, there is credible evidence showing changing the process does 
not necessarily means getting permission to build or repair churches.  
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underwent such a process in which the Copts had the opportunity to own such establishments 
and gain political power. The struggle against British rule is a watershed in the country‟s 
history as both the Coptic and Muslim cooperation reached an unprecedented level.  This was 
followed by the liberal nationalist Wafd era (1919-1952) that many Egyptians have nostalgia 
for it today because of the prevalent unity discourse. However, while early scholarship and 
national discourse is reflected as full of harmony, recent scholarship sheds light on inter 
communal relations. 
First, in the first decade of the 20
th
 century, Muhammad Abduh influenced Egyptian 
modernization by his combination of secular and Islamist ideas. Despite the fact that much of 
the tension was created by the press, prominently by  Jaridat al-Watan and  Misr, pan-Islamic 
emphasis on Egyptian nationalism led many Copts to distance themselves from the mainstream 
political parties (S. E. Ibrahim, 1996; V. Ibrahim, 2011; Makari, 2007; Scott, 2010).     
Nevertheless, given his merit, Buthros Ghali Pasha was appointed as the new prime minister in 
1908, but actually it created hostility against the Copts. According to El-Feki (1988), an 
extremist member of the Nationalist Party assassinated the prime minister in 1910 that 
exacerbated inter-communal relations and caused reactions from the Copts (quoted in Makari, 
2007).  However, was the assassination of Buthros Ghali Pasha a reasonable enough reason for 
such a tension? 
Despite the Egyptian discourse that Copts and Muslims were united against the British, 
Vatikiotis (1991) observed that the Copts sought protection from the British with the aim to 
strengthen their communal life. The result of this tendency can be cited as the crystallization of 
century long Coptic reaction to prevalent Islamic discourse; “they tended to isolate themselves 
in order to protect their interests against what they viewed as a rising Islamic sentiment” 
(Vatikiotis, 1991, p. 208), as a result of the ongoing hostility. Gorst‟s (the British High Officer 
in Egypt) arguments that the Copts are not discriminated against, and in reaction to Buthros 
Ghali Pasha‟s assassination, the Copts held a Coptic Congress in Assiut to make demands in the 
name of their communities. Pennington (1982) notes that the Copts wanted Sunday to be 
national holiday as they joined the church mass, an end to official discrimination in public 
employment, and financial contribution to Christian schools. While no official response was 
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given to these requests, a Muslim congress was held as a counter action and rejected such 
demands.   
Nonetheless, with the outbreak of the World War I national sentiments brought together 
Egyptians while the “other” remained somewhere in mind. At this point, one should bear in 
mind that the idea of pan-Islamism was not operational anymore and a liberal political wave 
was at stake. The 1919 Urabi Revolution of Egypt is said to be watershed as both communities 
did not hesitate to fight for the independence and unity of the country in which flags 
representing cross and crescent were used by many
9
. This was a result of Wafd Party‟s 
domination of political sphere, which promised national unity to be based on secular ideals. 
Therefore, it is not a coincidence that Makram „Ebeid, a member of aristocratic Coptic family, 
was an influential figure close to party‟s leader Sa‟ad Zaghlul. Reading between the lines, 
Makari (2007) implies that as secular nationalism gained momentum in the country, higher 
levels of tolerance and cooperation existed.  
However, in 1922 when Egypt gained its conditional independence from Britain, the English 
rulers wanted to have power on four points including  “protection of foreign interests and  
minorities in Egypt” (Vatikiotis, 1991, p. 270). Led by Sa‟ad Zaghlul and Makram „Ebeid the 
Wafd negotiated independence with the British that caused many Egyptians to think the Copts 
want to be protected by an outsider in case of conflict with the Muslims. This point was 
rejected both by the Wafd and the Copts during the parliamentary debates on the new Egyptian 
constitution. Nevertheless, early in 1922 when a draft constitution was proposed the Copts were 
offered proportional representation but they rejected it since fears were grown, since such a 
policy would deepen sectarian feelings (Scott, 2010).   
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 Scott (2010) in his nuanced study shows us that cooperation among the Copts and the Muslims was not that great and such 
flags were rare. Nevertheless, Egyptian governments and people always invest in such discourse. In addition, Egyptian 
historians and literature do not contradict this point. I follow Scott (2010) as he examines both Egyptian and English 
documents and focuses on the period as a case study. 
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While the 1922 Egyptian Constitution stated that Egypt is an Islamic state and not mentioning 
any point regarding the status of the Copts, the state avoided to seeing the Coptic issue as a 
problem. That being said, the Copts were subject to Hamayouni decree but felt they were not 
given full citizenship rights as the constitution referred only to Islam. In 1934, in contrast to 
advanced Hamayouni decree, the Minister of Interior of the time, Al Ezabi Pasha issued a ten 
point statement making more difficult to build a church than ever. Saad Eddin Ibrahim 
documents these points as follows:  
a. Is the land on which the church is to be built empty or agricultural land, and does it belong to the 
person presenting the request? 
b. What is the distance between the proposed church and surrounding mosques? 
c. If the land is vacant, is it near to Christian or Muslim settlements? 
d. If it is close to Muslims, do they have any objection to it? 
e. Is there another church belonging to this denomination in the same town or village? 
f. What is the distance between the nearest church belonging to this denomination and the town in 
which the requested church to be built? 
g. What is the number of Christians living in the area? 
h. If the land on which the church is to be built is close to the Nile, or bridges or public utilities 
belonging to the Ministry of Irrigation, an approval should be sought from the Ministry itself. 
Also, if it is near to railway lines, the railway authorities should also give their approval. 
i. An official report should be made on all of the above points, and it should indicate the 
surrounding buildings to be requested spot on which the church is to be built, including the 
nearest shops, and the distances between these shops and the church. 
j. The person making the request should have all these papers signed by the head of denomination, 
and the engineer who is to responsible for that area, in addition to aforementioned approvals, 
and present all the requested papers (S. E. Ibrahim, 1996, pp. 11-12). 
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It will not be an exaggeration if one interprets the above ten points as the reasons why it is 
extremely difficult, if not impossible, to get a church construction permit, let alone to build a 
church. Nevertheless, it is difficult to find studies problematizing the abovementioned ten-point 
decree
10
, and questioning the role of the nation state in contemporary Coptic-Muslim relations.  
Meanwhile, Wafd Party‟s domination of national politics prevented disputes on the national 
level until Makram „Ebeid‟s Black Book affair with the Wafd‟s leadership. „Ebeid was second 
to Mustafa al-Nahhas, the then Wafd‟s leader and expected to be named as party secretary 
general. However, when al-Nahhas did not appoint him to this position that was perceived by 
„Ebeid as sectarian. Therefore, he wrote a book called Al-Kitab al-Aswad (Black Book) in 
which he accounted how al-Nahhas and other top officials of Wafd were corrupt. To some 
accounts, this issue was raised as a result of King Faruq‟s will to diminish Wafd‟s power by 
emphasizing an Islamic discourse according to one account (Makari, 2007), whereas another 
account stresses the failure of  Anglo British-Egyptian Agreement that was negotiated by 
„Ebeid (V. Ibrahim, 2011). Nonetheless, Pope Macarius supported al-Nahhas by calling him the 
“leader of the people”, a title given only to Sa‟ad Zaghlul. This approach was criticized by 
many Copts but the Church succeeded to be the mainstream voice of the ordinary Copts, 
despite the dispute over this issue with the Lay Council (Majlis al-Milli). 
3.2.3 The Free Officers Coup: Institutional Entente, Crystallization of Official 
Discrimination and Exclusion 
 The Free Officers coup of 1952 started a new page in the history of contemporary Egypt and 
the Copts. Though the coup aimed at bringing the monarchy to an end, therefore the British 
influence on Egyptian politics, Gamal Abd al-Nasser became the pioneering figure combining 
his ideas on Arab identity with a socialist aspect, which was mostly used in international affairs 
but also become a significant current of Egyptian nationalism (Hinnebusch, 2009). Since 
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 It is interesting that only Saad Eddin Ibrahim (1996) mentions this decree as part of his summary. Those who claim to 
pursue period studies (V. Ibrahim, 2011) or citizenship matters (Scott, 2010) do not cite this decree at all. Though Makari 
(2007) cites many arguments from Saad Eddin Ibrahim, he does not cite this decree that shows how he prefers to use the 
available literature. 
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Nasser, emphasis on Arab identity and a blend of Islam and Arab Egyptian nationalism created 
significant problems for the Copts as they felt they were not part of the nation. Further, 
Nasser‟s Land Reform and nationalization projects changed the structure of the Egyptian 
bourgeois as these programs relieved the Coptic bourgeois  properties and welfare (Zeidan, 
1999). More importantly, the Free Officers Coup introduced a modern military rule to the 
country and since then the Egyptian military became the pioneering tool of the state apparatus 
that was administered by presidents who had military backgrounds. Though a new president is 
elected after January 25 elections, the continuum in military‟s power is remarkable. 
Though Nasser co-opted the Muslim Brothers (Ikhwan) that was perceived a threat to the 
secular regime and to the Copts by imprisoning its members and executing its leader Sayyid 
Qutb in 1966, the relationship between the Church and the regime relied much on personal 
relations of Nasser and Pope Kyrollos VI. Despite Pennington‟s (1982) claims that the Copts 
enjoyed more freedom during Nasser‟s era,  Nasser‟s objective to create an official Islam 
discourse against Ikhwan resulted in religion classes being added to curricula and Al-Azhar 
started to exclude Copts (S. E. Ibrahim, 1996). Furthermore, while Nasser‟s free education 
campaign made the Copts to feel equal with their Muslim fellows actually it resulted in 
discrimination in public employment as Muslims were chosen over Copts.  The Copts‟ 
demands in 1950s included equality in political and social areas, a solution to construction and 
renovation of the churches and conversion issues, and reversion of the confiscated waqf and 
bourgeoisie‟s lands.  Though Anwar Sadat returned Islamic waqf‟s properties in the 1970s, the 
Copts were left out of this policy. Indeed, according to Zeidan (1999), Nasser distributed 
Coptic lands to Muslim peasants, a policy that humiliated the community.  How did the 
abovementioned settings of the Nasserist regime influence Coptic- Muslim and Church-State 
relations? 
Two reflections of Nasser‟s policies towards the Copts are crucial to understand Church-State 
relations. The internal struggle-which will be elaborated in the section on intra-communal 
relations-, caused Pope Kyrollos VI to request from Nasser to weaken the Majlis al-Milli. 
Therefore, first, the Church‟s role as sole religious and political representative of the Copts 
crystallized (Hassan, 2003). Further, the Egyptian state‟s role as a mediator between the Church 
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and other groups- be it Coptic or Muslim- began in addition to its inherent interventionist 
approach in Church management.  Second, despite the Copts‟ citizenship problems before the 
Nasser era, religion become their identity marker as the regime gave so much credibility to the 
church and negotiated the problems of the Copts only with the Pope, instead of implementing 
the rule of the law. The entente  between the church and the state apparatus would fluctuate 
throughout the 20
th
 century but the church  having sole power on its own community enjoyed 
political domination over the Copts. Nevertheless, one should examine the implications of this 
entente to understand communal relations  
Such a policy resulted in three significant implications. First, the construction of churches 
depended on the personal relationships of the Pope and the President of the time. For example, 
Nasser granted to Pope Kyrollos the right to construct twenty-five churches per year. This is 
documented by Mohammed Heikal who was close to Nasser and the editor of the state owned 
Al Ahram newspaper. He narrates how the Coptic Patriarch got permission to construct 
churches:  
 it was understandably humiliating for the Patriarch to find that any applications for 
 building permits he made got lost in the labyrinth of the Ministry of Interior. So he 
 approaches Nasser on the subject. Nasser was sympathetic, and asked how many new 
 churches the Patriarch thought he needed. The answer was between twenty and thirty a 
 year. Right, said Nasser, and immediately gave him permission to build twenty-five 
 churches a year (Heikal, 1983, p. 158).  
Another implication of the entente between the Church and the regime reflected itself in 
electoral politics. Though Zeidan (1999) claims that the Coptic community experienced lack of 
Copts in senior positions sternly, the Church and the regimes did not give much attention to this 
phenomenon.  Not only Nasser but also Sadat and Mubarak, who were all army generals before 
becoming president, would negotiate with the Coptic Patriarchs over the names of the Coptic 
MPs, who were actually not elected but “chosen”. Heikal (1983) mentions how these MPs were 
technocrats, far from ordinary Coptic people. What Heikal does not mention is that how these 
MPs were loyal to both the regime and the Church and sometimes acted as intermediaries. 
Furthermore, as mentioned above, the Nasser regime taking the Church as interlocutor opened a 
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new phase for the Copts in modern Egypt‟s history as continuously they were treated as 
subjects of the church whom negotiated with the regime for them. 
3.2.4 Sadat and Shenouda III: Clash of the Leaders or Sectarian Conflict? 
When Israel defeated Egypt in 1967, many believed that it was a result of the lack of faith and 
therefore many took refuge in Islam. While some scholars argued that  this was the crisis of 
Arab political thought (Ajami, 1981), some others claimed  Islamism emerged in this period as 
a result of “disappointment with and insecurity felt under Nasser” (Vatikiotis, 1991, p. 407).  
Nevertheless, Nasser did not resign but died in September 1970 as a result of a heart attack to 
be succeeded by his vice president, Anwar Sadat
11
. This was followed by the death of   Pope 
Kyrillos VI in 1971 that caused harsh internal struggles over who will be the next patriarch. In 
sum, Nazeer Gayed Roufail who got the title of Shenouda was elected as the new pope whose 
papacy lasted over forty years and died in March 2012. From the very beginning, Pope 
Shenouda III showed a certain level of willingness to involve in politics and address the 
grievances of the Copts. 
Despite the common knowledge that Pope Shenouda and Sadat confronted each other because 
of their personalities, indeed, the real causes were Pope Shenouda‟s will to change the Copts‟ 
destiny and Sadat‟s objective to be the “(Muslim) pious leader of the country”. To achieve 
these ends, Sadat prayed publicly and appeared on state television on Friday sermons to show 
this image that gave him legitimacy in the eyes of people and Pope Shenouda did not hesitate to 
confront Mr. President. Furthermore, Sadat released Islamists that were imprisoned by Nasser 
to gain legitimacy to implement his infitah (opening) policy and oppress the leftists. Kepel 
(2002) argues by doing so Sadat lost his control on the monopoly of ideology (my emphasis). 
This was accompanied by socio-economic problems caused by the infitah that made the rich 
richer and the poor poorer. Therefore, Islamist movements like Ikhwan attracted people as they 
developed a social service network for needy people. This phenomenon gave legitimacy to the 
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 Though it is not directly related to our subject here, one should be aware Sadat became the president since he was the vice 
president. Mubarak was more cautious about this issue and never appointed a vice president. 
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Islamists to assume political power but they did so indirectly through attacking the Copts 
instead of the state apparatus, to make symbolic violence. 
While the abovementioned aspects of 1970s is crucial to understand the period, three issues 
heightened and intensified the conflict between two communities: Islam‟s increasing influence 
on society and political rise of Islamist groups, rising level of so called sectarian violence and 
Coptic emigrants‟ activism in the U.S. 
First, while the rise of political Islam is mentioned above the Egyptian Islamist movements 
vary significantly from a radical discourse to a soft interpretation of Shari‟a. For example, 
during the 1970s, a group called at-Takfir wa‟l Hijra targeted Coptic churches because of 
radical interpretation of Islam and the relatively secular life style the Copts enjoyed. After the 
1973 war, Sadat attempted to make a peace agreement with Israel that caused anger among 
Islamists and they thought Copts were playing a role in this process. To show their anger 
against the regime, Islamist movements targeted Coptic churches (Makari, 2007).  Furthermore, 
the infitah that aimed at a liberal economic program was another cause of Islamists‟ grievances. 
While the Copts generally supported this program as it opened up new employment 
opportunities and emphasized a western oriented policy, the Muslims explained their discontent 
as it only brought poverty and disengagement from pan-Arabism (Pennington, 1982).  
Nonetheless, Sadat amended the Constitution twice in 1970s: first in 1971 when Article 2 stated 
“the Shari‟a constitutes one of the sources of legislation” and second in 1979 in which Article 2 
declared “the Shari‟a is the principal source of legislation”.  While this amendment gave more 
legitimacy to Sadat in the eyes of the Muslim majority, the Copts felt threatened since this 
clause overlapped with the Islamists‟ agendas. 
Second, the increasing level of sectarian violence intensified conflicting relations between Pope  
Shenouda III and Sadat. Beginning with the Al-Khanka incident in which a chapel was burned 
down by “unknown arsons” (Nkrumah, 2012), Coptic-Muslim tension marked that decade as 
Pope Shenouda sent his priests to protest along with the ordinary citizens as a mass force. 
Further, Pope Shenouda III publicly criticized Sadat because of Sadat‟s reluctance to 
investigate violence against Christians, abeyance of the al-Oteify report‟s recommendation that 
Sadat should reconsider the legal framework of construction of churches and the ridda law that 
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proposed to punish people with the death penalty who convert from Islam to Christianity 
(Tadros, 2009).  Achieving peace with Israel through Camp David, Sadat promised Israel to 
send tourists to Israel in order to increase relations between two countries. Since he could not 
promote the idea of Muslims visiting Jerusalem, he tried to send Copts to Jerusalem for 
pilgrimage. However, Pope Shenouda refused such an idea as Jerusalem was occupied by Israel 
and his Palestinian fellows were subject to Israeli violence. This is not only because he was 
against Sadat‟s policies, indeed, Pope Shenouda himself served as a soldier in Palestine 
territories after Israel declared its independency and Arab states interfered in the conflict. 
Third, for Pope Shenouda protesting Sadat was not only criticizing him publicly but also taking 
refuge to a monastery in the desert and lobbying in the U.S. through the Coptic diaspora and 
cancellation of the Easter celebrations. Taking refuge in the desert is a political tactic to refrain 
from the public, leaving the opponent subject to public criticism and without a counterpart to 
negotiate. When Sadat visited the U.S., the Copts protested him in front of his American 
colleagues and by giving full page newspaper ads stating how the Copts of Egypt were 
persecuted (Ansari, 1984). Obviously, Sadat was humiliated in front of his “brother” Jimmy 
Carter and given his loose cannon personality he put Pope Shenouda under house arrest in 
Wadi al-Natrun forbidding him to contact public. The President also ordered the formation of a 
papal committee composed of five people to undertake Pope‟s duties that he expected to be 
cooperative
12
. Bishop Samuel who cooperated with Sadat was perceived as traitor whereas 
Pope Shenouda became the hero of the community that gave him the legitimacy to remove all 
of the factions against him. Nevertheless, Sadat was assassinated in 1981 by a member of an 
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 As the Pope was put under house arrest, different power groups arose among the Copts. While the Holy Synod supported 
the Pope, some Bishops took different stances regarding the issue. For example, Bishop Samuel appeared many times with 
Sadat and asked the Copts to vote in favor of the amendment of the Article 2.  Also, the Coptic diaspora supported Pope 
Shenouda by protesting the Egyptian government abroad but later on developed an independent approach that not necessarily 
consistent with the discourse of the church. For more information see: (Hassan, 2003). On the other hand, ordinary Copts 
supported Pope by chanting “Bi‟l dam wal roh nafdik” (With our blood and our souls, we will vindicate you) (Hassan, 2003, 
p. 113). 
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Islamist group after Sadat arrested more than 1,500 people including Islamists, leftists and 
Copts.  
3.2.5 The Mubarak Era: The Church-Authoritarian Regime Entente 
Succeeding Sadat, Mubarak‟s relationship with the church and the Copts was an uneasy one. 
The official relationship between Mubarak and Pope Shenouda started when Mubarak 
terminated Shenouda‟s house arrest in 1984 after the parliamentary elections.  Naming Fikri 
Makram „Ebeid as deputy prime minister and another Copt as minister of state, the Mubarak 
regime was able to lessen the communal conflict in the first half of the 1980s. Recounting on 
his relationship with Sadat and Mubarak, Pope Shenouda highlighted how Sadat was 
destructive whereas Mubarak  engages in dialogue (quoted in  McCallum, 2010). Despite 
Kepel‟s (2002)  arguments that the increasing sectarian conflict in the  1990s  is partly due to  
more political room given to Islamist groups
13
 (quoted in Makari, 2007), Tadros (2009) claims 
that Pope Shenouda reconciled the church-regime relations earlier than Mubarak co-opted the 
Islamists. It was in early 1990s when al-Jama‟a al-Islamiyya established a “state-like” 
organization in Imbaba neighborhood of Cairo that led to Mubarak to crack down on the 
Islamists. This phenomenon did not only threaten Mubarak‟s regime but more importantly the 
state apparatus itself.  Surviving more than 25 years, the Mubarak-Shenouda relationship was 
marked by the solution of communal issues through personal channels between the two and the 
Church‟s political alignment with the regime until 200714.  How did Pope Shenouda- Mubarak 
manage to survive such a relationship?  
                                                 
13
 Makari (2007) cites Kepel‟s work published in 1986 to explain the increasing conflict throughout the 1990s. I guess this is 
an editorial or writing process mistake since causally a book written in 1986 cannot explain the 1990s. Most probably, 
Makari wanted to cite Kepel‟s newer work published in 2002 as he includes this latter study in the bibliography. 
14
 One should be cautious in assessing Pope Shenouda‟s support to the regime. Shenouda‟s support to the Mubarak regime 
does not necessarily mean support to the state apparatus. The Pope had many conflicts with the state apparatus most notably 
over church construction and repair issues. The church repair and construction permits usually got lost in the labyrinth of the 
Ministry of Interior, though Mubarak assured Shenouda. 
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The seemingly peaceful relationship between Pope Shenouda and Mubarak was a result of 
many factors, though both communities did not enjoy such a level of peace. First, Pope 
Shenouda was smart enough to eliminate the Bishops who cooperated with Sadat. To achieve 
his objective, he focused on internal affairs and created his own clique to have full control both 
on his community and relations with the regime (Hassan, 2003). Second, Mubarak came to 
power in a sensitive period, and tried to consolidate his power by reconciling both 
communities. Therefore, while he did not aim at cracking down on the Islamists until early 
1990s, leaving his confrontational approach, Pope Shenouda showed gestures towards him. In 
early 1990s, when Islamist groups started to target tourists the President cracked down on 
Islamists harshly, putting them in jail. Throughout the 1990s, there have been attacks against 
the Copts in the following villages, Sanabo of Dayrout, Tima, Deir Mawas in 1992, Abu 
Korkas in 1995, Kush of Upper Egypt in 1998 and on many churches in Minya and Cairo that 
same year (Hassan, 2003).  In contrast to his fervent reactions during Sadat‟s period and to 
Khanka incident, Pope Shenouda did not criticize Mubarak publicly and did not even announce 
fast sessions. At this stage, learned observers analyze the relationship as diplomacy (Hassan, 
2003) or entente (Tadros, 2009)  in a neo-millet system. Though neo-millet system is explained 
by Rowe (2007) and Sedra (1999) as unconditional support of the Coptic Orthodox Church in 
exhange for unconditional political support, Tadros‟s (2009) research shows that neo-millet 
system shall not be understood as so.  And yet, how could be such a relationship built?  Are 
Pope Shenouda‟s consolidation of power and Mubarak‟s crack down on Islamists analytical and 
persuasive enough for such an entente? 
Pope Shenouda‟s article in the Church‟s mouthpiece al-Kiraza  in 1980  argues  that religious 
institutions should be part of social and economic development and regimes rejecting this idea 
are totalitarian (quoted in Al-Khawaga, 1998).  Obviously, he wanted to increase his influence 
by managing social and economic affairs of the Coptic community through material means and 
by placing faith into minds and hearts of the Copts.  Diversifying the Church‟s areas of action 
and his ability to circumvent any possible opposition to his authority required the Pope to 
alleviate the Copts‟ socio-economic burden on the state. This was the price paid for recognition 
of the Church as the sole authority on the community. The Church invested in Coptic hospitals, 
schools and provided social service through dense networks of churches that allowed it to 
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“reinvent” Copts and Coptic identity.  This is crystal clear evidence of alternative social order 
in which the Church offered its services to the community that eased its control over the 
community.  These services were operational because it gave the opportunity to the Church to 
alleviate grievances of the Copts. However, at the same time this phenomenon implies a 
drawback to Coptic mobilization. The following is a very telling statement showing how the 
neo-millet system worked. Asked about how they protested in the past or if they did ever 
protest, an interviewee told me “Whenever you suffered a problem, the Church offered its own 
service rather than allowing you to protest or, supporting you in your protest” (M.I., personal 
communication, March 12, 2012). 
Third, as the years passed new players became party to the relationship. While the authoritarian 
regime strengthened, the security apparatus, the ministry of Interior, and the Coptic diaspora 
emerged as new players whose actions and discourses differed to an important extent. For 
example, while Mubarak gave permission to church buildings and repairs the Church had to 
deal with the Ministry of Interior since “paperwork” lasted over two decades or more. Much of 
the Copts grievances stem from such issues.  The security apparatus dealt with many cases that 
made the Copts unhappy because of the methods used. Mariz Tadros mentions a significant 
case that reveals how the security apparatus handled such issues and deserves a citation at 
length: 
 In 2004 the wife of a priest, Wafa‟ Constantine, left her marital home, where she was 
 subject to domestic violence, and went to a police station, where she expressed her desire 
 to convert to Islam. In light of the sensitivity of the person‟s identity (Coptic priest‟s 
 wife), she was referred to state security apparatus, which held her until agents informed 
 her family, church and community. In the absence of information regarding her 
 whereabouts and the proliferation of rumors suggesting a possible kidnapping, hundreds 
 of youth protested in the cathedral, calling for her return. Upon request from the church 
 leadership and through the personal intervention of the President, the state security 
 allowed the church access to Constantine, who subsequently expressed her desire to 
 remain a Christian (Tadros, 2009, p. 278). 
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In the mid of the case, when violent demonstrations took place in front of  the St. Mark 
Cathedral in Cairo, the headquarters of the Coptic Church,  Pope Shenouda sought refuge in a 
desert monastery to protest the security apparatus. He did not return until calm was settled, the 
issue being solved and the streets were free of protesters (The Economist, 29/12/2004). 
Last but not least, the Coptic diaspora invested in such cases and used a discourse of 
persecution in the countries they have been influential, namely the U.S., Canada and Australia.  
For example, the Free Copts sent a petition to the U.S. State Department in April 2010, 
claiming that Coptic women are subject to forced marriages and exploitation to urge the State 
Department to include such issues in 2010 Trafficking in Persons Annual Report (Ienco, 2010). 
Inclusion of such an issue, of course, would embarrass the state of Egypt and Mubarak. 
Nevertheless, Pope Shenouda did not welcome such initiatives but did not have control on 
Coptic emigrants as he did on the Copts of Egypt.  
Figure 2 Sectarian Violence Between January 2008-January 2010
15
 (Retrieved from (Egyptian Initiative for 
Personal Rights, 2010)) 
 
The second reason for the confrontation between the Pope and the President was the increasing 
violence against the Copts. In May 2007, such an incident took place in Ayat district of Giza in 
                                                 
15
 Though the EIPR uses the term “sectarian”  to describe the violence against the Copts, I find this approach misleading 
since conflicts in Egypt have the potential to stem from personal or family matters that could easily turn into “religious 
matters”. Therefore, one should always ask “what is the conflict about?”. 
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Cairo. Rumors were circulated about a building used for religious purposes by the Copts that 
will be turned into a church after the Friday prayer. Though the Copts planned to do that, no 
action was taken. And yet, after the Friday sermon Muslim men and youth attacked Copts 
houses and shops, leaving 36 houses burned and seven shops looted in less than an hour (Loza, 
2007). Even the semi-official Al-Ahram Weekly reported that security forces arrived three 
hours after the incident took place  and implemented a wait and see strategy instead of 
intervening in the process and providing security. While this incident is an informative example 
since in most incidents the process is somehow similar, Pope Shenouda did not hesitate to write 
an open letter to Mubarak and publicize it blaming the security apparatus not taking action 
despite the intelligence it had (Tadros, 2009). Tadros argues that this should be interpreted as 
part of Pope Shenouda‟s withdrawal of political support in 2006 Shura Council elections. While 
such an interpretation is sound, it should be seen only as a temporary withdrawal since the 
below debate will show how Pope Shenouda supported Mubarak even in the wake of Tahrir 
Revolution in 2011.   
Egyptian Initiative for Personal Rights reported, between 2008 and 2010, 52 violence incidents 
out of 62, took place in poor Upper Egypt villages. Despite EIPR‟s finding that there is a close 
correlation between poverty and sites of sectarian violence, one should be aware of the lack of 
state mechanisms, the reluctance of the security apparatus to respond violence, and  the  salient 
primordial tribal relations. The Egyptian state controls Upper Egypt through the security 
apparatus and the de facto agreement with tribes.  But discontent among the Copts increased as 
the regime did not implement the rule of law, they were not represented proportionally and 
were treated as if they were “members” of dhimma but not as ordinary Egyptian “citizens”.  In 
most of the cases above, the state apparatus did not implement the rule of law but instead 
formed local reconciliation commissions usually led by Sheiks. Nobody would legally be 
questioned or sentenced but the Sheiks were expected to bring peace. In many cases, peace did 
not endure as it only serves cosmetic objectives.  
Political representation has always been a contested topic in Coptic-Muslim relations as Copts 
claim they are unequally and disproportionally represented in the Parliament and the Shura 
Council.  Nasser developed a policy of appointing Copts to the Parliament after negotiating 
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with the Coptic Pope.  While many Copts have been unhappy with this policy, both Sadat and 
Mubarak continued to implement it not only to increase their legitimacy but also for cosmetic 
purposes such as giving messages to the Western world, primarily the U.S. Nevertheless, Copts 
in the street believe that Coptic figures in the Parliament and the Shura Council were “loyal” to 
both the regime and the papacy. Therefore, my interviewees told me such people do not 
represent them. However, given the territorial dispersion of the Copts, it is difficult to say they 
will gain more seats in the parliament than they have had. Below the readers can find   statistics 
regarding the Coptic representation in the Egyptian People‟s Assembly. 
Figure 3 Coptic Representation in the Parliament, 1976-2011
16
(Retrieved from(Makari, 2007) ) 
 
 
 
     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Year Copts in Parliament Elected Appointed 
 1976 8 0 8 
 1979 14 4 10 
 1984 11 6 5 
 1987 10 6 4 
 1990 8 2 6 
 1995 6 0 6 
 2000 7 3 4 
 2005 6 1 5 
                                                 
16
  While only two Copts out of 498 seats achieved to enter the parliament in the 2011 elections, the interim ruler of the 
country, Marshall Tantawi appointed five Copts following the 1971 Constitution. One should be cautious here as many Copts 
were not put forward as candidates and many parties favored Muslim candidates. This shows us that the territorial dispersion 
of the Copts is not the only problem. Nevertheless, Rafiq Habib, the Vice President of the Freedom and Justice Party, the 
political wing of the Muslim Brothers, is Protestant Coptic who is mostly elected by Muslim votes. However, he is 
considered by most Copts as “traitor” since he joined the Muslim Brothers and embraced Islamist politics. 
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 2011 7 2 5 
 
As shown in the above analysis, when conflicts arise the state apparatus does not treat the Copts 
as “individual citizens” but rather as “members of dhimma” as the practice of the state‟s 
handling the issues shows. As I showed in the two cases above, the state apparatus negotiates 
with the Church and its leadership to react. This is also for the good of the Church since it 
wants full control on its community. However, many Copts oppose this policy and asks for 
respect to their fundamental rights. By negotiating with the Church and seeking local 
reconciliation, the state employs different strategies not to take responsibility by implementing 
the rule of the law. If the rule of the law implemented, the state apparatus would be responsible 
for not providing security. More importantly, on the macro view, the Mubarak regime did not 
implement the rule of the law as part of his strategy to gain legitimacy from both the Muslims 
and the Copts. There is evidence showing he threatened the Copts about the Islamists and 
created conspiracies if Muslims did not support him the Copts will cooperate with “external 
powers” to diminish Muslim rule. 
3.3 Intra-Communal Relations 
Intra-communal relations of the Copts are marred by two factors for the last one hundred years: 
the church‟s modernization and establishment of the Lay Council, and development of 
benevolence and philanthropy.  Modernization of the Egyptian state, the importance of the waqf 
properties and its management and the ignorance of and corruption in the Coptic Church led 
these factors to be at the front of inter- and intra-communal relations.  The below discussion 
will first focus on the philanthropic societies with regards to factionalism and struggle with the 
Church. Then, I assess how the modernization of the Church caused conflicts within the 
community and shaped its relations with the majority Muslim community.  The objective of 
discussing these two points is to show how internal struggles and factionalism set a drawback 
to mobilization and opened the doors for government intervention while Coptic revival was 
gaining momentum. 
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One of the fundamental reasons of why such Coptic charity societies started to be established is 
the missionary activities that came to Egypt with the British rule.  The Church realized the 
missionaries achieved to convert more Copts than Muslims. The conversion took place 
especially in Upper Egypt where people suffered from poverty. Nevertheless, as V. Ibrahim 
(2011) mentions, Coptic societies did not discriminate between the needy Copts and Muslims 
and helped poor Muslims as well. Meanwhile, one should differentiate between the religious-
led and lay-led societies since they focused on different issues. The difference between  the 
religious-led societies and others can be put as  “these groups (religious-led) who were largely 
closely associated with the Anglican missionaries, and did not concern themselves with intra-
communal institutional politics and power struggles but rather religious welfare”(V. Ibrahim, 
2011, p. 103) 
Some of the religious led Coptic societies can be cited as follows: Asdiqa al-Kitab al-
Muqaddas, (the Friends of the Holy Bible Society) and al-Jam„iyyat al-Iman al-Khayriyyah, 
(the Iman Benevolent Society). Established in 1908, Asdiqa was in close relation with the 
missionaries as the missionaries supported Coptic modernization and reform. This society 
achieved Coptic revival through its emphasis on education and spiritual work on the Coptic 
language and religion. From 1908 to 1940s, the society provided housing to students, coming 
from Upper Egypt and studying in the Delta and Cairo, visited the fellahin and poor villages 
where no church or means of praying existed. The society succeeded to attract more than 
thousands of people that contributed to Coptic modernization. 
The Iman was established in 1899 to promote Coptic language and religious education that will 
gather the Coptic ummah (nation). The society paid many students‟ expenses and helped many 
Coptic families for their daily maintenance. Along with this, one of the fundamental 
achievements of the society was to facilitate the relations between the upper class and ordinary 
people through benevolent activity. A significant influence of the Iman was the idea of Coptic 
ummah in relation with language that resulted in a distinct Coptic identity. Nevertheless, as the 
nationalist senses increased in Egypt, both the Asdiqa and the Iman  societies decreased their  
relations with missionaries and the Coptic cultural nationalism stayed in the background giving 
the first place to the anti-colonialist Egyptian nationalism.  
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Education has been the main focus of the Coptic societies be it religious-led or lay-led. Lay-led 
societies followed in the Egyptian state‟s footsteps in terms of modernization but especially in 
education.  Some significant lay-led societies that did work in educational and societal realms 
can be cited as follows:  Jam„iyyat al-Mahabah, (The Mahabah Society) and the Jam„iyyat al-
Tawfiq (The Tawfiq Society). Both societies opened secular education institutes to raise new 
Coptic generations. For example, established in 1902, al-Mahabah provided secular education 
to Coptic girls for free.  It also opened numerous schools in Cairo that operated throughout the 
first half of the 20
th
 century. On the other hand, the Tawfiq was created in 1891 by the young, 
educated, secular, civil servant Coptic men (V. Ibrahim, 2011). The society‟s objectives 
included “creation of reforming leadership” and “reaction to British colonialism”. The Tawfiq 
operated in social and educational arenas by opening schools and helping the poor but these 
activities articulated to the nationalist ideology of the 1910s prevalent in Egypt.  
In summary, many Coptic societies were established beginning from the late 19
th
 century. Their 
final objective was to fill the “spiritual” vacuum highlighting the failures of the Church in terms 
of religious education. It was believed through charity activities young Coptic generations will 
get better education and learn more about their religion and culture. Though these societies 
were somehow in relation with the Church, religious ignorance and material corruptness of the 
Church were the main causes for the emergence of such societies. Nevertheless, the existence 
of so many Coptic societies meant factionalism, which manifested itself not only over the 
Coptic waqf administration but also at political mobilization. Dividedness among Coptic 
charities and the Church .prevented the Copts from mobilizing against state authorities since 
they were busy dealing with internal problems. 
3.3.1 The Resolution of the Majlis al-Milli Issue and A Devout Authoritarian 
The Majlis al- Milli has always been a conflicting subject between the Church and laymen.  
While the laymen argued that clergymen misappropriated waqf income and made a personal 
fortune whereas the community suffered poverty, the clergymen rejected such an idea and did 
not want to share power. What happened beginning from 1883 until the early 1960s is, until 
Nasser passed a special regulation to manage Coptic awqaf and reduced much of the Church 
properties, the Majlis al-Milli would make claims on waqf administration and income directly 
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to be channeled to the community and the clergymen will usually side with the Pope to secure 
their interests. The Patriarch hopefuls cooperated many times with the Majlis al-Milli 
promising to hand over control and yet did not fulfill their promises once they were elected.  To 
put pressure on the Church, the Majlis al-Milli encouraged Coptic societies to rally against the 
Church and in response the Church created its own societies. Of course, this resulted in 
factionalism that plagued the Coptic community. More importantly, the conflict between the 
Church and the Majlis al-Milli involved the state either by the laymen‟s invitation or the 
church. For example, during Khedive Abbas Hilmi Pasha‟s reign (1892-1914) the laymen asked 
the Khedive to broker a compromise that resulted in their favor (V. Ibrahim, 2011). The 
Patriarchy also asked the state to intervene in times of crisis as documented by the acts of Cyril 
VI who served as Pope between 1959 and 1971.  
The conflict continued until late Pope Shenouda brokered a resolution between the Church 
administration and the Majlis al-Milli by opening subcommittees to control Church activities 
efficiently but making sure that the Majlis al-Milli is chaired by himself (Meinardus, 1999). 
The lesson to be drawn from the above debate is that internal conflicts divided the Copts and 
limited the chance of Coptic mobilization. Nevertheless, the late Pope Shenouda did not only 
solved the historic waqf administration issue but also took the final steps in reforming the 
Church and centralizing it and having direct control over every diocese in the country.  This 
was achieved through the Sunday School Movement that brought Coptic enlightenment under 
the Church leadership by providing education to Coptic children that promoted the distinct 
Coptic language and identity but being Egyptian as well. 
3.4 Sectarian Conflict or Inter-Communal Conflict?  
The tension between the Muslims and the Copts is usually described as sectarian conflict with a 
loose use. However, despite religion being one of the fundamental causes of conflict, this study 
suggests to be more cautious when discussing this issue as there is persuasive evidence showing 
economic and social disputes constitute a significant part of the tension and usually articulate to 
a language of sectarianism. Sociologists like Mariz Tadros, Elizabeth Iskander and the EIPR 
use the term sectarian conflict without paying attention to nuances. Some others problematize 
Egyptian state‟s approach to the problem and takes the state as the unit of analysis that results 
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in a “state of sectarian denial” (Tadros, 2011b).  Elizabeth Iskander argues that sectarian 
conflict does not only refer to religion but also to how the conflict is discussed in the media that 
is “fitna” in Egyptian media (E.Iskander, personal communication, March 25, 2012). EIPR 
(2010) goes one step further while discussing sectarian violence and use an all-inclusive 
definition that plagues this study
17
: 
 Any use of violence, regardless of degree or type, by an individual or group affiliated 
 with  one religion against an individual or group not affiliated with that religion, or 
 against their  property or houses of worship, if religious affiliation was one of the 
 motives of violence  or a factor in the escalation of violence included attacks on 
 religious practices, places of  worship or religious symbols (p.4). 
However, I find good reason to believe that economic and social reasons are also important 
factors in this conflict. For example, an officer who worked for the Early Warning and Conflict 
Prevention Council that was established after the January 25 revolution, told me that especially 
in Upper Egypt and in poverty ridden neighborhoods of Cairo and Alexandria,  social and 
economic problems turns out to create conflicting problems between the two communities (N. 
al-Ashwal, personal communication, March 27, 2012). Problems related to business, 
competition between two shop owners turns to a conflict between two communities since 
people want to stick to their fundamental identity markers as they need support from their 
communities to overcome such problems.  Further, an EIPR officer told me that there are 
recorded cases in textile sector, for instance, that have “nothing to do with religion” but resulted 
in sectarian clashes (I. Assaad, personal communication, March 26, 2012).  Last but not least, 
recalling that one of the most contentious issues, conversion, stems from practical socio-
economic reasons that reflect the role of such factors without excluding the religious 
dimension. In sum, while religion plays a significant role in the Egyptian society and politics, 
this study suggests economic and social problems have salient roles in inter-communal 
                                                 
17
 Unfortunately, EIPR has deleted this paragraph from the study in the online- accessible version of the report. I was lucky 
enough to grab a paperback copy of the report that helped me to cross-check the information. Those interested in this report 
may access it from the following address: http://eipr.org/en/report/2010/04/11/776 
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relations. Therefore, to assess inter-communal relations accurately one should in every case ask 
“What is the conflict about?”. 
3.5 Conclusion 
What is to be drawn from the above discussion with regards to this study? First, the Copts 
suffer from the citizenship issues, violence against the Copts and Coptic sacred places, political 
representation, and official discrimination. Second, the Coptic Church seems to be operating as 
a state-like institution or an authoritarian state within the authoritarian state, having almost full 
authority on its community and yet, its relationship with the state has transformed into a 
conflicting one until the Tahrir Revolution. During the Revolution the late Pope Shenouda 
asked Copts not to protest against Mubarak regime but many Copts did not even consider the 
Pope. Nevertheless, the Church managed to ally itself with the Supreme Council of Armed 
Forces (SCAF), the transitional military authority having the most influential power in the 
Egyptian state apparatus, by supporting the ex-Prime Minister (feloul) Ahmad Shafiq against an 
Islamist candidate. Third, the Copts ethnopolitical mobilization is not only related to their 
sufferings as a minority but also to their desperation of change within the Church and the State. 
The Copts‟ desperation shows they wanted change not only in leadership but also in state of the 
arts of politics. To put it simply, they wanted to be citizens seeking all their rights themselves 
but not subjects destined to words of Mubarak and Pope Shenouda. 
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Chapter 4 Ethnopolitical Mobilization of the Copts: Internal, External, 
and Religious Processes 
This chapter discusses the ethnopolitical and ethnoreligious mobilization of the Copts between 
2005 and 2012 in light of the previous two chapters and the data gathered during the field 
research conducted in Egypt between February-April 2012.  The first part of this chapter will 
briefly discuss the basic model of Gurr with regards to the Coptic issue. While the fundamental 
variables of Gurr‟s model will be used, some additional variables will be employed to shed 
more light on this subject and give the whole picture.  Both internal and external processes will 
be examined in this part first at the group level and then the governmental level, respectively. 
The group level analysis will exhibit characteristics of the Copts in terms of discrimination, 
group identity and cohesion. Government level of analysis will cover the responses of the state 
apparatus, its internal and international political and economic status. 
In the second part, Fox‟s ethnoreligious conflict model will be combined with Gurr‟s model to 
assess the religious dynamics of the conflict. Here, both communal level relations and 
institutional conflict and cooperation will be tracked.  Further, the results of the previous 
sections will be analyzed in depth and points contrasting Gurr‟s and Fox‟s models will be 
critically examined. 
4.1 The Copts’ Ethnopolitical Mobilization: Internal and External Processes 
Examining four cases of ethnopolitical mobilization, Harff and Gurr (2004) posit two different 
types of ethnopolitical groups, ethno-nationalists and group contenders. The distinction 
between ethno-nationalists and group contenders is that while the former communities seek 
autonomy or independence, group contenders clearly fight against discrimination without the 
objective of political autonomy. Though the distinction between the two groups is not rigid and 
these groups can be accommodated in the system if a compromise could be achieved, this study 
will employ the group contenders concept as the Copts do not claim independence and see 
themselves as an integral part of Egypt. The Copts have fought against official state 
discrimination and exclusion, demanding equal political and religious rights, public 
employment and promotion, and an end to state of insecurity caused by the state‟s non-
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enforcement of the rule of the law that encourage the Muslim majority to use discriminate 
against the Copts. Below I track these topic by topic. 
4.1.1 Political and Economic Discrimination between 2005 and 2012 
Beginning as early as the late 19
th
 century, the Copts have always claimed that they are 
underrepresented in the Egyptian Parliament, compared to their share of the population. As 
Table 1 shows (p.34), in the last three elections the number of the elected Copts decreased 
gradually while the Mubarak regime substituted this situation by appointing Coptic Parliament 
members from his presidential quota. Nevertheless, one should examine why the number of 
elected Copts in Parliament decreased and why the authoritarian regime appointed Coptic 
members to Parliament.   
According to Harff and Gurr‟s ethnopolitical mobilization model, limiting political 
participation of a community is an indicator of high level of grievance. While one might think 
there are public policies restricting the Copts‟ participation in political arena, there is no 
established official public policy preventing the Copts from being elected to Parliament. 
However, that does not necessarily mean the Copts are easily elected to Parliament. Compared 
to the Muslim community, Coptic political participation and representation is low but better 
than the Baha‟is who are not allowed to become citizens if they do not convert to Islam, let 
alone have any political participation. To understand how this low level of political 
participation causes grievances one should look at the underlying reasons and dynamics. 
Therefore, the question is why do the Copts participate in politics in low level and what are the 
community‟s reaction to this phenomenon? 
First, though there is no clear public policy restricting the nomination of the Copts to 
Parliament, the Copts have been underrepresented on candidate lists of the hegemonic political 
parties of Nasser, Sadat, and lastly Mubarak‟s National Democratic Party (NDP). Even if the 
Copts managed to be on the lists, despite their limited number, the NDP rarely nominated them 
as the in the first place in the national elections. The Copts running electoral campaigns 
competed with their rivals, be it NDP candidates, independent NDP candidates, or from any 
other political party, not only on the grounds of merit and political campaigns but also 
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religiously since other candidates urge their constituency to vote for Muslims. A Coptic 
activist, aged 22, who is also a regular visitor to the church, told me that not only the Muslim 
Brothers but also other NDP candidates vilified the Coptic candidates by arguing that these 
Copts will terminate Islam (B.G., personal communication, March 4, 2012). 
Second, despite the vast number of Coptic officers in the state apparatus, except for Muslim 
religious institutions and courts, the number of senior Coptic officers in state institutions is 
quite rare (S. E. Ibrahim, 1996; Zeidan, 1999). Though the Copts are qualified enough to 
occupy such positions, the state apparatus has a tacit policy of not accepting the Copts to 
reputable institutions such as the Police Academy and the military colleges. Further, those who 
work in public institution can only rise to certain position since they will not be appointed and 
promoted to such positions as such positions are reserved only for Muslims. This signals a 
policy of exclusivist citizenship approach allowing only Muslims to occupy certain positions as 
they constitute “the core” of the nation and thus loyal to it. While such a policy is irrelevant 
given the Copts contribution to the construction of Egyptian nation-state, the Copts are 
unofficially forced to convert to Islam if they want to be part of administrative elite. This policy 
dates back to the Free Officer‟s coup, which included no Copt in its ranks, and since then loyal 
Copts rarely could become senior officials. The Nasser regime did not hesitate to remove the 
Copts from political participation on the national level by not treating them as individual 
citizens and supported the rise of religious autocratic power within the Church (Philipp, 1988). 
Nevertheless, one should also question if there is any increase in Coptic conversion to Islam 
and how was this encouraged by the Mubarak regime or the majority. Almost all of the 
interviewees I talked to during my field research told me that the Mubarak regime encouraged 
people more than ever to convert to Islam to advance in career or did not interfere when Salafist 
groups forced Copts to do so. As 35 year old, male unemployed Copt put it: “They want us to 
convert to Islam by making being Copt costly to us” (B.M.G., personal communication, March 
12, 2012).  However, it is well known that converted Copts do not become pious Muslims, as it 
is desired. So, why did the Mubarak regime want the Copts to convert to Islam? Has this been a 
state policy for long time but accelerated in the last ten years?  The answer lies in the tactics the 
competitive authoritarian regime used to respond to the legitimacy challenges it faced. As I 
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showed above, the Egyptian state‟s imagination of citizenship is based on being Muslim and 
loyal to the state. In addition to this policy, the Mubarak regime wanted to show to the greater 
Muslim population that it demanded a more Islamic society that the regime was listening to the 
will of its people. By giving some more room to Islam in public space, the regime tried to have 
an official version of Islam competing with that of the Muslim Brothers or the Salafi trend but 
also giving some more room to the Salafi trend as a tactic to co-opt the Ikhwan (Creswell, 
2008; Makari, 2007). The Salafi trend welcomed this approach as it had the opportunity to 
disseminate its worldview to ordinary Egyptians by making use of media and therefore compete 
with the Ikhwan. Given this phenomenon, it will not be wrong to argue official discourse by 
implicitly asking the Copts to convert to Islam created an alternative channel to discourses of 
the Ikhwan and the Salafi trend. Further, this policy simply increased Mubarak‟s legitimacy in 
the eyes of Muslim electorate, as Islamic discourse gained momentum and decreased the 
chances of Ikhwan to criticize the regime. Nevertheless, one might ask why the regime did not 
prevent forced conversion that was attributed to Salafi trend.  
The Mubarak regime wanted to have the Salafi trend under control instead of removing them 
from the political and social scene since this policy would undermine the regime‟s legitimacy 
as the Salafi trend have a significant grassroots support especially in Upper Egypt and the Delta 
(Creswell, 2008). The regime was smart enough to use this fact by not hindering the Salafis 
from converting the Copts that overlaps with the state‟s policy, and also to threaten the Copts to 
be loyal to the regime.  
The above two points indicating high (official discrimination in public employment and 
promotion) and medium (conversion) levels of discrimination causing another medium level 
grievance: low level of participation in political sphere. Knowing they will be discriminated 
against and have to be approved by the Church (unofficially) and NDP, and the high costs and 
probability of failure in running independent, they did not participate much in political 
processes. Therefore, while one might think the Copts voluntarily do not enter politics as their 
Muslim fellows did, the barriers created by the regime are the main causes of political 
exclusion. Nevertheless, compared to the past, the number of Copts on lists of either NDP  or 
other political parties rose to 57 and 74, respectively, in 1995 and 2000 elections (Abdel-Latif, 
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2000).  However, none of the 57 Copts were nominated by the NDP in 1995 and only three 
were named in the lists in 2000. Indicating an increase in Coptic political participation, these 
statistics decreased significantly in 2010 as there were only 81 Coptic candidates running for a 
seat out of 5,725 hopefuls, and only two Copts remained to the run-off (El-Rashidi, 2010).  So, 
given all of the above points why to run for a seat in Parliament? 
However, to gain more legitimacy the Mubarak regime always appointed some Copts from the 
quota given to the president to supplement by the general picture of the country. Nevertheless, 
as I mentioned above, Mr. President would always negotiate the names of these MP‟s with the 
Church leadership. Therefore, these Coptic MP‟s have always shown loyalty to their patronage 
both to the regime and to the Church. Further, if Mr. President appointed five or six Copts to 
Parliament one of them would certainly be woman, a policy that shows the reluctance of 
Mubarak to give some more room to Copts and women. Part of the agreement included 
appointing two or three of these Copts as ministers, usually to less influential state ministries 
that have an international mission that actually contributed further to internal and international 
legitimacy of the regime. While this has been a policy of the authoritarian regime, Copts who 
have problems with the Church leadership criticized this situation thinking Mubarak paid only 
lip service. 
In terms of economics, Harff and Gurr‟s proposed indicators of economic discrimination 
applying to Copts in a low level since the Egyptian state did not restrict the economic activities 
or access to material professional or managerial positions in the private sector except limiting 
access to some certain offices. However, the Copts cannot be Arabic teachers and gynecologists 
since Arabic is taught with Quran instead of an ordinary language book and it is thought that 
Muslim women showing their private organs to a Christian will commit “haram”. Many Copts 
then ask why Coptic women have to show their private organs to a Muslim gynecologist. Or is 
it necessary to be Muslim to be proficient in Quran to be an Arabic teacher?  These two policies 
resulted in Coptic hospitals and schools serving mainly to Copts but also attracting Muslim 
students and patients who search better quality service. Nonetheless, even the establishment of 
such institutions is evidence to the polarization of the Egyptian society. 
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Despite the nationalization policy of Nasser, the state employed hundreds of Copts in Ministry 
of Finance, Ministry of Public Works, and in transportation related institutes (Beshai, 1998). 
Nevertheless, one should bear in mind historically the Copts have expertise in accounting and 
finance, and this is why they largely employed by this ministry. Different sources like Beshai 
(1998) mention how infitah policy undermined the middle class making the poor poorer and the 
rich richer that caused many Copts to seek financial aid from the Church. On the other hand, 
rich Coptic businessmen operating in every area of the Egyptian economy invested heavily 
during this process and became part of the elite business class. More importantly, the Copts 
abroad invested in Egyptian economy during Sadat‟s infitah and Mubarak‟s liberalization 
policies. Therefore, Copts have a significant share of the Egyptian economy with their 
investments inside and outside of the country and the employment opportunities they provide. 
For example, there is a story among the Copts narrated from one generation to the other. A rich 
Copt asked about why there are so many Copts doing business, answers his Muslim fellow‟s 
question by saying “You did not allow politics, what is left is economics” (Bishop A., personal 
communication, February 24, 2012). For example, Egypt‟s richest businessman, Naguib 
Sawiris, who owns Orascom Group that operates in electronics, telecommunications, and 
media, is the largest private sector employer. 
Harff and Gurr (2004) underline the importance of the political and economic discrimination 
since they do not want to derail their analysis by focusing on less important issues.  However, I 
think “everyday discrimination”, which Harff and Gurr would think a source of low level 
grievance, is as important as political and economic discrimination regarding the Copts since 
this has become a “regular social practice”. The everyday discrimination occurs in the street, 
classes, hospitals, government offices, subway, ID check and other means of face-to-face 
communication. This phenomenon has become widespread in the last ten years as Egypt 
suffered from socio-economic problems and Copts were perceived as those who are rich and 
have external support.  
Asked about how discrimination against the Copts work, a 45 year old male, to whom I will 
call AGBS, told me an example from his life that shows different aspects of state and society 
discrimination. Living in Australia, his uncle has given him the power of attorney to follow up 
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his businesses in Egypt. Three years ago his uncle asked him to take care of a court case 
regarding a business matter. Therefore, he asked a Muslim attorney to follow the case but was 
rejected. According to him, the cause was that the attorney showed reluctance when he first 
learned his name that indicate he is Copt. Negotiating the issue, the attorney wanted to check 
AGBS‟s identity to make sure that he accurately has full name and surname. Realizing that 
AGBS‟s religion is marked as Christian in his driver license and Muslim in his ID card, the 
lawyer promptly rejected him (A.G.B.S, personal communication, March 5, 2012). The 
Department of Population registers newborn Copts‟ religion as Islam in an effort to encourage 
them to be Muslim and increase the number of Muslims in the country. Last but not least, that‟s 
a very good example of the politics of numbers in a state where it is almost impossible to find 
statistics about minorities. 
Another example can be given from schools where Coptic and Muslim pupils come together 
every day. In addition to state imposed way of learning Arabic, which means the Coptic pupils 
have to learn and memorize Quranic verses, the students I interviewed reported that they have 
been discriminated in high school and university. A 20 year old, female and computer 
engineering student IZ told me that during her high school years that she was given low grades 
despite her efforts. She remembers once that she got the highest point in an exam that was 
organized as an entrance to a nationwide Physics competition. She was told that her paper 
would be reread since some “irregularities” occurred. Not surprisingly her grade was lowered 
but a Coptic teacher objected to this decision forcing the committee to change its decision and 
include IZ in the competition team (I.Z., personal communication, March 2, 2012). There are 
many examples like this. For example, if a traffic police realizes you wear on Christ tattoo or 
necklace you may be subject to fine just because you are Coptic. As 33 year old, female Copt 
put it; “No one treats you badly until they figure out you are a Copt!” (N.H., personal 
communication, March 17, 2012). The extent of everyday discrimination reached to an 
unprecedented level in the last seven years as Egyptian society was boiling as unemployment 
and poverty prevailed and the state remained ineffective to respond socio-economic demands of 
Egyptians.  
   
60 
 
On the other hand, my interview results suggest that there is a significant “differentiation” 
phenomenon among the lower, middle and upper classes of the Coptic community with regards 
to the discrimination faced in the everyday life. Despite the general grievances (political 
representation, houses of worship, conversion) of the Coptic community, people belonging to 
the upper classes are less discriminated against in everyday life as they usually work in private 
sector, live in posh neighborhoods like in al-Qahira al-Jadida, Maadi, Garden City of Cairo, 
engage in less government work and have the opportunity to find a solution to discriminative 
problems. As 20 years old, female and computer engineering student IZ put it: “If you are from 
an upper class, you don‟t experience such discrimination because you don‟t engage with the 
ordinary Egyptians in everyday life. Even if you are discriminated against, you can change your 
life” (I.Z., personal communication, March 2, 2012). Socio-economic inequality is not only 
source of discontent but also a catalyst showing which sectors of the Coptic community express 
more grievances. 
My interview with three professionals who work for foreign companies or run their own 
businesses, one as a senior administrator, another as an assistant, and the last as digital media 
expert reveal more on the differentiation phenomenon. DM is a 29 year old female and devout 
Coptic Orthodox who visits the historical Virgin Mary Church of the upper class Maadi 
neighborhood more than three times a week, told me that she did not encounter any 
discrimination as an individual until she uses public transportation and except those general 
problems regarding the community. As she remarks “If they (Muslims) see you‟re wearing 
Cross, they harass you especially if you use public transportation” (D.M., personal 
communication, March 5, 2012). Thinking harassment occurs only because they wear Crosses 
will be mistaken. Coptic women do not wear their body with niqab or headscarf that 
contradicts Islamic Egyptian traditions. Another interviewee, a 52 year old, female and 
administrative assistant, MD has experienced significant discrimination at personal level only 
once. To get rid of discrimination, MD changed her job that actually shows the difference 
between belonging to low, middle and upper classes (M.D., personal communication, February 
27, 2012). The last interviewee, a 36 year old male and digital media expert, KS, only 
recounted two personal discrimination cases and focused more on communal level problems 
(K.S., personal communication, March 25, 2012). In sum,   this abovementioned fact suggests 
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that Copts at the upper level suffer less than ordinary Copts as they have different socio-
economic life settings. Further, as in the case of KS, upper middle classes do not experience the 
same level of discrimination but speak out for the rights of their fellows and the community. 
However, DM, MD  and KS,  as professionals work five days a week which means they cannot 
attend mass on Sunday, as most working class Copts do, which is the Holy day for Copts, since 
Sunday is a workday. How do they respond this problem? While all of them attend Church 
mass more than twice a week, the Coptic Orthodox Church holds mass three times a week to 
overcome this problem as Copts have to work on this day. As a Bishop at St. George Church of 
the old Cairo Mar Girgis neighborhood told me the Church, aware of this problem, tried to allay 
the grievances of the community (Bishop A., personal communication, February 24, 2012). By 
holding mass on different days rather than only on Sunday, the Church prevents further 
grievances and provides flexibility to its parishes. Should the Church insist on holding the 
masses only on Sunday, “the sacred holiday” would be a more contentious issue offering the 
Copts another reason to show grievances. The flexibility of the Church has prevented further 
mobilization. 
In a nutshell, all of the three told me that they attend fasting and prayer sessions to protest 
discrimination and violence against the community and speak out for their Coptic fellows‟ 
rights as the everyday discrimination has become widespread and systematic in recent years, 
which actually caused an important level of grievance that contributed to the mobilization 
process.  However, one should question if the differentiation phenomenon causes any harm to 
group identity and cohesion?  Does this phenomenon weaken Coptic mobilization?  
4.1.2 Coptic Group Identity 
The strength of group identity can be measured by looking at the number and content of the 
traits that a group shares (Harff & Gurr, 2004). The ethnic conflict literature examines strength 
of group identity by employing the concepts of blood, language, culture, religion, history and 
the place of residence (Bayat, 2009).  This study argues that the fundamental identity marker of 
the Copts is religion as the Church has always been central to the psyche of the Copts and the 
Coptic revival was led by the Church leadership and clergymen. While providing educational 
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opportunities in parallel with the Egyptian national education curricula, the Sunday School 
Movement advocated Coptic students to learn the ancient Coptic language, the Bible, and 
community service. Meeting every Sunday after mass, Coptic students developed networks in 
the universities for solidarity and contribution to their community beginning from the 1940s. It 
has been argued that the Sunday School has reached over 85,000 Coptic participants in the 
early 1990s (Hassan, 2003). Another striking example is that the Coptic Church initiated sports 
activities such as football that now constitute the largest football league with over 700 clubs 
and more than 10,000 players and  yet there is no Coptic player in the Egyptian national team 
(Al-Ahram, 17/08/2011).  
The School‟s impact includes but not limited to giving a distinct sense of identity to the 
students by raising them as the sons of pharaohs and followers of St. Mark of Alexandria. 
During my field research I interviewed some Coptic students from the American University in 
Cairo and Cairo University who told me their Coptic identity was solidified during their studies 
at the Sunday School that they started to attend very young. Further, in line with the Church 
leadership‟s ideas, these students have established Coptic student organizations committed to 
helping poor Copts living in the poor villages of Upper Egypt.  This brings us to the idea of 
centrality of the Church to the Copts daily life, and therefore their identity, since the Church 
undertakes a remarkable amount of social service through its vast church network. For 
example, the Church helps the poor in Upper Egypt not only by providing basic services but 
also through dense networks of employment that actually results in loyalty to the Church and 
pride in being Coptic. 
Last but not least, the Coptic identity seems to be strong as it has articulated the notions of 
“persecution” and “martyrdom”. The Church has developed a discourse of persecution and 
martyrdom since the armies of Amr al- „As conquered Egypt. This discourse reached to an 
unprecedented level after the 1960s as the migration to United States, Australia and Canada 
resulted in strong Coptic diaspora groups that became more radical than their fellows in Egypt. 
Further, they relate this discourse with martyrdom since the Church considers those who 
suffered from discrimination and killed in conflicts with Muslims as “martyrs”. Therefore, 
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whenever Copts have clashes with Muslims and are killed, the Church names them as martyrs, 
a policy that polishes the Coptic identity, if not strengthens it. 
Though there are no visible racial characteristics between the Copts and the Muslims, the Copts 
differentiate themselves by drawing a visible Christ tattoo on their arms. All of the Copts (24) 
that I interviewed were wearing tattoos. Asked about why they exhibit such tattoos, my 
interviewees told me that it shows what and how they feel in addition to the convenience and 
security it provides. It also helps the Church to check the identities of those attending the 
Sunday mass, Liturgy, and entrance to Coptic sacred places.   
Language, culture, race and place of residence are not as important as religion since these 
concepts are intertwined regarding the Coptic-Muslim relationship.  First, the Copts do only use 
the Coptic language in religious ceremonies and only the Church sponsored people are able to 
study this language. Therefore, for centuries the Church publishes the Bible in Arabic as Copts 
have forgotten the Coptic language, except the words they learned in the Sunday School. Also, 
using this language in public is simply meaningless as nobody is able to communicate. During 
my field research I attended a Coptic mass on a Friday morning in which many religious songs 
were sang in Arabic and many could not join the parts in Coptic language. Second, it is difficult 
to argue there is a unique Coptic culture as the Muslims and Copts shared a common Egyptian 
culture.  Third, some Copts argue they are pure successors of ancient Egypt with a primordial 
emphasis and, for them, the word Egypt dates back to Pharonoic era whereas Muslims think it 
simply refers to an Islamic Egypt.  While this debate has concrete background, generally there 
is no dispute between the Copts and Muslims unless an Arab nationalist emphasis on the 
Egyptian identity is put.  The last concept, the place of residence, is not an influential identity 
marker since both Copts and Muslims base their identities on the territorial notion of Egypt.  
Egyptian people differentiate themselves geographically without considering ethnic or 
ethnoreligious roots. The basic distinction among the Egyptians is either being from the rural 
Upper Egypt (Nile Valley) as they call it in Arabic, Sa‟idi and being from Cairo, the capital or 
the Delta that is considered to be near abroad.  
Overall, despite the weakness of distinctive points I find the Copts group identity quite strong 
primarily based on religion but also has a primordial emphasis that finds its roots in the 
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Pharaonic Age. Nevertheless, while all Copts speak Arabic, the Coptic revival and the teaching 
of Coptic language has remarkable influence on their identity since it gives them a pride and 
offers opportunities to differentiate themselves from the Muslim “other”. Once the Copts were 
able to use their language in their daily life as a community, for example, the scene would be 
quite different. 
4.1.3 Church Leadership and Group Cohesion 
Harff and Gurr (2004) posit that as interaction and communication between the leadership and 
followers increases the group cohesion rises. However, if the number of factions or challenging 
groups increase group cohesion decreases. The dense network of communication and 
interaction link leaders with their followers and assert a unifying belief system or an ideology. 
Strong group leaders are usually able to subordinate their followers and mobilize them in 
certain directions.  
The Coptic Church leadership has developed an advanced network of communication and 
interaction since Pope Shenouda III became the Patriarch in 1971. The Church newspaper, al-
Kiraza, Sunday School Movement, social service, and improvement of transportation facilities 
all served to the enhancement of group cohesion and strength of Church leadership. Further, the 
Church expanded as internal migration to Cairo and international migration to the United 
States, Canada and Australia gained momentum, new churches were established to serve the 
parishes, increase their belonging to the Church and provide the Church control over them.   
Though my field research does not contradict the strength of the group cohesion, it actually 
reflects different dimensions of the group cohesion. Asked about what do they think about the 
group cohesion and unity of the Coptic Orthodox community, almost all of my interviewees 
gave me examples proving the unity of the community. However, asking open-ended questions 
revealed to me that there are problems between the religious leadership and some followers. 
For example, 45 year old female RW revealed that she thinks the Pope has a political role and 
she did not like the Church‟s alignment with the Mubarak regime (R.W., personal 
communication, March 14, 2012).  She went further to argue that Pope Shenouda was too 
conservative even for Copts. To understand what kind of role has the Church in her life, I asked 
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her if she attends Church sessions. She told me that she rarely goes to church, which led me to 
question if there is a relationship between the frequencies in attending mass and group 
cohesion. After I finished my field research, I reclassified my findings with regards to church 
attendance and found those (8) who attend church sessions twice or more than twice a week 
usually follow the path of the Church and show inclination to be more conservative. 
Despite the Protestant and Catholic denominations existence in Egypt, they do not compromise 
more than five per cent of the total Coptic community and have good relations with the Coptic 
Orthodox Church (Delhaye, 2012). The only dispute between these Coptic Christian 
denominations is the case of conversion, which is a result of the Coptic Orthodox Church‟s 
stance towards divorce. The Coptic Orthodox Church does not allow divorce unless one of the 
spouses committed adultery and in case of conversion, and only the Coptic Orthodox Church 
has the authority to divorce,- which takes years-, if they would like to remain in Coptic 
Orthodox parishes. Therefore, Copts sometimes convert to other denominations or Islam to get 
rid of this strict rule.  
In summary,  this study finds the Copts‟ group cohesion high and the Church leadership strong 
as the Church is the sole authority on  religious issues, the services it provide and the charisma 
and intelligence of the late Pope Shenouda III who unified the community around his 
leadership. The Copts organized fasting and praying sessions in March 2012 in al-Moqattam in 
large numbers for Pope Shenouda III who had health problems despite the treatment he had in 
the United States. When Pope Shenouda III passed away on March 17, 2012, while I was 
pursuing my field research in Cairo, Cairo streets were full of people making it impossible to 
wander around. 
High level of group cohesion and strong leadership do not necessarily mean there is unity on 
which issues to address. Instead, conflicts within groups usually arise on which issue to 
address. For example, as 36 year old male and digital media expert KM told me many Copts 
does not want the Church to negotiate for them as they want to force the regime to deal with 
them as full citizens. He puts it as follows: “Mubarak always talked to Pope but not to us. We 
don‟t want Pope Shenouda to negotiate for us, we wanted to be treated as equal citizens but not 
as a minority under Pope Shenouda” (K.S., personal communication, March 25, 2012).  
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Picture 1 Pope Shenouda III, Funeral Ceremony, March 20, 2012 Source: Al- Jazeera  
 
The Church and its leadership has almost been the “absolute” ruler of the community, therefore 
no group or individual could challenge it. Even those who reject this authority, as it is in the 
case of  agnostic Buthros Ghali who was nominated as the General Secretary of the United 
Nation in 1991, individuals had to ask Pope Shenouda‟s blessings (Hassan, 2003). In line with 
this phenomenon, the recently established Coptic groups like Free Copts and the Maspero 
Youth operate through non-religious means since they are smart enough to know, the number of 
their followers will decrease if they ever dispute the Church.   
4.1.4. The Political Environment in Egypt (Competitive Authoritarian Regime) 
The authoritarian Mubarak regime was on the brink of remarkable change in early 2000s since 
Hosni Mubarak had health problems and the ruling elite wanted to transfer power to his son 
Gamal Mubarak to maintain the regime. Gamal Mubarak was educated in the West, had 
management experience, was able to speak English and appointed as “Head of the Policy 
Committee” (Amin, 2011).  The regime tried to portray Gamal Mubarak as the future president 
who will further modernize the country, cure economic problems and achieve prosperity.  
The economic liberalization program went hand in hand with the façade political 
democratization program. In 2005, the first multi-candidate presidential elections were held in 
which the Ghad Party leader Ayman Nour competed against Mubarak getting 7.3 per cent of 
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the votes
18
. Further, in 2005 Parliamentary elections were also held on a competitive basis but 
consisted of three rounds that actually aimed at preventing non-NDP candidates entering the 
Parliament.  Why did the Mubarak regime undertake such a reform process if he did not want 
democratization? 
Two dimensions may be helpful in analyzing this issue; international and local dynamics. First, 
Egypt has been a major recipient of assistantship from International Finance Institutions (IFIs) 
and the United States.  IFIs‟ assist regarding economic liberalization cannot be taken without a 
price since such institutions require recipient states to follow certain agendas by implementing 
“conditionality” policy (Blaydes, 2011). Further, the United States invested large amounts of 
funds through United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and the bilateral 
agreement on military aid. International actors‟ pressure on Mubarak‟s regime for further 
democratization was reluctantly responded and sophistically employed for regime 
legitimization. Second, the Egyptian nation has been desperate for many years since “change” 
did not come and no socio-economic or political improvement was achieved. By giving some 
space to opposition forces such as the Muslim Brotherhood, the regime was able to present 
itself as relatively democratic and to sustain control over the public. More importantly, it forced 
the regime to enlarge the managing elite network by “distributing” sources to lower levels, 
which, in turn, means electoral victory (Blaydes, 2011). Last but not least, what is most 
important for this study is that this policy resulted in political protest as the people realized 
there is no hope of change if Mubarak will bequeaths power to his son. 
Overall, while this case study confirms Harff and Gurr‟s claims regarding authoritarian 
regime‟s environment, it supplement this model with “competitiveness”. Despite being a 
façade, reforms have had virtual influence on Muslim and Coptic Egyptians. This is significant 
since the regime‟s will to create fake opposition mechanisms backfired as the reforms were far 
from fulfilling people‟s demands but also signaling to the weakness of the regime. 
                                                 
18
 Ayman Nour was sentenced to five years of prison for his “misconduct” during the presidential elections translating that he 
“rigged” the elections by winning 7% per cent out of 100 (Amin, 2011). 
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4.1.5 Egyptian State’s Use of Violence 
State or majority group led violence is one of the key concepts in conflict mobilization and 
transformation. Intractable conflicts usually contain political mass murder, genocide and 
massacres that are the highest level of oppression, which mobilizes ethnic groups to confront 
the state or majority groups. Further, widespread torture, executions and evacuations are less 
influential in the mobilization process but Harff and Gurr do not deny that such factors may be 
enough for mobilization.  There is no record of Egyptian state‟s use of systematic violence 
especially against the Coptic minority during the whole history of Egyptian nation state except 
the Maspero massacre of 2011 (which will be explored below). 
However, what Harff and Gurr‟s model does not mention is the state apparatus might always 
find another way of using violence. In Egypt, during Mubarak‟s era, all the people were subject 
to police violence, which caused them to say “Every Egyptian will experience police-led 
violence”. This was a result of “state of emergency” that gave numerous unchecked 
mechanisms to the police department beginning from President Sadat‟s assassination until late 
May 2012, when it was dissolved by the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces.  So, does only 
extreme and direct state use of force facilitate mobilization?  This study supplements Harff and 
Gurr‟s model with the idea that the state apparatus sometimes encourage majority groups to use 
systematic violence against ethnopolitical groups by not punishing those who lead the violence. 
In the Egyptian case, the state apparatus did not prevent violence against the Copts even if it 
had the intelligence and did not enforce the rule of law to discourage the Muslims. 
In summary, I find the Egyptian State‟s use of violence at medium severity as the state used 
extreme violence only once, but encouraged the Muslim majority to do so tacitly. Therefore, I 
assume the severity of violence do not cause a high level mobilization since violence becomes 
an everyday phenomenon that people get used to and after a while do not react. 
4.1.6 External Support to the Copts 
Ethnopolitical rebellion groups seek external support to challenge more effectively the state 
they are fighting against as they lack strategic means of sources. Therefore, assessing the extent 
of external support, Harff and Gurr (2004) suggest that if ethnic groups get external support 
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such as weaponry, mercenaries, financial support, and intelligence information the extent varies 
from medium to high-level support. Since the Copts do not assume autonomy or independence 
and do not have organized armed rebel groups, they do not get aid to this extent. To argue the 
Copts get verbal encouragement to protest will be unfounded since the only concrete material 
that we can assess as external support is international human rights groups investigations and 
the U.S. and France‟s warnings to the Egyptian state. For example, Christian Solidarity 
International, an evangelical institution working on Christian persecution, and Coptic 
Foundation for Human Rights  published a report on how Coptic girls abducted by Muslim 
Egyptian so as to attract more attention  of the U.S. President and United Nations and 
investigate it in detail (Christian Solidarity International, 2009). Further,  ex-French Foreign 
Affairs Minister  Alain Juppe stated that France understands worries of Copts and Maronites 
and France “was and will remain by your (Copts and Maronites) side”(Juppe, 2012, p. 1). 
However, this does not go beyond verbal support and actually backfires since Muslims think 
Copts are supported by Christian France and threaten Islam. 
Overall, I find the extent and level of external support to Copts low and this support does not 
have a direct impact on the mobilization of the Copts. And yet, indeed, it has a counter-
productive influence as there are always rumors arguing that Copts ask external support or 
betray the nation transmitted around among the Muslims. However, the influence of the Coptic 
diaspora groups is significant, as these groups usually draw attention of world public opinion, 
American Congress and human rights organizations (will be elaborated below). This 
phenomenon provokes the Muslim majority as they think that Copts get aid from international 
powers such as the United States or international organizations.  
4.1.7 International Economic Status  
Harff and Gurr‟s (2004) model suggests that  regimes that possess significant scarce resources 
or those have a stable economy usually enjoy higher status as international powers are cautious 
in intervening in these countries‟ conflicts. However, rebel groups fighting resource-poor 
countries or weak economies are likely to get international support. Harff and Gurr‟s 
propositions regarding Mubarak regime‟s international economic status do not apply to Egypt 
due to the following three factors.  
   
70 
 
First, the Copts did not rebel in any phase of the conflict. Second, the Egyptian state do not 
possess any kind of scarce resource and its economy depends much on tourism revenues and 
foreign direct investment, which according to World Banks statistics “fell by 50 percent from 
2009 to 2010 to an average $3.7 billion, or under 1 percent of GDP, and even further in 2011 to 
$0.9 billion” (World Bank, 2012).  Further, the World Bank statistics also show that 19.5 % of 
Egyptians lived under poverty line in 2005 and that numbers rose to 22% in 2008. As of late 
2011, the economic situation deteriorated further leading  Daron Acemoglu to say “Fully 20% 
of the population lives in dire poverty” (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012). So, these statistics 
require one to question to why foreign powers did not intervene. The answer is the third factor 
and is threefold: Egypt is a significant ally of the United States and Israel that are party to the 
Middle East peace arrangements, namely Camp David order, simply Copts have never asked 
for such an intervention, and Egypt does not possess natural resources that may cause conflicts, 
as suggested in civil wars literature. Lastly, as a well-informed scholar argued  the Western 
world did not hesitate to pay lip service even to democratization in the Arab world, let alone 
Coptic issue, in order to maintain the status quo (Norton, 2009). Why to interfere if nobody is 
asking and there is no interest?  
4.1.8 Geographical Differences 
The Nile has fed the Egyptians for centuries as if it is a hydraulic conveyor starting from 
African countries and passing to Upper Egypt by irrigating the fields and by disemboguing 
from Alexandria which is called the Delta region. The Delta and Lower Egypt have always 
enjoyed prosperity, as they were more suitable to agriculture that has been until lately the 
primary source of Egyptians‟ income. Historically, these regional differences have markedly 
influenced Egypt‟s destiny in terms of economy and governance (Monson, 2007). 
Industrialization and urbanization in the late 19
th
 and early 20
th
 centuries caused regional 
differences to be clarified as Lower Egypt was home to the capital city, Cairo and Alexandria a 
significant port town of the Levant. Therefore, people suffering from poverty in Upper Egypt 
migrated to Lower Egypt in large numbers in search of better employment opportunities in 
private and public sectors. The Copts coming from Minya and Assiut to Cairo attached 
themselves with the Church as a care provider and that fostered the Coptic identity. 
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While newcomers confronted with the challenges of modern life, those remained in Upper 
Egypt enjoyed a low level of state authority as the state apparatus could only exist there through 
the security apparatus that makes compromises with the tribes. While this is a historical 
problem of Egyptian state‟s centralization and given the lack of public authority and services, 
tribes have provided necessary services and administered their own areas. Therefore, different 
tribes have encountered conflicts over the administration of their areas, lands and delivery of 
the services.  How does this phenomenon reflect itself regarding the Coptic problem in Egypt? 
The Egyptian Initiative for Personal Rights (EIPR, 2010) finds that more than fifty per cent of 
the conflicts between 2008 and 2010 occurred in Upper Egypt. While EIPR labels them as 
sectarian conflicts, this study is more cautious about the source of the conflict. Therefore, in a 
modest way, this study suggests that socio-economic and tribal issues matter in mobilization. 
4.2 Integrating Ethnoreligious Model into Ethnopolitical Mobilization 
Framework 
Religious discrimination is likely to result in religious grievances, as there is a causal 
relationship between the two phenomenons. In terms of protest, religious grievances appear as 
religious demands in two forms: passive and active. Passive grievances are those reactions to 
discrimination, whereas active grievances are demands for religious rights.  However, is there a 
direct relationship between the level of active/passive grievances and protest? Answering this 
question reveals the most perplexing dilemmas of ethnoreligious groups. Fox (2003) finds that 
the more the passive religious grievances increase, the less the ethnoreligious minorities protest. 
However, active religious grievances result in more protest showing a positive correlation 
between demand and action.  So, the question is why ethnoreligious groups protest more when 
they demand their rights but less when they react to discrimination?   
While this question requires a high level of intellectual discussion, I will not answer this 
question right now to continue to adapt Fox‟s ethnoreligious model into Harff and Gurr‟s 
framework.  One of the basic discussions of both Harff and Gurr‟s and Fox‟s models is that 
institutions may facilitate mobilization by bringing together adherents of groups and making 
use of already established communication channels. According to Fox (2003), two types of 
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mobilization can be facilitated by religious institutions: peaceful mobilization and mobilization 
for rebellion. While the first one is conducted in the legal political field by using peaceful 
methods such as negotiation, lobbying and peaceful protest, the latter is achieved through 
illegal means such as violence and terrorism.  Nonetheless, when do religious institutions 
facilitate mobilization and what kind of mobilization do they lead. How does this relationship, 
if there is any, work? 
Fox (2003) provides plausible and eloquent evidence that religious institutions tend to facilitate 
peaceful mobilization only when “religion is perceived to be at risk” (p. 166). Why, then one 
asks, do religious institutions not facilitate mobilization in other cases? The answer is that elites 
use such institutions to support the status quo for the sake of the religion and religious interests 
unless and until religion and these institutions are at risk. Why risk the material gains if 
religious grievances are low and religion itself is not threatened by other actors?  Further, 
mobilization for rebellion is also influenced by religious institutions, as Fox (2002) shows, 
since such a mobilization is related to autonomy religious institutions may hinder such a 
mobilization process to protect their interests. It is interesting that Fox (2003) reports that 
mobilization is highest when there are formal houses of worship but not ecclesiastical networks 
that refers to religious leadership negative role in mobilization. That is, religious leaders and 
institutions do not always facilitate or support mobilization processes. However, in contrast to 
Fox‟s claims religious institutions may remain ambivalent towards mobilization and facilitating 
or supporting mobilization until conditions are ripe and vital interests are threatened or 
destroyed by the opponents. Further, provocation plays a significant role during this process, as 
houses of worship and protests of the “other” may provoke the majority group and cause more 
discrimination against a group (Fox, 2002). Nevertheless, one should also ask if religious 
discrimination intensify the level of group cohesion. 
Harff and Gurr (2004) theorize that the level of group cohesion increases if perceived or real 
discrimination rise or add to group identity. Fox (2003) finds exactly the vice versa of this fact, 
that is religious discrimination decreases group identity and cohesion rather than increasing it.  
So, why it is so?  Why and how Harff and Gurr‟s (2004) and Fox‟s (2003) findings contrast 
each other?   
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One possible explanation is that the wide variety of discrimination in different fields that may 
cause “dissension” within the group regarding which is to be addressed first. This is why Fox 
(2003) concludes if there is only one type of discrimination the group cohesion is likely to be 
stronger. For example, if there is only religious discrimination the group may come together 
under one flag easily whereas if there is political and religious discrimination the group may be 
divided regarding which issue to address first. That is likely to cause the establishment of 
different factions within the group.  How all of the abovementioned factors can be applied to 
the Coptic issue? 
Four hypotheses of Fox‟s ethnoreligious model have been discussed above briefly. The first 
hypothesis is that religious grievances are likely to result in mobilization applies to the Copts in 
one form: peaceful mobilization. I find that Copts both react to religious discrimination and 
demand for religious rights between 2005 and 2012 at medium level, but remarkably increasing 
from 2011 to 2012. Nevertheless, I will discuss how the Copts reacted to discrimination in 
detail below as the Church asks the parishes to pray and fast after discrimination incidents took 
place.  However, some Copts also actively pursued their rights in the street and did not hesitate 
to protest both the Mubarak regime and the Church. This brings us to the second hypothesis 
that religious institutions may facilitate mobilization unless religious elites have significant 
interests in not doing so. This study finds the Coptic Church had an ambivalent stance towards 
Coptic mobilization as it did not hesitate to challenge the Mubarak regime when vital interests 
were at stake, did not support Coptic groups openly and yet did not discourage them to free the 
streets. The logic of Church‟s stance can be put as not to actively operationalize mobilization 
channels but not to discourage protesters unless they threatened the Church‟s interests. For the 
third hypothesis, the fact that there is more than one type of discrimination against the Copts 
causes lack of support to mobilization as the Church is seen the ultimate authority to protect the 
rights of the community. However, that does not necessarily decrease group cohesion of the 
Copts but indicates different methodological approaches to the problem. Fourth, provocation 
played a significant role during the mobilization process since Coptic and Egyptian media 
published widely on this issue by using a language of vilification and sometimes demonization. 
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4.3 Analysis 
How have the Copts responded to the abovementioned discrimination processes between 2005 
and 2012? Given the theoretical foundations of this study, to what extent have the Copts been 
mobilized?   If their level of mobilization was low or high, what were the causes?  
This part of the study will analyze the data gathered from the field and literature to assess the 
overall mobilization of the Copts and answer the above questions. Successes and failures of the 
group will be examined; the Mubarak regime‟s responses to the mobilization will be critically 
discussed and Muslim majority‟s stance toward this mobilization will analytically be evaluated. 
To achieve this objective, this part will periodically be divided into sections the first section 
being from 2005 to 2010 and the second from 2011 to May 2012. The analysis will be based on 
institutional and communal relations and their interaction within and out of the group that 
presents an inextricable phenomenon. 
4.3.1 The Coptic Mobilization from 2005 to 2010 
From 2000 to 2005, the relations, on the communal level, remained relatively peaceful despite a 
certain level of mutual hostility. However, beginning with 2005, there is good reason to believe 
the conflict escalated as church construction, political representation and religious conversion 
surfaced and reached a level of friction especially among the middle and lower classes.  The 
Mubarak regime allowed the Ikhwan members to run for parliamentary elections as 
independent candidates that actually caused hostility among the Copts.  
In turn, at the institutional level, the Church and the regime relationship went beyond implicit 
entente as the Church officially announced that it supported Mubarak in the first multi-
candidate presidential elections.  Further, Pope Shenouda did not only publicly announced his 
support to Mubarak‟s NDP but also, as a 30 year old male BG told me, provided bus  service to 
Coptic parishes to go to the ballots (B.G., personal communication, March 4, 2012). The 
prominent novelist Ala Al Aswany, a dentist by profession, narrates this fact by mentioning that 
one of his Coptic colleagues who is not interested in politics and has never taken the burden of 
going to the ballots, went to vote for Mubarak. When Aswany asks him why he did so, his 
friend tells him that he was at mass and the Church Priest asked him to vote for Mubarak 
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(Aswany, 2011). So, why did the Church announce its support publicly? Were there vital 
communal concerns to be lost if the support was not announced publicly? 
Though McCallum (2011) argues that Pope Shenouda supported Mubarak as the thirty years 
old regime proved to be fairly peaceful and an alternative regime may not guarantee a tolerant 
treatment, the reality is that Pope Shenouda paid the price of the President‟s involvement in the 
Wafa‟ Constantine affair of 2004 and wanted to exclude other players from the entente with 
Mubarak. The case of Wafa‟ Constantine in 2004 showed the Church leadership that the 
Ministry of Interior and the Police Department sought a new role in the regime-church entente, 
and the regime did not back the Church as it did in the past. Pope Shenouda himself had to ask 
Mubarak to intervene and solve the problem. Therefore, the Church by publicly supporting 
Mubarak in the presidential elections wanted to reassure the entente and exclude the Ministry of 
Interior and the Police Department from the relationship. This was followed by a presidential 
decree easing the restrictions on church construction awarding the Coptic Church because of its 
support. 
Nevertheless, the Church‟s objective was not only showing loyalty to the regime but also to 
reconcile the Coptic community-regime relationship as the Copts wanted to protest the regime 
over its handling of the Constatine case. By voting for Mubarak, the Copts would reassure 
security instead of an uncertain future under a possible Ayman Nour presidency, and the reform 
promising Mubarak regime would address the grievances of the Copts and protect them from 
attacks. Therefore, the Church and its leadership, given the important institutional interests in 
contrast to deterioration of communal conditions blocked the Copts from protest and 
mobilization early in 2005. The Church‟s stance changed gradually and according to the 
necessities of the day. 
However, after the 2005 elections the Pope-Mubarak relationship deteriorated as the Pope 
gradually decreased his support. Why did the relationship transformed from open public 
support to indifference? One might think that after 2005 presidential elections and 
parliamentary elections in late November that year, in which the Ikhwan won 88 seats, the 
violence against the Copts increased and alarmed the Church as the ruler of the Copts. Rather, 
if this was one reason for the withdrawal of Pope‟s political support, the more important reason 
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was establishment of a parallel Orthodox church in Cairo, Mubarak‟s attempt to amend the 
Personal Status Law, state courts‟ ruling on divorce matters and violence against Copts. 
First, as mentioned above, the Constantine affair caused a tension between the security 
apparatus and the church. The ministry of Interior that includes the police department allowed 
Max Michel to establish the Holy Synod for the Orthodox in Egypt and the Middle East. Such 
an establishment is naturally a rival to the Coptic Orthodox Church of St. Mark See and its 
Patriarch since it used similar titles and the founder, Max Michel, was suspended from the 
church by Pope Shenouda. Though Tadros (2009) interprets this as a “harsh personal and 
political message, raising questions as to whether the Ministry of Interior taking revenge for the 
Constantine affair” (p.279), actually it threatened the legitimacy of the Coptic Orthodox 
Church‟s authority and ability to manage the relationship with the regime. Given that the 
Egyptian state apparatus usually does not allow church construction and give new ID‟s to 
bishops, by allowing Max Michel to do so it created another Orthodox Coptic denomination 
that may be an alternative to the Coptic Orthodox Church of St. Mark. 
Furthermore, Max Michel wore almost the same dress with Pope Shenouda and used archs and 
cross made of gold that are reminders of Pope Shenouda. As a response the Coptic Orthodox 
Church requested the President to stop this “farce” and not to allow others to wear the same 
ecclesiastical attire. According to Tadros (2009), Pope Shenouda thought they do not know 
where President Mubarak‟s orders got lost. However, Mubarak publicly announced that he does 
not intervene in religious affairs that meant he does not back the Pope. The Pope‟s answer to 
this was ardent: “if the state supports Maximos (Max Michel), the Copts will revolt”. While this 
was a crystal clear warning to the authoritarian regime that Copts‟ support cannot be taken for 
granted, Mubarak‟s attempts can be interpreted as he does not want to rely only on the 
personality of the Pope Shenouda and his power, legitimacy or the church‟s institutional power 
over the community. 
Nevertheless, Pope Shenouda‟s words also are clear proof of Fox‟s (2003) hypothesis that 
religious leadership may not mobilize or intervene unless vital interests of the religious 
institutions are at stake. The Maximos case posed a pure threat to the Coptic Orthodox Church 
and its leadership as it undermined the entente between the regime and the Church and 
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embarrassed the Church leadership, as it could not protect its rights and status in the eyes of the 
Coptic community. Saying the Copts will revolt, Pope Shenouda posed a threat to the regime as 
he could easily mobilize the Coptic community and protest the regime.  The Sawt al Ummah 
newspaper reported on December 31, 2008 that the case was settled after a court ruling that 
denied to recognize Max Michel‟s official stamp on the grounds that there is already a patriarch 
for the Coptic Orthodox Church, and Max Michel‟s church buildings did not fulfill the law 
requirements (quoted in Tadros, 2009). 
Second, in 2009 Mubarak‟s government proposed a draft law to amend the personal status law 
that aimed at changing the family laws of both the Muslims and non-Muslims. The 
amendments are said to ease divorce for the Copts but especially women since they are the 
most contentious issues within the Copts, Muslims and between the Coptic Church and the 
Egyptian state. According to Coptic Orthodox Church traditions Copts cannot divorce without 
the legal permit of the Church, which became a legal rule after Nasser nationalized Egyptian 
courts. Further, the Coptic Orthodox Church forbids marriage from other denominations on the 
grounds to protect Orthodox traditions and values. In case an Orthodox Copt marries to 
someone from other denominations, Muslim family law is applied for divorce. Last, those who 
get a divorce by converting to another denomination or Islam were not allowed to remarry in 
the Church.  
The draft law provided the opportunity to those who wanted to divorce, to apply to the 
Egyptian State Family Courts instead of relying on a Church ruling that usually declines 
divorce requests.  Pope Shenouda rejected such amendments as they violate biblical rulings and 
it is a direct intervention in church affairs that is guaranteed by religious freedom in the 
Constitution (Aina, 2010; Mahmood, 2012). The Pope was not alone in this debate as many lay 
Coptic intellectuals supported Pope Shenouda against the state on the grounds that the Egyptian 
state does not have the right to interfere in Coptic affairs. A 43 year old, housewife told me 
“The Church‟s divorce decisions take time but we do not want the state to interfere” (M.W, 
personal communication, March 3, 2012). This indicates a discontent with the Church but 
protects it against the state, not only because the state is seen as intervener but also as a result of 
the right of Church to rule the community. Moreover, while this comment questions to which 
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areas the Egyptian state can interfere, this bold move of the regime shows its willingness to 
penetrate into the religious area that leads one to ask to what extent the Egyptian state is 
secular. Further, the amendment also eased conversion to Islam but did complicate returning 
from Islam to Christianity, “al-„aidin”. Given the benefits of conversion to Islam and costs of 
reconversion to Christianity, Mubarak regime‟s this move caused anger among the Copts as 
they perceived it an act against their existence. 
Supported by the Coptic Church some Coptic lawyers brought a case of reconversion to the 
attention of the Egyptian Supreme Constitutional Court. While this is a significant response of 
the Church to the state apparatus, the Coptic women‟s conversion and marriage is a significant 
source of conflict not only in the broader Egyptian society but also within the Coptic 
community. As 24 year old activist argued the Church provides incentives to convert as it wants 
to be in the center of individuals‟ life, in his words, “The Church wants to be the sole authority 
in our personal matters like divorce that makes many of us to follow other denominations or 
convert to Islam” (B.F.T., personal communication, March 15, 2012). This indicates discontent 
with the Church‟s policies and helps explaining the emergence of Maspero Youth as an 
ethnopolitical movement, which will be explored below.  
The amendment was procrastinated as the Ikhwan and many other Islamists rejected the idea 
because of its violation of religious traditions. In 2010, Mubarak replaced seven Copts in 
Parliament by appointment by giving a seat to an anti-Church person, Gamal Assad that was 
perceived as a betrayal by the Church authorities (Khalil & Ramadan, 2010). This was one of 
the worst moments of Mubarak-Pope Shenouda entente over the last 30 years. And yet, the 
following questions remain: to what extent is the Egyptian state is secular, and does religious 
freedom mean that a religious institution has the right not to divorce or allow the convert 
parishes to remarry?  
Third, violence against the Copts has intensified significantly and changed character.  
According to EIPR (2010), one of the most common violence types is provocation that is 
caused by houses of worship. Between 2008-2010, 62 violent incidents took place the most 
notables being the targeting of the Coptic Churches during the Coptic Christmas Eve on 
January 7, 2010 and 2011.   Despite EIPR‟s explanations that religion is the fundamental reason 
   
79 
 
of such actions; provocation usually takes form of attacking the Copts‟ houses and looting their 
shops. Why? The stories told after incidents suggest that Muslims are led by local preachers 
after Friday prayer when rumors‟ regarding a new home church is being constructed. However, 
why do the Muslims attack to Coptic houses and shops threatening them to evacuate the village 
if the problem is with the home church?  
 The incident in Bimha village of south of Giza in 2007 in which Muslim men destroyed 36 
houses and looted seven shops belonging to the Copts after the Friday prayer is a good case 
study. The below quotation explains how the process works: 
  Pamphlets distributed ahead of the violence called on Muslim villagers who wanted to 
 "protect" their religion to gather after Friday prayers, in order to stop the construction of 
 a church in their village. The pamphlet included the rumored location of the church and 
 concluded by saying that the time to act had come: there must be no more laxity, no 
 more laziness... it is necessary that every Muslim protects his religion otherwise all 
 is lost (Loza, 2007, p. A3).  
However, reading between the lines there are significant details of this attack not being a 
religious one. The witnesses told the reporters that local security officers (ghafar‟) were 
involved in the riot and those who entered houses and shops did not kill anybody but stole 
jewelry and other valuables. Further, Coptic intellectual Kamal Zakhir commented that  simple 
villagers were involved in this case whereas it is usually extremist groups expected to be (Loza, 
2007). While this suggests how the unease between the two communities prevails among the 
“poor”, reading between the lines show us that the cause of the conflict may not be religious but 
economic as poverty dominated the Egyptian society. The case was reported to be solved after a 
reconciliation meeting between the locals (al-majlis al-„urfi) that actually meant parties were 
made to reach a resolution since local sheiks and other facilitators are “men of power”19.  
                                                 
19
 Reconciliation sessions are usually undertaken by the local notables to reach a resolution. However, in most cases the 
resolution is temporary as it does not satisfy the parties and only solve the problems on the surface. That‟s one of the causes 
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On the other hand, Pope Shenouda gave an interview to the Coptic newspaper Al-Watani 
criticizing the practices of the security apparatus as they arrived to the village late despite the 
intelligence they had and to the practice of forming local reconciliation committees instead of 
enforcing the rule of the law: “The problems need a radical cure not a cover up!” This was 
remarkable as it was his first time using a harsh language after an inter-communal tension. The 
number of houses destroyed, targeted shops, perpetrators (over 2,000 Muslims rioted that day) 
and involvement of local security forces seemed to alarm the Pope over insecurity as it was also 
a wider problem: the conflict between the Ministry of Interior and the Church. 
What was the response of the Coptic community?  In general, the Coptic community did not 
protest the regime openly as a minority between 2005 and 2010 except after violent incidents 
targeting Churches.  Instead, the Copts usually articulated to daily protests of the Egyptians, 
which, actually reached from a level of 49 protests per year in 2001 to hundreds per day in 
2008 (El-Ghobashy, 2011). The Copts‟ participation in Kefaya protests was partly due to their 
sufferings not because of being Copts but of being Egyptian as part of the wider society. 
Prevailing unemployment, poverty, and horizontal inequality was accompanied with increasing 
level of baseless police violence. As one activist put it “Many Copts supported the Kefaya 
because it demanded justice, equality and employment that all Egyptians suffered. We felt it 
obligatory to join the Kefaya as it was the only option for change” (B.F.T, personal 
communication, March 15, 2012). Demanding justice and employment, the Egyptian protesters 
stick together under the umbrella of the Kefaya (Enough!) Movement that was established in 
2004, electing George Ishaq, a leftist Copt as its coordinator. The Kefaya aimed at voicing 
legitimate demands of the Egyptian society asking for justice, food and democracy and the 
discourse of change found considerable support from different sectors of the society. To reach 
that end, toppling of Mubarak, Kefaya organized protests almost on a daily basis that bore no 
physical products but psychological ones. A particular influence of the Kefaya on the Copts 
were the discourse of change that contained demands related to justice and equality.   
                                                                                                                                                                         
why personal matters easily turn into inter-communal conflicts and become repetitive. Those interested in how customary 
law and mediation implemented in Egypt may read the following articles: (Nielsen, 2004) and (Zayed, 2004). 
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For many Copts, protesting was important and yet, by no means useful as it changed anything.  
Some Copts told me that they could not protest against the state institutions or the majority in 
the past because they were the same people who would take care of your protest. One Copt put 
it succinctly “to whom are you protesting against! The Police and others have the same 
understanding” (H.B., personal communication, February 19, 2012).  The Kefaya‟s impact was 
to help all Egyptians, not only Copts, to overcome their learned helplessness by showing them 
they have the power to change. Further, not participating in such movements meant living with 
their learned helplessness that causes desperation of not being able to change their destiny. 
However, not all Copts participated in protests. Why did not they go to streets? 
Asked about how they have responded discrimination or violence at communal level, those who 
visit the church, told me that they fast and pray as the Church asks them to do.  As 25 year old 
male AB who works for an NGO told me “I can go to protest as my fellows do but I think my 
job is to pray for them” (A.B., personal communication, March 10, 2012).  Therefore, instead 
of “actively” being in the streets, they fasted and prayed for their fellows as the Church did 
want them to “protest peacefully” in the Church but not in public. 
Despite this being a religio-political drawback for mobilization, from an anthropological point 
of view this can be interpreted as “passive mobilization”. Passive mobilization can be 
interpreted as a peaceful way of reacting to discrimination and violence without being in the 
streets or taking direct action against a government or a group but relying on alternative means 
of protest like praying or fasting as a way of protest or non-cooperation with state institutions.  
Yet, why do some people protest in the streets but others fast and pray?  Neither Fox‟s (2003) 
ethnoreligious model nor Harff and Gurr‟s (2004) ethnopolitical framework provides an answer 
to this question. From a vantage point, recalling my finding on mass attendance it will not be 
wrong to argue that the Church leads parishes to protest by praying and fasting that can be 
named peaceful religious mobilization in anthropological terms.  This shows us that some 
religious institutions prefer to lead their adherents in religious terms and negotiate for them 
rather than directly fighting. This phenomenon contradicts Fox‟s framework since it shows 
while the Church mobilize its followers in anthropological terms it also negotiates for the 
Church‟s and community‟s interests.  
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The Church being loyal to the entente, suffering and witnessing the community‟s grievances 
used a rhetoric of “martyrs” that is highly important in Coptic history. For example, the Copts 
have a calendar which they date from the 3rd century which Copts refer to as the “era of 
martyrs” (Caeserea, 1984; Meinardus, 1999).  St. Mark is also considered to be  a martyr, and 
those were killed in Church attacks in Al-Kosheh in 2000 are seen as martyrs (El-Magd, 2000). 
Relating martyrdom to the everyday life, the Church promotes the idea that people can relieve 
their grievances and feel spiritually closer to religious figures. For instance, an interviewee said 
“I pray and fast because in this way I feel closer to our martyrs and feel the sufferings that are 
widespread in our history. As once Pope Shenouda said, we should pray and fast and God will 
have His word” (D.M., personal communication, March 11, 2012). Another interviewee‟s 
statements show how priests play a significant role in passive mobilization by orienting people 
to fast and pray after confession sessions. She, a 43 year old public officer, stated that “Once I 
could not stand discrimination when a Coptic family was evacuated after a love affair between 
two young people. I told my priest that I want to do something and he suggested me to think of 
our martyrs and to pray and fast if I want to help my fellow Copts” (M.A, personal 
communication, March 21, 2012).  This shows how influential the Church is in orienting its 
parishes reaction and channeling them to use religious means as a way of protest.  
However, for Fox (2002) the Copts‟ low level of mobilization is related to the status of 
“dhimmi” as the Copts have lived under the Islamic rule for centuries that provide “historical 
legitimacy of religious discrimination against them” (p.159). While this idea is related to pre-
2002 context and flawed as there has been significant Coptic activism throughout the 20
th
 
century, the post-2005 context shows a rise in protest and mobilization
20
. So, why did some 
other Copts protest? How did they manage to go to streets and protest if the Church wanted 
them in the churches? 
                                                 
20
 There is evidence showing mobilization of the dhimmis under the rule of Ottoman Empire that contradicts Fox‟s claim. Fox 
fails to see how the Coptic community was divided until Pope Shenouda rose to power and does not consider the Copts status 
as part of the Egyptian society. Further, one should bear in mind that the regime provided unofficial flexibilities to Copts and 
Copts are patriotic people who stood together with their nation in its struggle against Israel and other foreign threats. 
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The shift leading the Copts to protest account for several reasons; 
1.   From 2005 to 2010, Copts usually protested along with the Kefaya demanding justice, equality 
and religious freedom and did not organize separate protests unless a Coptic Church is attacked 
and some Copts have been killed.  For example, in November 2005 when thousands Muslims 
protested in front of St. Georges Church in Alexandria after learning a film was shown in the 
Church that is believed to be vilifying Islam, no Coptic counter-protests were recorded. Instead, 
the Church and al-Azhar issued a joint statement asking Copts and Muslims not to intensify the 
tension giving an example from the regime‟s response to the problem. This suggests that 
religion can be used officially to prevent escalation of conflict and the Copts did not respond, as 
it was not a deadly attack. However, protesting after inter-communal or sectarian incidents 
provided legitimacy to Coptic grass root movements. In contrast to November 2005 Alexandria 
incident, in another case again in Alexandria in April 2006, a Coptic man was stabbed back as 
he was leaving the Church after praying. Hundreds rioted after the funeral as fervor reached to 
an unprecedented level and the Church was not able to control those leaving the funeral sermon 
(BBC, 2006). This case is of remarkable importance as it was the first protest of the Egyptian 
Copts marching outside of a church, raising Cross in the streets and chanting “We would die for 
you oh Cross!”  Raising the Cross in the streets show us that the Copts do not only demand 
equality, religious freedom and enforcement of rule of law but also to want Christian symbols 
in public next to Islamic symbols. 
2.  The character and size of the attacks against the Copts has changed beginning as early as 2005. 
EIPR (2010) finds three most common types of violence to be collective attribution, violence 
prompted by Copts engaging in their religious rites and targeting churches. In collective 
retribution cases a group of Muslims usually attacks Copts because of personal or tribal 
vendettas that aim to punish the whole “Other” community.  
After 2005, Copts‟ houses of worship were targeted frequently by unknown Muslim  arsons 
and the security apparatus failed to provide security to the community, and even  was involved 
sometimes in kindling inter-communal tension. Further, the term “houses of  worship” does 
not necessarily mean “church” and refers to those buildings used by the  Copts for religious 
purposes. However, despite its knowledge of “unofficial status” of  such buildings the 
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state does not close them down, allowing them to operate until such  buildings are targeted. 
When such buildings are targeted governors of provinces and the  security apparatus speak in 
favor of Muslims emphasizing that such buildings are already  illegal legitimizing the acts of 
the Muslims. Further, the security apparatus usually responded by setting up local 
reconciliation committees that usually covered up the problems instead of finding a durable 
resolution to the conflict.   
Covering up inter-communal clashes aggravated the fury of the Copts as no long term solution 
was provided and the perpetrators were encouraged to continue their operations.  Being the less 
frequent type of violence, targeting churches, caused intense anxiety among the Copts as these 
churches are normally “protected” by the Egyptian Police Department. As one of my 
interviewees told me, “After two of my close associates were killed and nobody was put on 
trial, I felt it necessary to go to streets and this was the first step to the establishment of Coptic 
Youth Movement, lately known as Maspero” (B.F.T., personal communication, March 15, 
2012).  
3.   The development of information technology intensified the communication between the Coptic 
diaspora and the Copts of Egypt. Living in more democratic and welfare oriented countries like 
the United States, Canada and Australia, the Coptic diaspora have made the problems of their 
fellows a “cause” for them. Since its inception in 1970s, the Coptic diaspora have been more 
radical than Copts of Egypt, not hesitating to organize protests abroad, asking human rights 
organizations to intervene and by drawing attention on the grievances of Copts. The 
information technology increased interaction between the two groups and websites, blogs, 
forums like Facebook and videos posted on video sharing websites like YouTube  became the 
fundamental tools of exchange of ideas (Brinkerhoff, 2005).  The Free Copts and Copts United 
websites work as a forum where thousands of Copts discuss communal, social and political 
issues. Plus, Coptic satellite TVs called Al-Hayat and C TV were established and focused on 
inter-communal problems projecting how the Muslims treat the Copts. 
4.3.2 Copts in the Streets 2011-2012: Cooperation or Violence? 
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Moore and Gurr (1998) found that instability and insecurity caused by regime change may give 
opportunities to ethnopolitical groups to mobilize. The recent past shows that such chaotic 
moments have provided mobilization opportunities to some ethnopolitical communities when 
the Soviet Union started to fall apart. As Charles Tilly observed once upon a time, regimes 
begin to fall when they cannot control the rapid change of a community‟s “organization, 
behavior and daily routine”(quoted in El-Ghobashy, 2011). Yet, it remains problematic how 
masses mobilize and revolt against “strong” regimes. The Mubarak regime was considered as a 
strong authoritarian regime to a degree that caused Secretary of State Department, Hillary 
Clinton to say the following on January 25, 2011: “I believe that  the Egyptian government is 
stable and is looking for ways to respond to its people‟s aspirations” (my emphasis) 
(Mohammed, 2011). So, now the question is how to mobilize against a strong regime as an 
ethnopolitical group. Three important factors stand out: Copts‟ discovery of street politics, 
Mubarak‟s paralyzed response to violence, and the Church‟s unpreparedness. 
First, street politics in Egypt means confronting the police not because Mubarak regime was a 
police state but because the police had become the chief tool of the regime, as it administered a 
wide range of matters including birth certificates, dealing with crime and inter-communal 
tension. Further, to make the things more complicated  Mubarak regime employed “unknown” 
thugs as a tool of crashing opponents of the regime (Kandil, 2011).  The Egyptians achieved to 
link three sectors of social movements, workplace movements, street movements and 
professional syndicate movements as early as 2008 after having experienced police violence 
when they methodically restored common weal (El-Ghobashy, 2011). 
To reach that end, the Copts used two type of protests, the first being neighborhood protests and 
the second youth protests. First, neighborhood protests provided an advantage to the Copts as 
they started their protests in neighborhoods where they constituted the majority. In Cairo, this 
was usually district of Shubra al Khayma, home to 350,000 Copts, a poverty ridden 
neighborhood attracting Coptic migrants from Upper Egypt as there are many nearby factories 
and, Coptic Orthodox churches providing social service (Marshall, 2011). Starting the protest 
from this neighborhood gave the Copts the advantage of security and the opportunity of 
attracting more supporters as their numbers grew while they marched in the neighborhood. 
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Second, youth protests were usually led by university students or new graduates coming from 
Upper Egypt and unemployed Copts who actually started to challenge the Church about how to 
respond the regime since they were fed up with the ongoing relationship between the Church 
and the Mubarak regime (M.I., personal communication, March 12, 2012). 
This youth was raised by the Youth Bishopric, one of the most influential departments of the 
Church that provided an advanced level curricula, social activities and community service.This 
suggests that the Coptic youth actually experienced less coexistence with their Muslim fellows 
as they formed societies for Copts and socialized with Copts. EIPR‟s (2010) findings prove this 
fact as this study observes: 
 …a no less serious problem is the isolation of a large segment of Christian (Copt)  
 men, who are not integrated in society whether through schools, universities, clubs or 
 civic associations (p.25). 
While the above quote presents the results of the internal dynamics, one should also examine 
the broader context of the Egyptian youth that mobilized and was at the front of protests. 
Reading the youth as a social category in social movement debates, Asef Bayat (2009) argues 
that “youthfulness is likely to generate collective dissent”. In his examination of the Egyptian 
youth, Bayat finds that young people representing different social classes have little in 
common, and could not become a movement until late 2000s when they started to find some 
venues to come together and act collectively. Furthermore, rigged elections and desperation of 
change pushed the youth to create youth subcultures in their own socio-economic capacities. 
Reinterpretation of the surrounding world and finding new definitions to Islam have become 
the catalyzer of the change, passive revolution in words of Bayat, leading the Egyptian youth to 
mobilize collectively and discover sophisticated ways of protesting the regime (Bayat, 2009). 
The content of Coptic groups‟ protests emphasized the demand to abolish the restrictions on 
houses of worship, implementation of rule of law, religious freedom, equal political rights and 
an end to religious discrimination. For many Egyptians, the January 25 Revolution started after 
the Naga Hammadi incident on January 6, 2010 when a Muslim murdered six Copts and one 
Muslim because of a story circulated that these people raped a Muslim girl. The Copts flooded 
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to the streets to protest as they were aware if they do not do so, the state would cover the issue 
and nobody would be arrested. They continuously tried to keep this issue on the agenda of the 
society to put pressure on government and make it a “cause” for the Copts. A Coptic activist 
put it as follows: “Before Naga Hammadi we would pray, fast and ask Pope Shenouda to find a 
solution.  But after this incident and the Revolution, now we have the streets!”(B.F.T, personal 
communication, March 15, 2012) Being in the street means, the Copts know they have to pay 
the cost of their freedom and they are eager to do so. 
Second, the regime‟s paralyzed response and non-enforcement of the rule of the law 
contributed to Coptic mobilization. On January 1, 2011, parishes leaving the New Year‟s mass 
after the midnight from the Al-Qiddisin Church in Alexandria were shocked when a car bomb 
exploded in the middle of the night leaving 21 Copts dead and 79 others injured.  Copts rioted 
against the police, attacked government buildings, protested against the regime and  asked 
“revolution in Egypt, in all churches of Egypt” (BBC, 2011). This anger heightened as 
ministers paid a visit to Pope Shenouda and President Mubarak asked Egyptians to stand 
together be they Christian or Muslim as this case was an act of “foreign hands”. This was the 
usual practice and stance of the state apparatus: denial of inter-communal tension. Relying on 
police force without investigating who are the perpetrators of such attacks along with foreign 
hands discourse was not persuasive any more since these people wanted to change the status 
quo and such discourses were expired.  
Third, the Coptic Church was both caught unprepared to these protests and remained 
ambivalent towards Coptic protests until Pope Shenouda announced his support for Mubarak. 
Despite Pope Shenouda‟s condemnation of the Alexandria incident and demand for an 
investigation, his meeting with government officials caused clear fury among the Copts.  When 
Bishop Youanis thanked Mubarak for his condolences after the incident, Copts attending to the 
funeral whose numbers were reported to be between 5,000 and 10,000 chanted adamantly “No, 
No, No!” (AFP, 2011). This shows that the Church did not expect such a powerful civil society 
response to such attacks and was caught unprepared to these protests. Nevertheless, the Church 
also did not ask the Copts not to protest that could easily undermine its legitimacy and took an 
ambivalent stance. On the other hand, most Muslims offered their condolences including the 
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Ikhwan  and  served as human shields on January 7, 2011, the Coptic New Year Eve in the 
Coptic  churches (El-Rashidi, 2011).  The case was attributed to one of the Gaza Jihad Group 
and to al-Qaeda in Iraq as this group threatened the Christians of the Middle East recently, 
despite these groups‟ rejection of the attack (VOA, 2010).  
The regime‟s paralyzed response- blaming foreign powers-, and not taking action was enough 
reason for Copts to maintain and accelerate their protests against the regime. The Church had 
an ambivalent stance towards the protesters. On the one hand, it was reluctant to support the 
Coptic protesters who organized sit in protests and marched in neighborhoods not hesitating to 
clash with police. They managed to block the streets leaving the police ineffective and 
constituting an example for the future demonstrations. Yet, the Church did not discourage 
protesters to leave the streets until two days earlier than the January 25 Revolution when it 
became apparent the protests were absolutely getting out of control, and the Church feared not 
only  from excessive use of force by the government but also from an Islamist dominated 
political and societal realm
21
. Nonetheless, cooperation between the Copts and Muslims 
prevailed as some Muslim groups protected Coptic churches, and Coptic schools and hospitals 
around Tahrir Square allowed Muslims to perform ablution and pray. However, cooperation did 
not necessarily mean the Copts‟ grievances were addressed or they abandoned them for the 
sake of the revolution. Instead, they were well aware if the Mubarak regime was not toppled 
democracy, religious freedom, equality, political representation and socio-economic welfare 
could not be achieved.  The disobedient Copts did not listen to Pope Shenouda who ordered 
them to free the streets and revolution was realized on January 25, 2011 and Mubarak stepped 
down on February 14.   
Pope Shenouda‟s this order, however, backfired as the Copts did not listen to him and 
participated massively in the Revolution. It will not be wrong to say that the Church could not 
                                                 
21
 The friendship between Pope Shenouda and Mubarak could also be another reason of why the Church asked its parishes to 
go to their homes. Further, the Church was well aware who holds power in Egyptian politics and they knew removal of 
Mubarak did not necessarily mean the end of his regime. This point is important given the renewed entente between the 
SCAF and the Church. 
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adapt to the new means of politics led by youth and wanted to be party to the status quo. While 
it was rational for the Church given the power equilibrium in the Egyptian politics, for many 
Copts Pope Shenouda was a feloul, a remnant of Mubarak regime who did not understand the 
change in the Copts and could not fulfill their demands. According to Fox (2002) authoritarian 
leaders have more ability than democratic leaders to mobilize their followers. However, while 
Pope Shenouda was a strong leader and had to the ability to mobilize his followers to go to the 
streets, he did not so because of the abovementioned neo-millet system,his understanding of 
mobilization on theological grounds and his patriotism exemplified by his rejection of sending 
Copts to Jerusalem for pilgrimage in order to stand with his Muslim fellows in the Palestine 
case. Therefore, Pope Shenouda‟s role in mobilization process as a leader is more of preventive 
rather than being leading. 
4.3.3 The Revolution’s Influence on Coptic Mobilization 
When Mubarak stepped down, Egyptians were hopeful about their future as they were eager to 
elect new parliament members that would be responsible to undertake reform and address 
socio-economic and inter-communal issues. Copts were both hopeful and anxious as Muslim 
Brothers and Salafis that many believed to be threatening the Copts rose to political power. Yet, 
all Egyptians soon understood that revolution was a long marathon in which one had to 
confront the Supreme Council of Armed Forces, the 19 generals who have ruled Egypt since 
Mubarak‟s ouster. Below this study briefly discusses the influence of the revolution on Coptic 
mobilization in relation with the political rise of the Salafi trend, the Ikhwan and government 
responses.  It simply argues that the revolution influenced the Copts negatively; the police as 
the main security apparatus were paralyzed to respond to prevailing insecurity, some policemen 
were involved in inter-communal conflicts and lack of authority caused increasing violence 
against the Copts. However, this proved Gurr and Moore‟s mobilization supposition as the 
Copts mobilized further as they were aware of the opportunities the Revolution provided and in 
response to the treatment they had. 
Insecurity and lack of order triggered usual inter-communal conflicts serving both as an 
opportunity for Copts to mobilize and risking their coexistence with the Muslims as a 
community since their “communal” protests were perceived as provocative. Verbal support to 
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the Copts coming from western governments was perceived as interfering to Egyptian internal 
politics and in the broader Muslim vs. Christian context. In 2011, when a U.S. Congress 
commission wanted to investigate an inter-communal incident, even the famous intellectual 
Ala‟ al Aswany  criticized this effort as it was a foreign hand interfering in internal affairs of a 
Muslim majority country and provoking people (Aswany, 2011).  
Two significant cases occurred after the revolution that eased the establishment of 
ethnopolitical organizations challenging both the Church and the state; Camilia Shehata‟s 
conversion and the Maspero incident. The first case is almost the same case with that of Wafa‟ 
Constantine. Shehata, wife of Tadroos Saman, a Coptic priest in Minya, is believed to have 
disappeared after a dispute with her husband over family matters to some accounts and against 
her will to convert to Islam according to some other accounts. Despite the lack of information 
regarding her whereabouts, she was returned to the custody of the Church or to her family. On 
May 7, 2011 Shehata appeared on a TV program in the Coptic Al-Hayat TV claiming she never 
converted to Islam that led to mass protests next to St. Mark Church, the Headquarters of the 
Coptic Patriarchiate, of  the Salafi trend claiming the Church forcibly returned Shehata to 
Christianity (Bentelmassih, 2011). In response, the Coptic youth called for one million protest 
and announced they will protect the Coptic churches themselves (Khalil, 2011).  What do all 
these things tell us about the mobilization of the Copts?  
Three important reflections on the above story give insight about the changing nature of the 
Coptic mobilization. First, in contrast to Constantine case of 2004, the Church and the security 
apparatus did not discuss this issue publicly that means  institutions realigned themselves as 
insecurity prevailed and the prospects of Islamist movements taking power alarmed both the 
security apparatus and the Coptic Church. In the late 1990s, the regime believed that once the 
Islamist threat was co-opted or solved, there would be no Coptic problem (Ayalon, 1999). What 
had happened is that Mubarak was toppled leaving a strong state apparatus that have not 
wanted to share power with the political wings of the Salafi trend and the Ikhwan that won the 
2011 parliamentary elections. Cooperation between the Coptic Church and the SCAF was 
restored as there was a common threat and the Church knew very well it was the security 
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apparatus that would provide security but no other political actor. However, to what extent did 
this cooperation block Coptic mobilization or does it block? 
The second phenomenon is that conversion/reconversion issues have become great source of 
provocation and mass demonstration whereas in the past such issues were solved between the 
institutions. This phenomenon refers to the change in dealing with such issues and engagement 
of the Coptic activists though Shehata‟s conversion case was solved by the Church and the 
security apparatus. The Church‟s ambivalent stance to Coptic mobilization did not only stem 
from its timid will to support such movements but also because its legitimacy could be 
challenged and weakened if it precluded such movements. For instance, one of the founders of 
the Maspero Youth Union told me that the Pope told them in a meeting the in the St. Mark 
Cathedral that “Pope did not ask us to end the sit-ins and protests but he was fearful for us” 
(F.P., personal communication, February 28, 2012).  Further, this phenomenon reflected itself 
in symbolic power struggles as the Coptic groups knew they could not gather one million 
Copts, but wanted to show their growing muscles with the support of the bottom level Copts. 
Their mention of protecting their churches provided another opportunity to attract more Copts, 
as their Coptic Orthodox faith and its representatives were projected as threatened, and the state 
security might not be willing to provide security. 
Third, the economic liberalization helped the emergence of private Coptic media broadcasting 
programs on Christian way of life and publishing articles on inter-communal relations. Along 
with its assertion of Coptic identity and traditions, Coptic Al-Hayat TV‟s coverage of Shehata‟s 
story revealed how the Church covered this problem but also provoked the Salafi trend. 
Therefore, one can assume the coverage of inter-communal incidents contributed to Coptic 
groups‟ mobilization and questioning of the Church policies whereas Copts  have criticized 
Egyptian media‟s coverage of communal relations that kindles  the flames of  conflict, or 
“fitna” as it is used by Egyptian media (Elsasser, 2010). It would not be an exaggeration if one 
claims that inter-communal conflict may intensify in the foreseeable future if the media 
continues to broadcast and publish along communal lines.  
To say that the Egyptian state responded intensifying conflict and increasing violence on the 
Copts only through the security apparatus will be unfair. During Essam Sharaf‟s prime 
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ministry, from March to December 2011, an investigation commission called Early Warning 
and Conflict Prevention was established to prevent further conflicts, reconcile conflicting 
parties, and map the zones of conflict. However, despite its little power this commission 
revealed that security personnel played important roles in inter-communal conflicts that caused 
the institute to be blocked from further activity. However, the state apparatus was not alone in 
its stance as both Al-Azhar and the Coptic Orthodox Church rejected the “kanun al-„ibada al-
muahhad” draft law that aimed to manage sacred places construction with one rule applying to 
Muslim and Christian houses of worship (N. al-Ashwal, personal communication, March 27, 
2012).This reveals that there was little change after the revolution, if not any, in the 
understanding of the institutions‟ approach to inter-communal relations. These institutions have 
been part of the former regime and could not engender “new policies” to respond Coptic 
mobilization that show their reluctance to change. Nevertheless, in general, it would not be 
wrong to say that these institutions reconfigured their policies after the revolution. 
On October 9, 2011 Coptic youth organized a 10,000 person protest after an attack on a church 
that was under construction in Marinab of Aswan governorate on September 30. The Muslims 
claimed the church construction was illegitimate as it did not have a license and were backed by 
the governor of Aswan whereas the Church sources submitted a copy of their original license to 
the SCAF that did not take action. Not convinced and provoked by a speech of the local imam, 
a group of young Muslims attacked the church leaving the church and some Copts‟ houses 
destroyed, and some Copts injured. The Early Warning and Conflict Prevention Commission 
found that some security personnel were involved and the governor of Aswan made the parties 
reconcile without the enforcement of the rule of law (N. al-Ashwal, personal communication, 
March 27, 2012).  The involvement of the Governor of Aswan as mediator, who was party to 
the conflict, shows that the deal could only survive for a short period since learned observers 
know well that such sessions could only address the surface. 
The protesters gathered in front of the Egypt‟s state radio and TV building called Maspero and 
demanded the following: “immediate restoration of the church in al-Marinab; the Aswan 
governor‟s resignation; justice for those assaulted; compensation for Aswan Christians whose 
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property was damaged; and a quota for Copts in the parliamentary elections coming up in late 
November”(my emphasis) (Tadros, 2011a, p. 2) 
Picture 2 Copts protesting peacefully on October 9, 2011 just before they were harshly 
crashed (Source: From the private collection of K.S., available upon request from the 
author) 
 
Starting as a peaceful protest with more than a thousand of participants including some 
Muslims, the night ended with 23 dead Copts and more than 300 injured.  The SCAF showed 
its strong muscles not only to Copts but also to the entire revolutionary groups as many eye 
witnesses said there was no shooting or fight until some tanks approached the protesters and 
began shooting indiscriminately. The state TV asked help from Muslim citizens since the Copts 
were attacking the armed forces and killing soldiers at Maspero. Obviously, the media has 
become more than a weapon of the armed forces, as this call for Muslims means demonization 
of the Copts. The SCAF denied any responsibility and told reporters that Maspero was the work 
of “foreign hands and unknown thugs” denying any inter-communal and political problem. 
Pope Shenouda rejected an international investigation since it would threaten “national unity” 
(Jadalliyya, 2011). Yet, why so many Copts were killed and injured if they were protesting 
peacefully? What was the rationale behind the Maspero massacre? 
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Harff and Gurr‟s (2004) ethnopolitical mobilization conflict model surmises that massacres are 
sources of high-level mobilization since they intend to systematically destroy the existence of 
an ethnopolitical group. To say that the Maspero incident was a massacre would not be an 
exaggeration since peacefully protesting, innocent people were killed in a state sponsored 
attack. Why did the SCAF lead such an attack on Copts? From a vantage point of view, though 
not justifying such massive killings, there are at least three significant reasons that eased 
SCAF‟s use of violence. 
To begin with, prevailing insecurity and ongoing protests paralyzed the daily life of Egypt and 
left SCAF‟s rule ineffective. At the time, Egypt was reported to suffer from insecurity the 
number of tourists visiting Egypt being one of the main indicators of this fact. More than 10 
million tourists visited Egypt in 2011 whereas the number of tourists visited Egypt was 30 
percent higher in 2010 (Farouk, 2011). Further, respect for institutions such as the Police, the 
primary civilian security tool of the state, was at the minimum level because of this institution‟s 
corruptness and collaboration with Mubarak regime during the Revolution which led to 
anarchy, given the number of daily protests after the Revolution. To argue these protests, 
plagued Egypt and made people to complain about Revolution will not be wrong. 
Second, the security apparatus‟s unfriendly stance towards the Copts is well-known and can be 
counted as one of the reasons SCAF‟s handling this issue with hard power, to show Coptic 
folks that its‟ the ruler of the country and they cannot revolt. Despite the fact that SCAF did not 
mention religion at all and the attack was not sectarian but turned into after the state TV asked 
help from Muslims against the Copts. This shows religion was operationalized to intimidate the 
Copts, as the Muslim majority could easily be mobilized against the Copts. Nonetheless, the 
attack was also a response to the Coptic Church since a respected Coptic priest had publicly 
stated: “Tantawi knows well what we can do. We will show them a march that the country has 
never seen, ending inside Maspero” (Tadros, 2011a, p. 2). That shows the SCAF wanted to 
show the Church and to different voices in it that the SCAF is the ultimate power holder at the 
time. The message was clear, if the Church wants to maintain its power over the community 
and its respected place in the society, it had to understand whom should it negotiate. However, 
it also signals that the Church does not have a monolithic structure and accommodates priests 
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who support mobilization and action against the state and the majority Muslim community. A 
leader of the Maspero, for instance, cited two priests‟ names Father Philopather and Father 
Mattias, though just as priests but not representatives of the Church that means they provide 
legitimacy to the movement with their titles (F.P., personal communication, February 28, 
2012). 
Third, the SCAF‟s message did not only intend to target the Copts but also to show its will to 
maintain power by using force to threaten other revolutionaries and political forces, especially 
those who did not leave the streets after the Revolution and demanded full power transfer to 
civilians. Not surprisingly, no serious investigation was undertaken that leads one to argue if 
this case is not investigated and security apparatus was not held accountable; other local cases 
will not even be considered worth mentioning. 
Nevertheless, while the Salafi trend asked Tantawi to protect Islam and stated they will protect 
it in case of any failure, the Ikhwan argued that the Marinab case was exaggerated and 
criticized the Copts for their demands at Maspero since not only the Copts but all of the 
Egyptian society had similar grievances. Instead of denouncing violence used by the SCAF, 
threatening the Copts and blaming them for prioritizing their grievances can be interpreted as a 
result of their hostile stance towards the Copts. This is a significant catalyst that brought SCAF, 
the Salafi trend and the Ikhwan together under one umbrella: The Copts cannot revolt along 
communal lines and demand specific rights!  
This study highlights that beginning with the Maspero incident the Coptic groups publicly 
demanded “proportional political representation” marking a transformation in ethnopolitical 
mobilization as they added a new dimension to their discourse. This issue has become a 
contentious issue, as the Church rejected this idea and the formation of a Coptic political party 
to unite Christians on the grounds it would intensify sectarianism (Mayton, 2012). The political 
differences among the Church and the Maspero Youth emerged after Pope Shenouda‟s 
invitation of SCAF, Ikhwan, Al-Azhar and Salafi trend leaders to the Coptic Christmas Eve on 
January 7, 2012 in which the Pope was protested against in front of his guests and accused of 
hosting murderers of Copts. Yet, who is the Maspero Youth and how did they emerge as a 
distinct ethnopolitical movement? 
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The Maspero Youth was not established just after the Maspero massacre but started to organize 
like a youth club after the Naga Hammadi incident in 2010. Angry about the Church‟s and 
Mubarak‟s stance, they wanted to exchange ideas and organize in order to put an end to the 
community‟s sufferings. To reach that end, they did not distance themselves from the Church 
and had a religious discourse in the beginning until they realized that it was Mubarak whom 
they suffered most. This implies the entente between the Church and the regime and the 
movement became transformed into a more secular one in order to be “a parallel channel” to 
the Church and be the political representative of the Copts while being cautious not to criticize 
the Church on the religious grounds which could easily undermine their legitimacy. 
Nevertheless, they did not hesitate to challenge the Church on political grounds especially after 
spectacular incidents. According to one of Maspero‟s founders, violent attacks accelerated the 
organization of the movement, as these people lost their relatives and friends in such attacks 
(B.F.T., personal communication, March 15, 2012). Despite many problems that Maspero 
experienced since its inception, the group opened branches in Alexandria, Assiut, Ismailia, and 
Fayoum where they set investigation and early warning committees that interfere in cases of 
conflict on the grounds to protect the rights of the Copts and organize protests. Despite the 
number of their supporters which is claimed to be between 8,000 and 10,000, the movement is 
still very young and should attract more people to be the representative of the Copts. 
Nevertheless, the death of Pope Shenouda in March 2012 caused Copts to feel more vulnerable, 
as he was the undisputed leader of the Copts and it would take  five months to elect a new Pope 
that meant the Copts will not have a religious leader during the presidential elections in May 
and June that will determine the future of the country
22
.  
 
                                                 
22
 At the time of writing, Mohamed Morsy of Freedom and Justice Party, the official political wing of the Ikhwan was elected 
as the new president of Egypt. However, the Copts supported Ahmad Shafik who was the last prime minister of Mubarak as 
they had to choose between these two candidates. Nevertheless, there is convincing evidence that the Church leadership 
tacitly supported Shafik and asked Coptic parishes to do so. This suggests that the entente is renewed against an Islamist 
threat (Gokpinar, 2012). 
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4.4 Conclusion 
This study finds that during 2005-2010 period the Copts protested after the “sacred” places 
were targeted and when Copts were killed that refer to a problem of existence and insecurity. In 
general, the Coptic mobilization fits well into Harff and Gurr and Fox‟s models.  However, 
neither Harff and Gurr (2004) nor Fox (2003) differentiate between those mobilizing 
ethnopolitical groups in terms of age and socio-economic classes unless factions have conflicts 
with each other that weaken mobilization. A significant finding of this study is that Coptic 
mobilization is led by Coptic youth that experienced unemployment, poverty, migration, lost 
their relatives in attacks against the Copts and lost faith in Mubarak regime not only Copts but 
also as Egyptians. Therefore, the Coptic mobilization cannot be discussed apart from the 
broader Egyptian mobilization that has had significant diffusion influence on Copts. To Harff 
and Gurr (2004) ethnopolitical groups take examples from the outside world, whereas the 
Coptic case shows Coptic movements are not only influenced by internal movements like 
Kefaya and 6 October movements but also cooperated with them. 
Despite Coptic mobilization‟s general fit in Fox‟s ethnoreligious model, Fox‟s attempts to 
explain low level of mobilization with religious elites‟ and institutions‟ interests may not be 
sound, as religious peaceful mobilization does not necessarily mean protesting in the streets. 
This flaw is a result of the ethnoreligious model‟s structure that depends on “likelihood” rather 
than clear “casual” relationships. Further, Fox takes religion as the primary unit of analysis but 
the Coptic mobilization shows that other variables like nationalism, cooperation against a 
common problem and thousands of years of coexistence play significant roles in (im) 
mobilization, in other words, low level of mobilization. Yet, why do some people protest in the 
streets and mobilize actively whereas some others pray and fast in churches? 
Protesting after so called sectarian incidents provided legitimacy to Coptic groups as the 
Church was seen the sole authority on Coptic matters.  Further, despite the Church‟s 
deteriorating entente with the Mubarak regime and its influence on Coptic mobilization, the 
Church took a more ambivalent approach towards Coptic mobilization after 2007. This 
suggests, in contrast to Fox‟s arguments, religious institutions do not necessarily either 
facilitate or block mobilization. Constructing their role as a dichotomy prevents one seeing 
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religious institutions‟ interactions with regimes and their parishes. Also, this study could not 
find any data if the Coptic Orthodox Church allowed Coptic ethnopolitical movements to use 
its services as a means to mobilize Copts. Last but not least, this study finds that the Coptic 
diaspora groups, economic liberalization and façade reforms, and growing semi-independent 
Egyptian and Egyptian-Coptic media have had significant influence on mobilization as 
independent variables during this period.   
In the second period of the mobilization this study finds that Coptic mobilization has increased 
in parallel with the  escalating violence and increasing level of  violence that is not only  a 
result of lack of order and insecurity but also because of surfacing hostility towards the Copts. 
Provocation played a significant role, confirming Fox‟s (2002) assumptions, during this period 
since players from both sides threatened each other and struggled for opportunities in the new 
political landscape. However, the security apparatus sponsored massacre was the peak point of 
the Coptic mobilization since many rejected the Church‟s approaches and joined the Maspero 
Youth. While this phenomenon confirms Harff and Gurr‟s (2004) proposition that times of 
upheaval may provide further opportunities for mobilization, this study supplements it with the 
risks the Copts confronted. Official emergence and rise of ethnopolitical groups that use 
nonviolent and peaceful mobilization strategies provided an alternative channel for Copts and 
has challenged the Coptic Church because of its renewed entente with the state institutions. Yet, 
this may cause dissension within the Copts in the long run if the newly elected Pope cannot 
fulfill the charisma and authority of late Pope Shenouda.  
Further, Coptic mobilization cannot be discussed without the broader Egyptian society‟s 
mobilization. In this mobilization period, this study observes both cooperation and conflict 
between the Copts and the Muslims but argues that conflict increased as insecurity prevailed. 
Yet, one should also consider that Copts have been aware of the opportunities the revolution 
brought and wanted to fight for their future. In the same vein, it is striking that the Copts‟ 
discourse began to change as ethnopolitical movements stressed polity related issues. The 
Coptic ethnopolitical movements‟ debate on proportional political representation and formation 
of a Coptic political party marks the birth of a politically active and mobilized actor. In a 
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nutshell, the Revolution‟s impact on the Copts has been negative in the short run but has 
positively influenced Coptic mobilization. 
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Chapter 5  Conclusion 
What is to be drawn from the above discussion? How does the Coptic mobilization fit into 
Harff and Gurr‟s (2004) and Fox‟s (2003) models?  To what extent, does the Coptic 
mobilization contrast with these two models?   The conclusions of this study can be collected 
under two headings; results supporting or contradicting Harff and Gurr‟s ethnopolitical and 
Fox‟s ethnoreligious conflict frameworks.  
First, the Coptic mobilization between 2005-2012, generally, fits well into Harff and Gurr‟s 
(2004) and Fox‟s (2003) ethnopolitical and ethnoreligious models. While this study finds that 
the degree of group discrimination, strength of group identity, and degree of ethnic group 
cohesion to be high, external support for Copts does not go beyond verbal support or 
investigation of some violent incidents, and the severity of governmental violence is low with 
the exception of the Maspero massacre in October 2011.  This study employed a type of 
political environment termed “competitive authoritarian regime” and found the façade reforms 
and economic liberalization program actually resulted in significant developments such as the 
establishment of new Coptic and Muslim media networks. While there is no statistical data to 
measure the influence of these outlets on ordinary Egyptians, this study finds good qualitative 
evidence to believe that such media outlets facilitated Coptic mobilization. This study finds the 
role of the international status of the regime in the mobilization process is medium since Egypt 
does not enjoy extensive natural resources however it does receive annual military aid as part of 
the Camp David Peace Accords.  
Fox‟s theory addresses most of the factors in the Coptic mobilization as it encompasses a wide 
range of subjects. From a vantage point, Fox‟s (2002) argument that religious grievances cause 
mobilization is sound with regards to the Coptic mobilization. However, this begs the question 
why the Copts did not mobilize in the 1990s but only after 2005. This study shows that while 
religion is a significant part of Coptic mobilization and provides legitimacy for Coptic protests, 
the context is a key variable that shows religious mobilization may not be as powerful as Fox 
predicted if other factors are not present. Further, in parallel with Fox‟s (2002) proposition, the 
Coptic mobilization was peaceful and used nonviolent strategies. This study finds that the 
Copts both reacted to religious discrimination and demanded religious rights between 2005 and 
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2012 at a medium level, but this level remarkably increased from 2011 to 2012.  Also, Fox 
(2002) argues religious institutions facilitate mobilization unless the institutions‟ and elites‟ 
interests are at stake.  However, in contrast to Fox‟s propositions this study finds the Coptic 
Orthodox Church took an ambivalent stance towards the Coptic mobilization but found it 
strategic to renew its relationship with the SCAF as an uncertain future  with the Ikhwan‟s and 
the Salafi trend‟s success to enter the Egyptian Parliament and the death of Pope Shenouda.  
Further, the Church‟s resources were not used to functionalize as a means of mobilizing the 
group that leads one to question if the Church is more reluctant to mobilize. While one might 
argue religious institutions do not necessarily facilitate mobilization and devote resource for 
this purpose, one should examine the religious leadership‟s role in the mobilization process. In 
contrast to Harff and Gurr‟s (2004) and Fox‟s (2002) suggestion that authoritarian leaders 
usually mobilize their groups more than democratic leaders is not valid in this case, as Pope 
Shenouda opted for the renewal of the entente, and preferred a peaceful mobilization as he 
considered being in the street meant accelerating inter-communal conflict.  
In this regard, the emergence of the Coptic ethnopolitical movements should not be understood 
only as a result of discrimination and increasing violence but also because of their desperation 
for change within the Church and the State. Research findings show that the Maspero Youth 
showed discontent against the Church leadership and its policies especially after the Revolution 
and did not hesitate to protest against Pope Shenouda, who occupied the Church leadership for 
more than thirty years, publicly in some instances. This shows that the Church is not the sole 
ruler of the community anymore; the Copts have become independent actors pursuing street 
politics.   
While Coptic ethnopolitical movements operationalized religion to protest against the Egyptian 
government as Fox (2002) predicted, this study‟s findings suggest that these movements 
demanded not only religious freedom and equal rights but also asked for political rights and 
proportional representation of the Copts in the Parliament. Whereas one expects Coptic 
mobilization to be based on religion and the demand for religious rights or ease of church 
construction, discourses related to political representation beg the question if religious 
grievances are enough of a reason to mobilize.  
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What other factors contributed to Coptic mobilization? Why did not the Copts mobilize in 
1990s or 2000s but now? Is this mobilization only a context-based one? The neo-millet system 
provided flexibility to both communities and the entente between the state and the Church was 
one of the main drawbacks to Coptic mobilization. Changing dynamics in the entente between 
power centers converged with deteriorating socio-economic dynamics in a boiling society that 
facilitated mobilization. This study finds four additional reasons that help us to understand the 
reasons behind the mobilization; differentiation among the Copts, geographical differences and 
concentration of power, structural changes in Mubarak regime and their reflections, and 
diffusion effect of other social movements and diaspora groups and the changes.  
First, some findings of this study cannot be discussed within the framework of Harff and Gurr‟s 
(2004) and Fox‟s (2002) models since these findings are not coded as variables in these models. 
One of the major findings of this study is that the “differentiation” between the rich people and 
middle and lower classes in terms of discrimination and mobilization. This study‟s empirical 
findings suggest that the Coptic social classes experienced discrimination at different levels, the 
middle and low classes feeling the most state repression as they engaged with the state 
apparatus and Muslim Egyptians in their daily lives more than upper classes. As stated above, 
poor Coptic neighborhoods that are home to Coptic migrants became key points for starting 
Coptic protests as ethnopolitical movements attracted more participants from these parts of the 
different cities.   
Second, it is important to note, as EIPR (2010) indicated, most of the violent incidents occurred 
in Upper Egypt whereas the protests usually took place in the two big Egyptian cities, Cairo 
and Alexandria. The rationale behind this phenomenon is twofold. First, despite the fact that 
Copts live mostly in Upper Egypt, the Headquarters of the Coptic Orthodox Church is in Cairo 
and Coptic migrants in the capital city are active in seeking their rights as they can attract more 
media and political attention. Second, traditional reconciliation commissions are set up in 
Upper Egypt where the Egyptian state rules lightly and the rule of tribal leaders is valid. 
Therefore, regional differences, which are not mentioned in Harff and Gurr‟s (2004) model, 
matter not only because of different socio-economic settings and traditional establishments but 
also because of the central authority‟s power concentration and efficiency. 
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Third, Harff and Gurr‟s (2004) framework does not differentiate between state actors but 
analyzes the state as if the state is a monolithic structure pursuing a certain agenda as a whole. 
This study finds that monolithic dispersion of power is not at stake as different key veto actors, 
like the Ministry of Interior, wanted to be a player in Church-regime entente in the last few 
years. Further, after the January 25 Revolution, the Church renewed its entente with the 
transitional ruler of the country, SCAF, that shows us how the veto players operate on different 
levels and state repression may be intrinsic to different state institutions. The overthrow of 
Mubarak did not necessarily mean the regime was defeated. Therefore, this study emphasizes 
that Harff and Gurr‟s (2004) study remains weak in explaining the state apparatus‟s behaviors 
as it considers the state as a monolithic structure. Moreover, the economic liberalization policy 
of Mubarak regime resulted in opening of new media outlets that published and broadcasted 
along communal lines by antagonizing the other. This fact is significant in the transformation of 
the conflict and the role of media and other technological developments are not discussed 
neither in Harff and Gurr‟s nor Fox‟s model. To think that such economic liberalization 
attempts are façade is flawed as such reforms had authentic impacts on Egyptian society. 
Last but not least, Harff and Gurr‟s (2004) framework emphasizes that ethnopolitical 
movements can learn from other movements abroad. In this case, Coptic ethnopolitical 
movements did not take any model as an example and Coptic mobilization cannot be discussed 
without considering the greater Egyptian mobilization. As this study stressed in earlier chapters, 
until lately, the Copts joined protests against Mubarak with the Kefaya and protested as Copts 
only after the Revolution and where they had strongholds like Shubra. The Kefaya‟s diffusion 
impact is significant as the Copts learned sophisticated ways of gathering and protesting from 
this movement. The Maspero, the biggest Coptic protest and the bloodiest one, was a watershed 
not only because it showed the ruler of the country, SCAF, would not allow the Copts to protest 
as a distinct group but also resulted in formation of well-structured Coptic ethnopolitical 
movement. 
What is the future of Coptic ethnopolitical mobilization? Is there any sign showing further 
escalation or decrease in mobilization level? The painful transitional period in Egypt and the 
election of a new Pope will determine the future of the mobilization. If the Egyptians achieve to 
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write a new and democratic constitution that satisfies the demands of the Copts, there is no 
reason to believe mobilization will increase. However, the SCAF and the Church seem to be 
pursuing traditional diplomacy politics that may provide another opportunity for the Maspero 
Youth to challenge both of them. Nevertheless, the Ikhwan‟s rise to political power caused fear 
among the Copts that might block mobilization and help institutions to renew the entente on the 
basis of the necessities of the day. 
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Appendix 
List of Coptic Interviewees 
  
Name 
(Abbreviation) 
Age Sex 
Educational 
Level 
Occupation I. Date 
1 M.I. 28 Female High School Unemployed 3/12/2012 
2 B.F.T 29 Male University Student 3/15/2012 
3 A.B. 25 Male University NGO worker 3/10/2012 
4 D.M.  29 Female University Senior Adm. 3/5/2012 
5 M.A. 43 Female University Public Officer 3/11/2012 
6 F.P. 35 Male University Veterinary 2/28/2012 
7 I.Z. 20 Female High School Student 3/2/2012 
8 N.H.W 33 Female University Grad. Student 3/17/2012 
9 A.B.G.S 45 Male Primary School Unemployed 3/5/2012 
10 M.P.M 51 Male Primary School Unemployed 3/9/2012 
11 R.R.G 65 Female Primary School Housewife 2/26/2012 
12 Bishop A. 61 Male High School Bishop 2/23/2012 
13 R.R.R 39 Male High School Shop Owner 3/18/2012 
14 B.R. 28 Male University Engineer 2/15/2012 
15 M.D. 52 Female University Administr. Ass. 2/27/2012 
16 
K.S. 
36 Male University 
Digital Media 
Expert 
3/25/2012 
17 R.W. 45 Female High School Unemployed 3/14/2012 
18 B.G. 28 Male High School Accounter 3/12/2012 
19 M.W. 43 Female Primary School Housewife 3/3/2012 
20 M.S. 58 Male Primary School Unemployed 2/19/2012 
21 B.G.B. 36 Female High School Employee 2/21/2012 
22 M.R. 27 Female University Unemployed 2/25/2012 
23 C.S. 38 Female High School Employee 2/26/2012 
24 H.B. 48 Male Primary School Employee 2/19/2012 
List of Interviewed Experts 
 
 
 
1 E. Iskander LSE (PhD) 3/25/2012 
2 
Ishak 
Assaad 
EIPR 3/26/2012 
3 
N. al-
Ashwal 
Cairo Uni.( PhD Candidate) 3/27/2012 
4 
Amal 
Hamada 
Cairo Uni.(PhD) 3/19/2012 
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